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No. 70-73

Moore v. California

Argued 1/19/72

This is an appeal from a conviction, after jury trial, in a
California state court of violating Section 311.2 of the California Penal
Code which prohibits the mailing of obscene matter.
The case was tried under Roth principles, with the jury being
instructed in accordance with Roth standards.

(Seep. 3 of my Bench memo).

The appellant assigns as error (i) failure to apply national rather
than local standards, (ii) the state statute imposes an unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce; and (iii) that petitioner's conviction was unconstitutional because the material was not obscene as a matter of constitutional
fact.

(This last point means, as I understand it, that this Court must make

the decision as to obscenity rather than leave this to the jury).
At the oral argument, counsel for the appellant (Mr. Marks)
virtually abandoned his specific assignments of error.

He made a plea that

the entire law of obscenity be clarified and rewritten.
My tentative views, subject to Conference:
I would affirm the judgment below as being a valid application
of Roth, with the jury applying Roth standards.
But if the Court wishes an opportunity to reexamine the entire
range of obscenity cases, and endeavor to prescribe new standards (based,
possibly, on protecting the interest of junveniles and unwilling adults),
this case affords such an opportunity.

BENCH IY'EmO
No, 70-73 OT 1971
Miller v. California
Appeal from App. Dept of Superior Ct, Calif
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1)

In determining whether particular material is "obscene, ..

should State courts look to national or local standards to determine whether the material is "patently offensive" to contemporary community standards?
(2)

If a local standard is employed, does the California

statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material vialate the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, i,e,, does
the state law impose an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce?
(3)

Is the State law invalid because the federal interstate

mailing of obscene material statute prefempts
the field and is,
..._,
RELEVANT CASES:

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 1957 ; Memoirs
v • 1\'1 a s sac h use t t s , 3 83 U• S • 413 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; Jacobe 11 i s]!.
Ohio, 378 u.s. 184 (1964); Redrup v. New York, 386
u.s. 767,

(4)

Was Petr's conviction unconstitutional because the

material was not obscene as a matter of constitutional fact?
(Petr's other claims do not deserve mention,)

I I.

FACTS
Petr was tried by a jury in a California TC and was con-

victed of violating Section 311,2 of the Calif Penal Code--

'"

causing
to be mailed\.\ obscene matter, Proof at trial indicated
......._
that Petr had mailed 5 brochures containing advertising for

-- -------

several books and a movie,

State points out,

11

The advertisements depict, as the

cunnilingus, sodomy, buggery and other similar

acts performed in groups of two or more,"

The pertinent material

is available for your perusal if you should find it helpful.
At trial the State introduced the testimony of a Sergeant
on the Los Angeles Vice Squad,

He had conducted an informal

______________________

....
statewide survey and was allowed to testify that the....___________
materials
__,_

involved here were offensive to California community standards
...

of decency.

Other witnesses testified as to whether the material

had redeeming social value1 a

..'
_;.,..! . r~~
~-n
'~~
~

-

JZrofessor_~{ &.n~Jj-sh

-

and

a~ychiat-

- .....
b~ ~he St.at;,:. testified tha~-=~~a_t__:::_~a,~~~~s _w2:!h~~t

redeeming social value; another professor J of
material did -have - ;edeeming social value.

Petr~stated
-J

that the

On the bas is of this

evidence the jury convicted Petr and his conviction was aff'd
by the App Dept without opinion.

III.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

(Rather than outlining the parties' arguments separately, I will
treat each party's responses on each of the issues as a unit.)
(1)

Question if: 1
Petr is challenging the standard used by the TC to determine

'··

-~

whether the material in question is patently offensive to
contemporary standards.

d

The stanard used by the State is reflected

in the testimony of the Resp's expert witness who discussed the
California view on the matter.

In order fully to understand the

_'~ laim here it is first important to set out the form presently

~_

being followed in obscenity cases.

~ ments

According to recent pronounce-

by this Court, obscenity is not protected speech and may be

~~jcohibited

by the State.

The

f:u~as be~;refore, ~-

~l~f~ning what is obscene and then applying that standard.

The

~~~
· yVr st~rd appar~y accepted at present by most lower courts is
?
the Roth-Memoirs (see cites in "relevant Cases"). Under that

~
#"
i1
~~~ approach three factors must coalesce before material may be deemed
,.~
-.;'

onscene 1

"the
~minant

(1)

theme of the material .. taken as a
H
\
who
ppeals to a prurient interest in sex;
"the material is patently offensive because it
~ffronts contemporary community standards relating
to the description or representation of sexual
matters; ._...
and
"the matterial is utterly without redeeming social
. value."
•f

~

(2)
1,..

~·Wii"ST

__.

•-. ~· loio.·,.r·

--

(3)

Under this standard, even if the book is found to appeal to the
prurient interest and to offend community standards,it may not
be suppressed unless it is utterly without redeeming social value.
Presently, the jury is instructed that it is to consider whether /
. 1 .

t h e materLa

.

.

.

Ln questLon Ln any gLven case meets these three

t ~-~~

~

______

~
Aleo . o f course.. this CourtA has taken the

approach of re-evaluating the material as a matter

6

of determinifl~

\'\

Constitutional ... fact since the determination is one which resolves
the question whether the First Amendment applies.

-

Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
W

wr

767 practice.

This is the

Under it, each Jus-

tice has been evaluating material to determine whether it meets

. •

~~

requirements--if it does the matterial may be suppressed and conr victions based thereon.

~

his own standards of obscenity (caveat: the three part Roth-Memoirs
Memoirs-~among

standard commanded 5 votes in Roth and only 3 in

those Brennan is the only one still on the Court; Stewart uses· a
test of "hard-core pornography" , see Jacobellis v. Ohio , supra;
Douglas firmly believes , as did Justice Black , that all written
material , movies , etc are entitled to First Amendment protection;
Harlan believed that different standards should apply depending
on whether the case came from a state or a federal court, see
his opinion in Roth; other Jusltices apply other tests , I
believe, for instance , that Marshall has followed Brennan).
At any rate, the question presented on this leg of the case

----- -

conside~erely

is whether the jury . should

local standards of

community decency or~
whether a national standard is applicable.
The parties point out that this Court has addressed itself to that
issue without definitive result in Jacobellis v. Ohio , supra. The
opinion for the Court was written by Brennan with whom Goldberg
joined (White joining only in the result).

Here Brennan clearly

~

~4.,.-..,..

Na..~~

states that national standards must ~ern, 378 U.S. at 192 .. 95 . .,,..,_~
The reasoning proceeds from the premise that the First Amendment
applies to the States and that the test for obscenity is a federal
test.

The opinion also points out that

"communit ~~ vary

in many

-

respects" and that those differences should not allow of a different
constitutional result.
~

...~-- _..

In that same case CJ Warren and Clark
.,

5

-----..

stated that they would commit the resolution of these factual
questions to the trial court with this Court exercising a much
narrower area of review.

----------

They further concluded that the standard

must be a local rather · than a national standard.

Justice Harlan ,

after noting t:t:;;a his view that the First Amendment does not apply
with the same vigor to the states as it does to the federal government , and after acknowledging that his view had been rejected by a

majority of the Court, stated that he would apply a test of "rationality" to the States.

"I would not prohibit them from banning

any material which, taken as a whole, has been reasonably found
in state judicial proceedings to treat sex in a fundamentally
offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for judging
such material."

379 lJ.S. at 204.

Petr argues that Brennan's view must prevail.

The State

~

argues that the local test should control but goes on to assert ~~

.parts ~~

that local standards are relevant only for the first two
of the three-part test and that this Court should apply

national ~~ ~;

standards in determining whether material is utterly without
redeeming social value.
It is very difficult to pinpoint the problem in this case.
Primarily this case must require you and Justice Rehnquist to

-·------~--------~----~------------------------------If you reject

decide where you stand on the obscenity question.

the Roth-Memoirs test it makes little difference whether the
community standard is local or national.

If you adopt Harlan 's

position, the local view will obviously prevail.

This case is

essentially a blank check, not only for you but for the entire
Court.

All the Justuces are aware that the area is in serious

need of reevaluation and that no standard is presently accepted
by a majority of five.

As part of this re-evaluation, you will

-

also need to decide whether you accept Justice Brennan 's assertion
............

stated most strongly in Jacobellis that it is the function of this
II

,\

Court to make independent findings of constituional fact.

Or,

should those determinations be made exclusively by the state courts?
Obviously, this case confronts you with precisely the same
quality of "incorporation" problems you are presently considering
in the less-than-unanimous-jury-verdict cases.

When we have more

t~me, I would appreciate the opportunity to write at length my

1

v~ews

1

on the question of incorporation and, more particularly, my

views on the proper treatment of the obscenity problem.

Time does

not permit such consideration at this time.

I can only suggest
a
that you postpone judgment and await the views of your coliegues

on this question.

(2)

Question # 2
The second question is tied to the first.

Does the use of

local standards in judging obscenity--especially in cases of
distribution--constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce thereby cinstituting a violation of the Commerce Clause
~t!d
of the Constitution? The argument offered by Petr ~ that ~f~er-

1

ing standards in the various States imp

"s the free flow of

e. ,.
m~:te c~~~e:ce.

~

analogizeJto the cases,

like Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, in which the
?11

regulations of one state (here dealing with the type of )}ud flap
to be used on interstate trucks) would be so out of line with those
in other states as to interfere unreasonably with the flow of
commerce bet,veen the States.

In Bibb the laws of Illinois required

truckers to stop at the border and change
rubber to steel.

th~

mud flaps from

The Court said that it was essential in such case

to balance the interest of the State in passing the legislation,
or promulgating the rule, against the

~nterest

in free commerce.

Petr seeks, sub silJentio, to rephrase the balancing question to
make in one of balancing the interest of the State against the
interest of the individual to exercise First Amendment rights.
Resp points out the missed focus of Petr' s argument--the federal
government's concern with obscenity is not under the

-

____________________

....,
~
....
..,
clause
but
unde~
the First
Amendment.

commerc~

This is a subsidiary Lssue

at any rate and will doubtless drop out of the case before its
resolution here.

1

Question :/1 3
Petr also complains that the State law , insofar as it prohibits the mailing of obscene material , conflicts with the federal
regulation of the mail and is therefore pre-empted.

l

The Court

in Roth squarely held that no federal pre-emption problem existed .

I

The Court there pointed out that pre-emption arises only when there
is a direct interference with the federal mail system.

The federal

---

postal laws do not
eliminate the power of the state to regulate
,....._....._..---...,_
~

the mailing of obscene advertisements .

Question :/1

378 U.S. at 493-94.

L~

Finally 9 Petr contends that the materials in this case are
4 ~
~
not obscene as a maiter of Constitutional fact . On the strength
of Redrup he makes the argument that this material is no more
offensive than material held not obscene in other cases which have
been summarily reversed in recent years under Redrup .
believe this issue is really still in the case.

I do not

I do not

anticipate that the Court would use the Redrup standard to dispose of a case which has been granted and set for argument.

This

case will doubtless call for the setting out of basiu views on
obscenity and will not lend itself to summary treatment (unless
the Court shouMd conclude that it is , for some reason , not prepared
to tackle the difficult Constitutional issues presented.).

IV .

DISCUSSION
I have attempted to scotch the arguments which are without

serious merit--I believe

the first question deserves

serious consideration by the Court .

And , the question of local-

-------------------~---------national
standards is really subsidiary to your determination of
where you stand on the much more basic questions ofltncorporation

an~finition

of obscenity .

I will be glad to do whatever additional

research

w~ll

be of assistance in that regard.

LAH

'
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5/21/72--LAH
Re:

Hiller v. California

Judges
Attached is the proposed memorandum of an opinion by the
CJ in this obscenity case--this is the case raising the question
whether local or national standards of community values are
to be applied in resolving questions under the First Amendment.

I have read the opinion only once and will need to

reread it with great care several times before I begin to
discuss the matter with you.

It is a mind"full.

You have a luxury in this area .

Other Justices , who have

long dealt with this most difficult conceptual area , will
bear the burden of immediate response.

We would be wise and

safe to await the views of your other colleagues- ... this

-

opinion will most surely s tir a diversity of

vi~ws.

The the s,is of the opinion is that local community
standards of patent offensiveness in the description of sexual
material govern.

Local standards are to be determined by

the jury applying the "reasonable man" standard and
ascertaining whether the material is offensive to the "average"
man in the locale .

The jury ~ be assisted by testimony

from obscenity experts but need not be .

It is entirely

permissible for jurors to make the judgment on the basis of
their personal views of acceptability.

This Court , and other

appellate courts , retain some review function but it is

--------------

unclear--probably intentionally--what test
use .

-

~

t~--~

to
--------~

Since no evidence is required it cannot be the

s tandard sufficiency of the evidence test .

My guess is that

the test will be whether a conviction for distribution of a
paeticular

item is sufficiently shocking to 5 men on the Court.

--2- ...

-

The opinion does other significant things: (1) it
embraces Roth; (2) in draws a cloudy distinction between
"public" dessimination and private use, but it does so
without citing

Stanley v. Georgia; (3) he eschews, appar-

ently, any interest analysis approach, staing at page 11
that the justification. for regulation is "the offense it
·.~

gives to the people living in the community."

1

~ ~~

~~ ~·

~ ~
~~

Innumerable questions jump out of these pages.

a reasonable man standard be applied in a criminal prosecution
where gfuilt must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt•·
can a jury be really instructed that they must find the

~" " " " 0aterial
-RP~

IJ;

~n

l.reasonably offensive to the average man beyond a

reasonable doubt?

Has the opinion turned the First

Amendment into a majoritarian pronouncement--i.e. material
is obscene andp therefore, outside the protections of the
First Amendment if it is unacceptable to the majority of the
reasonable and average people in the community?

Roth re-

viewed and rejected a vagueness argument in this area: is
it not fair now to re-examine that consideration?

Can we

say with any candor that persons can know with reasonable
certainty what conduct is impermissible?
outlined here provide any degree of
material is prohibited?

notic~

Does the test
that certain

If one of the considerations is

an interest in getting the courts of this country out of
tqe business of handling obscenity cases, this case will prove
failure.

The only judicial tribunal which will

benefit in any subsnantial degree will be this one.

You

would be free simply to deny cert in every case on the ground
that 12 jurors found thatp applying the community standards

--3--

of whatever locale is concerned, found it offensive to
the tastes (see p. 14) of the average reasonable man
there.

What of the federal district courts and the state

trial courts?

I doubt that many state judges would suppose

that this decisiion will lighten their dockets.
The next several weeks will provide you and me with
many opportunities to consider the content of the First

Amendmen~~ealy
~chool picketing

James~e ncwsmens
cases, an~scenity).

v.

9

privilegep the
Maybe through

all this, despite the formidable and apparently insuperable
time obstaales, we can begin to arrive at some cohesive view
of that critical Amendment.

UH

5/22/72--LAH
Re: Obscenity cases
Judges
Attached you will find the following: (1) memo from
Justice Brennan; (2) memo from Justice Stewart; (3) first
circulation of Justice Douglas' opinion in Miller v. California;
200~ft

(4) recirculation of Justice Douglas' opinion in 12
reels.

The exchange of memos between Justices Brennan and

Stewart indicates that Justice Brennan is now prepared to
execute Roth and to recognize that obscenity cannot be
treated as sui generis under the First Amendment.

He

appears to lean toward the interest analysis approach
which we have frequently discussed.
indicates encouragement.

Justice Stewart

Justice Douglas isp of course, already

on paper as opposing Roth; Justice Marshall, if he maintains
he dedication to Stanley v. Georgia, may also disavow the
ill-starred Roth precedent.
This is obvoiusly quite an important development.

While

our private discussions and your statement at lunch today
indicate that you are leaning away from the approach
suggested by Justice Brennan, I think you will want to give
his views the closest consideration.

Your vote will be

most likely a decisive factor (as seems to be the case with
incredible frequency lately).

In view of the significance

of these developments, I would suggest that it may prove
advisable for this Chambers to adopt a more collegial
approach to the obscenity cases.

All of us have had a number

of cases in this area so no one can claim a peculiar expertise.

Fresh analysis, when Brennan's opinion circulates,

may prove of value.

Assuming nothing comes around for a

--2--

couple of weeks, one or all of the other clerks might
have more time available to devoue to these cases.
At any rate, I see nothing to be done at present.

LAH

'r

~ r~·nnan

.
'

r

I'~

t

Jp .

No. 70-73
Marvin Miller, Appellant,

v.
State of California.

On Appeal from the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California,
County of Orange.

[March -, 1972]
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting.
We judges who work at the appellate level have an
understandable tendency to write essay-like opinions that
announce general constitutional principles, but often arc
far removed from the gritty facts of the case.
Today we send a man to prison for distributing brochures which advertised books and a movie. A basic
premise of criminal law under our Constitution is that
it must give fair warning. I submit that the law of
obscenity as defined by legislatures and by courts is so
~as not to give fair warning. Some make it a crime
to self a book which deals with sex "in a manner appealing to prurient interests." 1 Some define obscenity as
literature which is "patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary standards." 2 Others make a book obscene when it is "utterly without redeeming social imRoth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 487.
California defines "obscene matter" as "matter, taken as a whole,
the predominant appeal of which to tho average person, applying
contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or
morbid intem;t in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which
taken as a whole goes ::;ubstantially beyond customary limi ts of candor
in description or representation of ::;uch mal tors; and is mat1 er
which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance." Calif. Penal Code § 311 (a).
2
I d., 489.
1
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l\liLLER v. CALIFORNIA

portanco." :• Some condemn it if its "dominant tendency
might be to deprave or corrupt a reader." 4 Others look
not to the content of the book but to whether it is advertised "to appeal to the erotic interests of customers." "
Some condemn only "hard-core pornography"; but even
then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been said
of that definition, "I could never succeed in [defining it]
intelligibly," but "I know it when I see it." 6
Those are tho standards we ourselves have wr.itton into
the Constitution.' Yet how under these vague tests can
we sustain collvictions for the sale of a book prior to tho
time when some court has cloclarecl that book to be obscene. I subm.it that prior to a court's declaration that
a specific book is "obscene," tho la"· is far too vague to
send men to prison and yet satisfy the requirements of
due process.
!d., 484.
!d., 502 (Harlan, J.).
5 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 467.
6 .Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197.
7 At the conrlu~ion of a 1\YO-year s1udy, 1hr U.S. Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography determined that the stand:.uds we have
written interfrre with constitutionall~· protected materials:
"Society's attempts to legislate for adults in the area of obscenity
have not been successful. Present laws prohibiting the consensual
sale or distribution of explirit sexualmntcrials to adults arc extremely
unsatisfactory in their practic;tl application. The Constitution permits material to be deemed 'obscene' for adults only if, as a whole,
it appeals to the 'prurient' interrst of the average person, is 'patently
offensive' in light of 'community standards,' and lacks 'redeeming
social value.' These vague and highl~r subjccti,·e aesthetic, psychological and mor.'ll tests do not provide meaningful guidance for law
enforcement officials, juries or conrts. As a result, law is inconsistently and sometimes crroneou~ly npplied and the distinctions
made by courts between prohibited and permissible materials often
appear indefensible. Errors in the appliention of the l::tw and uncertainty about its scope also cause intcrefrrence with the communication of constitutionally protected materials." Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 59 (1970).
3
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Yet we approved a conviction that sent Ralph Ginzberg to prison for five years' under those standards. This
petitioner fares better, getting only 60 days in .Jail. Yet
he could not possibly know whether the literature he
offered would be held obscene. As Mr. Justice Harlan
has said:
"The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is
that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's
decisions since Roth which have held particular material obscene or not obscene would find himself in
utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas,
390 U. S. 676, 707.
The decision of what is or is not obscene is a purely
personal decision by each judge, based on his tastes,~
background, and perhaps his neuroses. Mr. Justice Black
said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. Y. Regents,
360 U. S. 684. 600-·691, that
"Such an individualized determination cannot be
guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards.
Accordingly, neither States nor moving picture
makers can possibly know in advance, with any fair
degree of certainty, "·hat can or cannot be done in
the field of movie making ancl exhibiting. This
uncertainty cannot easily be reconciled "·ith the rule
of law which our Constitution envisages."
We should have too much pride in the rule of law and
in guidelines that keep a law from being a trap to fine
or imprison people for violating such vague laws. 9 "A
Ginzberg v. United States, ~S3 U. S. 4(>:3.
It i~ 110 an~wrr lo ~ay that Roth v. United SLates, :354 U.S. 476,
491-492, set1led for all time the question whether obscenity standards are unconstitutionally Ya~uc. There, the Court noted "that
lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due
process." The Court then concluded that the "standard[s] for
8
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failure of a statute limiting freedom of expression to
give fair notice of what acts will be punished and such
a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions,
protected by the principles of the First Amendment,
violates an accused's rights under procedural due process
and freedom of speech and press." Winters v. New York,
333 U. S. 507, 509-510. "[Tlhere is no external measuring rod for obscenity," Smith v. California, 361 U. S.
147, 165 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Our obscenity
decisions have been "left to a majority of this Court on
a case-by-case basis," ibid. (Black J., concurring), without the formulation of the predictable standards required
by Winters.
We have struck down, as unconstitutionally vague,
statutes limiting expression based upon such uncertain
terms as " [ d] escribing or portraying brutality, criminal
judging obscenity ... [it had] discussed, g[a]ve adequate warning
of tho conduct proscribed .... " /d., at 491.
The rases relied upon to reach that conclusion were wholly inapposite to the standard of precitiion necessary for the regulation of
ron~titutional freedoms such as those srcurcd by the First Amrnclment. "[T]his Court has intimated that stricter sta ndards of
penni sible stat utor~· vaguenrss may be applied to a statute having
a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be
required to act at his peril hero, because the free dissemination of
ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151.
With one exception, however, the cases relied upon in Roth to gauge
the requisite statutory precision, all dealt with instances of economic
and social regulation where this Court has traditionally applied more
lenient standards than those used in the area of expression. That
sole exception-Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273-is a relic of the
days prior to Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, and no longer
is good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444.
·or have our later decisions vindicated the determination in Roth
on the precision of obscenity standards. On the contrary, those
decisions have only further blurred the line between the constitutionally protected and thai which five members of this Court will
allow to be proscribed.
Roth was, with all respect, predicated upon an improper promise
and the rnsuing years hnve accentuated that error.
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violence or depravity ... or sexual promiscuity or abnormal sexual relations." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas,
supra, at 681. So too, with other standards such as
"approve such films ... [as] are moral and proper ...
[and] disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or·
immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals,"
Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U. S. 870;
"immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals," Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U. S. 587; "moral, educational or amusing and harmless," Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587; "prejudicial to
the best interests of the people," Gelling v. Texas, 343
U. S. 960; "sacrilegious," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495; "criminal news or stories of deeds of bloodshed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting
violent and depraved crimes," Winters v. New York,
supra.
How can it be maintained that our obscenity decisions
provide any more definite a standard than this plethora
of statutes which we have held to be unconstitutionally
vague? As Mr. Justice Black said in Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U. S. 463, 478-480 (dissenting opinion):
"I think that the criteria declared . . . as guidelines . . . are so vague and meaningless that they
practically leave the fate of a person charged with
violating censorship statutes to the unbridled discretion, whim and caprice of the judge or jury which
tries him ....
"(a) The first element ... is that the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal
to the prurient interest in sex. It seems quite apparent to me that human beings, serving either as
judges or jurors, could not be expected to give any
sort of decision on this element which would even
remotely promise any kind of uniformity in the
enforcement of this law. . . . [T]he submission of
such an issue as this to a judge or jury amounts to .
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practically nothing more than a request for the
judge or juror to assert his own personal beliefs
about whether the matter should be allowed to be
legally distributed ....
"(b) The second element ... is that the material
must be 'patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters .... '
... [H]ere again the guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with obscenity must depend in the
final analysis upon the personal judgment and attitudes of particular individuals and the place where
the trial is held ....
" (c) A third element . . . is that the material
must be 'utterly without redeeming social value.'
This element seems to me to be as uncertain, if not
even more uncertain, than is the unknown substance of the Milky Way. . . . Whether a particular
treatment of a particular subject is with or without
social value in this evolving, dynamic society of ours
is a question upon which no uniform agreement
could possibly be reached among politicians, statesmen, professors, philosophers, scientists, religious
groups or any other type of group. A case-by-case
assessment of social values by individual judges and
jurors is, I think, a dangerous technique for government to utilize in determining whether a man stays
in or out of the penitentiary."
If a specific book, play, paper, or motion picture has
in a civil proceeding been condemned as obscene and review of that finding has been completed, and thereafter
a person publishes, shows, or displays that particular
book or film, then a vague law has been made specific.
There would remain the underlying question whether
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the First Amendment allows an implied exception in the
case of obscenity. I do not think it does and my views
on the issue have been stated over and again.' 0 But at
least a criminal prosecution brought at that juncture
would not violate the time-honored void-for-vagueness
test. 11
10 Sec Unitrd SLat('S v. 12 200-Ft. fleets of Film, post, :it - ;
Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U. R. 976, 977; Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U. S. 629, 650; Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431, 436; Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 482; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U. S. 413, 424; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 72;
Times Film Corp. v. Citu of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78; Smith v.
California, 361 U. S. 147, 167; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684, 697; Roth v. Unit('d State.~. 354 U.S. 476, 508; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. R. 436, 446; Superior Films, Inc.
Y. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 588; Gelling v. Texas,
343 U. S. 960.
1t The Commi~~ion on Obsrenitr and Pornogrnph~, hn~ nch·ocn.t eel
;;uch a procedure:
"The Commission recommencb the emrtment, in nll jurisdictions
which enact or retain provisions prohibiting the disscmimtion of
se:>..'Ual materials to adults or young persons, of legislation authorizing
prosecutors to obtain dcrlarntory judgments as to whether particular
materials bll within existing legal prohibitions . . . .
"A declaratory judgment procedure ... would permit proserutors
to proceed civilly, rather th::m through the criminal process, against
suspected viol:ltions of obscenity prohibition. If surh civil procedures arc utilized, penult ies would be imposed for violation of the
hw only with respect to conduct occurring after a civil declaration
i~ obtained. The Commi~sion believes this course of action to be.
appropriate whenevrr there is :m existing doubt regarding the legal
status of materials; where other alternatives are availuble, the criminal process should not ordinarily be invoked against persons who
might have reasonably believed, in good faith, that the books or
films they distributed were entitled to constitutional protection, for
any threat of criminal ~anctions might otherwise deter the free distribution of constitutionally protected material." Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 70-71 (1970).
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No such protective procedure has been designed by
California in this case. Obscenity-which even we cannot define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send
men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in
a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 22, 1972

No. 70-73 - Miller v. California
Dear Bill,
I am most interested to learn of the views
described in your memorandum and am grateful that
you propose to write them out. I think that they offer
a most hopeful approach toward extrication from what
you correctly describe as an "intolerable mess."
I shall suspend further consideration of the issues in
this case pending receipt of what you write.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

l
,ju:prttttt ~omt of fltt ~tti±tb ,jtattg
~agfpngttttt. ~. ~· 21!.?'~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN . JR.

May 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 70-73 - Miller v. California
With all r.espect, the Chief Justice's proposed solution to
the obscenity quagmire will, in my view, worsen an already intolerable mess. I've been thinking for some time that only a
drastic change in applicable constitutional principles promises
a way out. I've decided that I shall use this case as a vehicle
for saying that I'm prepared to make that change. I'll write in
effect that it has proved impossible to separate expression concerning sex, called obscenity, from other expression concerning
sex, whether the material takes the form of words, photographs
or film; that Stanley (as well as the Chief Justice's 12, 000 Reels
of Film?) has already eroded that concept; that we should treat
obscenity not as expression concerning sex excepted from First
Amendment speech but as expression, although constituting
First Amendment speech, that is regulable to the extent of legislating against its offensive exposure to unwilling adults and dissemination to juveniles. I'll try in due course to circulate my
views.
W. J. B. Jr.
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United States, Appellant, On Appeal from the United
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States District Court for
12 200-Ft. Reels of Super
the Central District of
8mm. Film et al.
California.
[May -, 1972]
Mn. JusTICE DouGLAS.
My difficulty with the case is that 1 know of no constitutional way by which a book, tract, paper, postcard, or
film may be made contraband because of its contents.
The Constitution never purported to give the Federal
Government censorship or oversight over literature or
artistic productions, save as they might be governed by
the Patent and Copyright Clause of Art. I, ~ 8, cl. 8, of the
Constitution. 1 To be sure, the Colonies had enacted statutes which limited the freedom of speech, see Roth v.
United States, 354 U. S. 476, 482-484 nn. 10-13, and in
the early 19th century the States punished obscene libel
as a common law crime. Knowles v. State, 3 Conn. 103
(1808) (signs depicting "monster"); Commonwealth v.
Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821) (John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315
( 1857) (utterance of words "too vulgar to be inserted in
this opinion"); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Pa. 91
(1815) ("lewd, wicked, scandalous, infamous, and indecent posture with a woman").
1

Even the copyright power is limited by the freedoms srcured
by the First Amendment. Lee v. Runge, 404 U. S. 887, 892-893
(DouGLAS, J., dissenting); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970).

.·
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To construe this history, as this Court did in Roth,
as qualifying the plain import of the First Amendment
is both a non sequitur and a disregard of the Tenth
Amendment.
"[W]hatever may [have been] the form which the
several States . . . adopted in making declarations in
favor of particular rights," James Madison, the author
of the First Amendment tells us, "the great object in
view [was l to limit and qualify the powers of [ th~
Federal] Government, by excepting out of the grant
of po"·er those cases in which the Government ought·
not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 1
Annals of Congress 437. Surely no one should argue
that the retention by the States of vestiges of established
religions after the enactment of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clause saps these clauses of their meaning.
Yet it was precisely upon such reasoning that this Court,
in Roth, exempted the bawdry from the protection of
the First Amendment.
When it was enacted, the Bill of Rights applied only
to the Federal Government, Barron v. City of Baltimore,
7 Pet. 243, and the Tenth Amendment reserved the
residuum of power to the States and the people. That
the States, at some later date, may have exercised this
reserved power in the form of laws restricting expression
in no wise detracts from the express prohibition of the
First Amendment. Only ·when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed did it become even possible to argue
that through it the First Amendment became applicable
to the States. But that goal was not attained until the
ruling of this Court in 1931 that the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment included the First Amendment. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368.
At the very beginning, however, the First Amendment
applied only to the Federal Government and there is not
the slightest evidence that the Framers intended to put
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the newly created federal regime into the role of ombudsman over literature. Tying censorship to the movement
of literature or films in interstate commerce or into foreign commerce would have been an easy way for a government of delegated powers to impair the liberty of
expression. It was to bar such suppression that we have
the First Amendment. I dare say Jefferson and Madison "·ould be appalled at "·hat the Court espouses today.
The First Amendment was the product of a robust,
not a prudish, age. The four decades prior to its enactment "saw the publication, virtually ,.,.ithout molestation from any authority, of two classics of pornographic
literature." D. Loth, The Erotic in Literature 108
(1961). In addition to William King's The Toast, there
was John Cleland's Fanny Hill which has been described as the "most important work of genuine pornography that has been published in English . . . . "
L. Markun, Mrs. Grundy 191 (1930). In England,
Harris' List of Covent Garden Ladies, a catalog used by
prostitutes to advertise their trade, enjoyed open circulation. N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 25
(1956). This was the age when Benjamin Franklin
wrote his "Advice to a Young Man on Choosing a
Mistress" and "A Letter to the Royal Academy at Brussels." "\Vhen the United States became a nation, none
of the fathers of the country were any more concerned
than Franklin with the question of pornography. John
Quincy Adams had a strongly puritanical bent for a
man of his literary interests, and even he wrote of Tom
Jones that it was 'one of the best novels in the language.' " Loth, supra, at 120. It was in this milieu
that Madison admonished against any "distinction between the freedom and licentiousness of the press."
Padover, The Complete Madison 296 (1953). The Anthony Comstocks, the Thomas Bowdlers and the Vic-
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torian hypocrisy-the predecessors of our present obscenity laws-had yet to come upon the stage.~
Julius Goebel, our leading expert on colonial law. does
not so much as allude to punishment of obscenity.a J.
Goebel. Development of Legal Institutions (7th rev.
1946 eel.); J. Goebel. Felony and Misdemeanor (1937);
J. Goebel & T. Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial
New York (1944).
Nor is there any basis in the legal history antedating
the First Amendment for the creation of an obscenity
exception. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413,
424 (DouGLAS, J., concurring). The first reported case
involving obscene conduct was not until 1663. There,
the defendant was fined for "shewing himself naked in
2 Separating the worthwhile from the worthle~s has largely been
a matter of individual taste because significant govPrmnental sanctions against obsrrne literatmo are of relativrly recent vintage, not
having developed until the Victorian Age of the mid-19th crntury.
N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 1-85 (1956). See 1 T.
Emerson, Tile System of Freedom of Expression 468-469 (1970);
J. Paul & M. Schwartz , FPdernl CenHorship c. 1 (1961); Report of
tho Commission on Obsccnit)' and Pornography 348-:354 (1970). In
this country, the fir~t federal prohibition on obscenity was not until
the Tariff Act of 1842. c. 270, § 21\, 5 Stat. 566. England, which gave
us the infamous Star Chamber and a history of licensing of publishing, did not raise a statui ory bar to the importation of obscenity
until 1853, Customs Consolidation Act, 16 & 17 Viet. c. 107, and
waited until 1857 to enact a statute which banned obscene literature
outright. Lord Cnmpbell's Acl, 20 & 21 Viet. c. 83.
'1 The only colonial statute mentioning the word "obscrne" was
Acls and Laws of the Province of Mass. Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712),
Mass. Bay Colony Charter & Laws 399 (1814). It did so, however,
in the context of "composing, writing, printing or publishing . . .
any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon, in imitation or in mimicking of preaching, or any other part
of divine worship" and must, therefore, be placed with the other
colonial blasphemy laws. E. g., Act for the Punishment of Divers
Capital and Other Felonies, Acts and Laws of Conn. 66, 67 (1784);
Act of 1723, c. 116, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty 1799).
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a balkony, and throwing down bottles (pist in) vi &
armis among the people in Covent Garden, contra pacem,
and to the scandal of the Government." Sir Charles
Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K. B. 1663). Rather
than being a fountainhead for a body of law proscribing
obscene literature, later courts viewed this case simply
as an instance of assault, criminal breach of the peace,
or indecent exposure. E. g., Bradlaugh v. Queen, L. R..
3 Q. B. 569, 634 (1878); Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849,
851 (K. B. 1727) (Fortescue, J., dissenting).
The advent of the printing press spurred censorship
in England, but the ribald and the obscene were not, at
first, within the scope of that which was officially banned.
The censorship of the Star Chamber and the licensing of
books under the Tudors and Stuarts was aimed at the
blasphemous or heretical, the seditious or treasonous. At
that date, the government made no effort to prohibit the
dissemination of obscenity. Rather, obscene literature
was considered to raise a moral question properly cognizable only by ecclesiastical, and not the common law,
courts. 4 "A crime that shakes religion, as profaneness
on the stage, &c. is indictable: but writing an obscene·
book, as that intitled, 'The Fifteen Plagues of a Maidenhead,' is not indictable, but punishable only in the Spiritual Court." Queen v. Read, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (K. B.
1708). To be sure, Read was ultimately overruled and
the crime of obscene libel established. Rex v. Curl, supra.
It is noteworthy, however, that the only reported cases of
obscene libel involved politically unpopular defendants.
Rex v. Curl, supra; Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (K. B.
1770).
)
In any event, what we said in Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252, 264-265 (1941), \vould dispose of any
4 Lord Coke's De Libelli::; Famo::;i::;, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606), for
example, was the definitive statement of the common law of libel
buL made no mention of tho misdemeanor of obscene libel.

70-2-8EPARATE
6

UNITED STATES v. 12 200-FT. REELS OF FILM

argument that earlier restrictions on free expression
should be read into the First Amendment:
"[T]o assume that English common law in this field
became ours is to deny the generally accepted historical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolution was to get riel of the English common law on
liberty of speech and of the press.' More specifically, it is to forget the environment in which the
First Amendment was ratified. In presenting the
proposals which were later embodied in the Bill of
Rights, James Madison the leader in the preparation
of the First Amendment said: 'Although I know
whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom
of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question
in [Parliament], the invasion of them is restricted
by able advocates. yet the l\'Iagna Charta does not
contain any one provision for the security of those
rights, respecting which the people of America are
most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights
of conscience, tho~e choicest privileges of the people,
are unguarded in the British Constitution' "
This Court has nonetheless ellgrafted an exception
upon the clear meaning of words written in the 18th
century. But see Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252,
264-265; Grosjean \'. American P1·ess Co., 297 U. S. 233,
249.
Our efforts to define obscenity have not been productive of meaningful standards which I have tried to demonstrate in Miller v. California, ante - , decided this
day. What is "obscene" is highly subjective, varying
from judge to judge, from juryman to juryman.
"The fireside banter of Chaucer's Canterbury Pilgrims was disgusting obscenity to Victorian-type
moralists whose co-ed granddaughters shock the Victorian-type moralists of today. Words that are ob-
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scene in England have not a hint of impropriety in
the United States, and vice versa. The English
language is full of innocent words and phrases with
obscene ancestry." Brant, The Bill of Rights 490
( 1965).
So speaks our leading First Amendment historian;
and he went on to say that this Court's decisions "seemed
to multiply standards instead of creating one." I d.,
491. The reason is not the inability or mediocrity of
judges.
"What is the reason for this multiple schlerosis
of the judicial faculty? It is due to the fact stated
above, that obscenity is a matter of taste and social
custom, not of fact." I d., 491--492.
Taste and custom are part of it; but as I have said on
other occasions, 5 the neuroses of judges, lawmakers, and
of the so-called "experts" who have taken the place of
Anthony Comstock, also play a major role.
Finally, it is ironic to me that in this Nation many pages
must be written and many hours spent to explain why a
person who can read whatever he desires, Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, may without violating a law
carry that literature in his brief case or bring it home
from abroad. Unless there is that ancillary right, one's
Stanley rights could be realized, as has been suggested,
only if one wrote or designed a tract in his attic, printed
or processed it in his basement, so as to be able to
read it in his study. United States v. Thirty Seven
Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 382 (Black, J., dissenting).
Most of the items that come this way denounced as
"obscene" are in my vie'" trash. I would find few, if
any, that had any redeeming social value. Yet by what
right under the Constitution do five of us have to impose
5

Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 661-671

(di~~cnting).
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our set of values on the literature of the day? There is
danger in that course, the danger of bending the popular
mind to new norms of conformity. There is also danger
in tolerance, for tolerance often leads to robust and ribald
productions. Yet that is the plain thrust of the First
Amendment.
Irving Brant summed the matter up:
"Blessed with a form of government that requires.
universal liberty of thought and expression, blessed
with a social and economic system built on that
same foundation, the American people have created
the danger they fear by denying to themselves theliberties they cherish." Op. cit. supra, at 493.
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting.
We judges \Yho work at the appellate level have an
understandable tendency to "Tite essay-like opinions that
announce general constitutional principles, but often are
far removed from the gritty facts of the case.
Today we send a man to prison for distributing brochures which advertised books and a movie. A basic
premise of criminal law under our Constitution is that
it must give fair warning. I submit that the law of
obscenity as defined by legislatures and by courts is so
vague as not to give fair warning. Some make it a crime
to sell a book which deals with sex "in a manner appealing to prurie11t interests." 1 Son1e define obscenity as
literature which is "patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary standards." " Others make a book obscene >vhen it is "utterly without redeeming social imRoth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 487.
California defines "obscene matter" as "matter, t aken as a whole,
the predominant appeal of which to the average person , applying
contrmporary standards, is to prurient int eretit, i. e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudit y, sex, or excretion ; and is matter which
taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor
in description or representation of such matters; and is matter
which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance." Calif. Penal Code § 311 (a ).
2 ! d., 489.
1
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portance." 3 Some condemn it if its "dominant tendency
might be to deprave or corrupt a reader." 4 Others look
not to the content of the book but to whether it is advertised "to appeal to the erotic interests of customers." 5
Some condemn only "hard-core pornography"; but even
then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been said
of that definition, "I could never succeed in [defining it l
intelligibly," hut "I know it when I see it." u
Those are the standards we ourselves have written into
the Constitution.' Yet ho\v under these vague tests can
we sustain convictions for the sale of a book prior to the
time when some court has declared that book to be obscene. I submit that prior to a court's declaration that
a specific book is "obscene," the law is far too vague to
send men to prison and yet satisfy the requirements of
due process.
/d., 484.
• !d., 502 (Harlan, J.).
"Ginzburg v. United States, 38.'3 U. R. 463, 467.
6
JacobeUis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197.
3

7
At the conclm;ion of a t wo-~·ca r study, the U. S. Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography dcterminrd that the standards we have
written interfrre with con~titutionally protected materials:
"Society's attempts to legi~late for ndults in the area of obscenity
h:wr not been sucre~sful. Pre,;enl laws prohibiting the consensual
~ale or distribution of explicit. ~exual materials to ndults are extrrmely
unsatisfactory in their pmctical application. The Constitution per-·
mits matrrial to be deemed 'obscene' for adults only if, as a whole,
it appeals to the 'prurient' intcrr~t of the avernge person , is 'patently
offensive' in light of 'communil~· ~tnndards,' and lacks 'redeemingsocial value.' The.~e Yagne and highly subjerti\·e aesthetic, psychological and moral testH do not provide meaningful guidance for law
enforcement officials, juries or courts. As a result, law iH inconsistently and sometimes erronrou~l~· npplied and the distinctions
made by courts between prohibited ami permi~sible materials often
appear indefrnsible . Errors in the application of the law and uncerlninty about its scope also cause intcrrfcrence with the communication of constitutionnlly proteeted materinls." Report of th~
Commis~ion on Obscenity and Pornography 59 (1970).
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Yet we approved a conviction that sent Ralph Ginzberg to prison for five years 8 under those standards. This
petitioner fares better, getting only 60 days in Jail. Yet
he could not possibly know whether the literature he
offered would be held obscene. As Mr. Justice Harlan
has said:
"The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is
that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's
decisions since Roth which have held particular material obscene or not obscene would find himself in
utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas,
390 U. S. 676, 707.
The decision of 'vhat is or- is not obscene is a purely
personal decision by each judge, based on his tastes, his
background, and perhaps his neuroses. Mr. Justice Black
said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. Y. Regents,
360 U. S. 684. 690-·691, that
"Such an individualized determination cannot be
guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards.
Accordingly, neither States nor moving picture
makers can possibly know in advance, with any fair
degree of certainty, what can or cannot be done in
the field of movie making and exhibiting. This
uncertainty cannot easily be reconciled with the rule
of law which our Constitution envisages."
We should have too much pride in the rule of law and
in guidelines that keep a law from being a trap to fine
or imprison people for violating such vague laws. 0 "A
Ginzberg v. United States, ~sa U. S. 4oa.
It is 110 nn;:wrr to ~a~· that Roth v. United State8, 354 U. S. 47G,
491-492, settled for all time the question whether obscenity standards are unconst itutionally Yague. There, the Court noted "that
Jack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due
process." The Court then concluded that the "standard[s] for
8

0
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failure of a statute limiting freedom of expression to
give fair notice of what acts will be punished and such
a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions,.
protected by the principles of the First Amendment,
violates an accused's rights under procedural due process
and freedom of speech and press." Winters v. New York,
333 U. S. 507, 509-510. "l T]here is no external measuring rod for obscenity," Smith v. California, 361 U. S.
147, 165 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Our obscenity
decisions have been "left to a majority of this Court on
a case-by-case basis," ibid. (Black J., concurring), without the formulation of the predictable standards required
by Winters.
judging obscenity ... [it had] disrn~scd, graJvc adeC]uatc warning
of the conduct proscribed .... " !d., at 491.
The cases relied upon to rench that conclusion were wholly inappoRitc to the standnrd of precision necessary for the regulation of
con~titutional freedoms ~urh ns tho ·c secured by the Fir~t Amendment. "[T]his Court haR intimated that stricter Rtnndards of
permissible statutory Ynguene~~ ma~· be applied to a stntutc hnving
a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be
required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of
ideas may be the losrr." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151.
With one exception, however, the cases relied upon in Roth to gauge
the requisite statutory precision, all dralt with instances of economic
and social regulation where this Court has traditionally applied more
lenient standards than those used in the area of expression. That
sole exception-Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273-is a relic of the
days prior to Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, and no longer
is good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444.
Nor have our later dcci~ions vindicated the determination in Roth
on the precision of obscenity standards. On the contrary, those
decisions have only further blurred the line between the constitutionally protected and that which five members of this Court will
allow to be proscribed and have resulted in what one commentator
has labeled "a constitutional di;mster area." l\1acGrath, Thr Obscenity Cases: The Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 7, 59.
Roth was, with all respect, predicated upon an improper premise
and the ensuing years have accentuated that error.
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We have struck clov.;n, as unconstitutionally vague,
statutes limiting expression based upon such uncertain
terms as "[d]escribing or portraying brutality, criminal
violence or depravity ... or sexual promiscuity or abnormal sexual relations." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas,
supra, at 681. So too, with other standards such as
"approve such films ... [as] are moral and proper ...
[and] disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or
immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals,"
Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U. S. 870;
"immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals," Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U. S. 587; "moral, educational or amusing and harmless," Superior Filrns, Inc. v.
Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587; "prejudicial to·
the best interests of the people," Gelling v. Texas, 343
U.S. 960; "sacrilegious," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U. S. 495; "criminal news or stories of deeds of bloodshed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting
violent and depraved crimes," Winters v. New York,
supra.
How can it be maintained that our obscenity decisions
provide any more definite a standard than this plethora
of statutes which we have held to be unconstitutionally
vague? As Mr. Justice Black said in Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U. S. 463, 478-480 (dissenting opinion):
"I think that the criteria declared . . . as guidelines . . . are so vague and meaningless that they
practically leave the fate of a person charged with
violating censorship statutes to the unbridled dis-·
cretion, whim and caprice of the judge or jury which
tries him ....
"(a) The first element ... is that the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal
to the prurient interest in sex. It seems quite apparent to me that human beings, serving either as
judges or jurors, could not be expected to give any
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sort of decision on this element which would even
remotely promise any kind of uniformity in the
enforcement of this law. . . . [T]he submission of
such an issue as this to a judge or jury amounts to
practically nothing more than a request for the
judge or juror to assert his own personal beliefs
about whether the matter should be allowed to be
legally distributed ....
"(b) The second clement ... is that the material
must be 'patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters ... .'
... [H] ere again the guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with obscenity must depend in the
final analysis upon the personal judgment and attitudes of particular individuals and the place where
the trial is held ....
" (c) A third element . . . is that the material
must be 'utterly without redeeming social value.'
This element seems to me to be as uncertain, if not
even more uncertain, than is the unknown substance of the Milky \Vay. . . . Whether a particular
treatment of a particular subject is with or without
social value in this evolving, dynamic society of ours
is a question upon which no uniform agreement
could possibly be reached among politicians, statesmen, professors, philosophers, scientists, religious
groups or any other type of group. A case-by-case
assessment of social values by individual judges and
jurors is, I think, a dangerous technique for government to utilize in determining whether a man stays
in or out of the penitentiary."
If a specific book, play, paper, or motion picture has
in a civil proceeding been condemned as obscene and review of that finding has been completed, and thereafter
a person publishes, shows, or displays that particular
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book or film, then a vague law has been made specific.
There would remain the underlying question whether
the First Amendment allows an implied exception in the
case of obscenity. I do not think it does and my views
on the issue have been stated over and again. 10 But at
least a criminal prosecution brought at that juncture
would not violate the time-honored void-for-vagueness
test. 11
H> Ser United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, post, at - ;
Byrne v. Kamlexis, 396 U. R. 976, 977; Ginsberg v. N etv York, 390
U.S. 629, 650; Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431, 436; Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 41<2; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U. S. 413, 424; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Svllivan, 372 U. S. 58, 72;
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78; Smith v.
California, 361 U. S. 147, 167; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U. S. 684, 697; Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436. 446; Superior Films, Inc.
v. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 588; Gelling v. Texas,
343 U. R. 960.
11 The Commi~sion on Oh~crnit~· and Porno~raphy has ach·ocated
such a procedure:
"The Commission recommrnds the enactmrnt, in all jurisdictions
which enact or retain provisions prohibiting the dissrmination of
sexual matrrials to adults or young persons, of legislation authorizing
prosecutors to obtain declaratory jud~mrnt~ as to whether particular
materials fall within existin~ legal prohibitions . . . .
"A declaratory judgment procedure ... would permit prosecutors
to proceed civilly, rather than through thr criminal process, against
suspected violations of obscenity prohibition. If such civil procedures arc utilized, penaltirs would be imposed for violation of the
law only with respect to conduct occurring after a civil declaration
is obtained. The Commission believes thi~ course of action to be
appropriate whenever there is :m existin~ doubt regarding the legal
status of materials; where other alternatives arc available, the criminal process should not ordinarily be itwokecl against persons who
might have reasonably believed, in good faith, that the books or
films they distributed were entitled to constitutional protection, for
any threat of criminal sanctions might otherwise deter the free distribution of constitutionally protected material." Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 70-71 (1970).

'
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In Rabe v. Washing·ton, 405 U. S. 313, this Court recently held that it was a denial of due process to sustain
a conviction under an obscenity statute where the meaning of the statutory word "obscene" was not clarified until
the conviction was on appeal. Under such circumstances,
we reasoned, the defendant was not given fair notice of
the conduct which was proscribed. I fail to see the difference between Rabe and the typical obscenity case·
where the defendant may not know whether a particular
book or motion picture is constitutionally protected until
his case becomes final on appeal.
No such protective procedure has been designed by
California in this case. Obscenity-which even we cannot define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send
men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in
a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process.
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United States, Appellant, On Appeal from the United
v.
States District Court ' for
12 200-Ft. Reels of Super· . the Central District of
8mm. Film et al.
California.
[May -, 1972]
MR. JUSTICE DouGLAS.

My difficulty with the case is that I know of no constitutional way by which a book, tract, paper, postcard, or
film may be made contraband because of its contents.
The Constitution never purported to give the Federal
Government censorship or oversight over literature or
artistic productions, save as they might be governed by
the Patent and Copyright Clause of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the
Constitution. 1 To be sure, the Colonies had enacted statutes which limited the freedom of speech, see Roth v.
United States, 354 U. S. 476, 482-484 nn. 10-13, and in
the early 19th century the States punished obscene libel
as a common law crime. Knowles v. State, 3 Conn. 103
(1808) (signs depicting "monster"); Commonwealth v.
Holmes, 17 Mass. 330 (1821) (John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315
( 1857) (utterance of words "too vulgar to be inserted in
this opinion"); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Pa. 91
(1815) ("lewd, wicked, scandalous, infamous, and indecent posture with a woman").
To construe this history, as this Court did in Roth,.
as qualifying the plain import of the First Amendment
1
Even the copyright power is limited by the freedoms secured
by the First Amendment. Lee v. Runge, 404 U. S. 887, 892-893
(DouGLAS, J., dissenting); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press ·t, 17.
U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970).
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is both a non sequitur and a disregard of the Tenth
Amendment.
"fW]hatever may [have been] the form " ·hich the
several States . . . adopted in making declarations in
favor of particular rights," James Madison, the author
of the First Amendment tells us, "the great object in
view [was] to limit and qualify the powers of [the
Federal] Government, hy excepting out of the grant
of power those cases in which the Government ought
not to act, or to act only in a particular 1node." 1
Annals of Congrel"s 437. Surely no one should argue
that the retention by the States of vestiges of established
religions after the enactment of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clause saps these clauses of their meaning.
Yet it was precisely upon such reasoning that this Court,
in Roth, exempted the bawdry from the protection of
tho First Amendment.
When it was enacted , the Bill of Rights applied only
to the Federal Government, Barron v. City of Balt'imore,
7 Pet. 243, and the Tenth Ame11dment reserved the
residuum of power to the States and the people. That
the States, at some later date, may have exerciEed this
reserved power in the form of laws restricting expression
in no wise detracts from the expreEs prohibition of the
First Amendment. Only when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed did it become oven possible to argue
that through it tho First Amendment became applicable
to the States. But that goal "·as not attained until the
ruling of this Court in 10:31 that the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment included the First Amondnwnt. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368.
At the very beginning, however, the First Amendment
applied only to the Federal Government anrl there is not
tho slightest evidence that the Framers intended to put
tho ue,vly created federal regime into the role of ombudsman over literature. Tying censorship to the movement
of literature or films in interstate commerce or into for-
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eign commerce would have been an easy "·ay for a govermnent of delegated powers to impair the liberty of
expression. It ''"as to bar such suppression that we have
the First Amendment. I dare say Jefferson and Madison would be appalled at \\·hat the Court espouses today.
The First Amendment was the product of a robust,
not a prudish, age. The four decades prior to its enactment "saw the publication, virtually without molestation from any authority, of two classics of pornographic
literature." D. Loth, The Erotic in Literature 108
( 1961). In addition to William King's The Toa.st, there
\\·as John Cleland's Fanny Hill which has been described as the "most important ''"ork of genuine porllography that has been published in English . . . . "
L. Markun , Mrs. Grundy 191 (1930). In England,
Harris' List of Covent Garden Ladies, a catalog used by
prostitutes to advertise their trade, enjoyed open circulation. N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 25
(1056). Bibliographies of pornogra-phic literature list
countless erotic works which were published in this
time. Sec, e. g., A. Craig, Suppressed Books (1063);
P. Fraxi, Catena Liborum Tacendorum (1885); 'V. Gallichan , The Poison of Prudery (1929); D. Loth, The
Erotic in Literature (1961); L. Markun. Mrs. Grundy
(1930). This was the age when Benjamin Franklin
wrote his "Advice to a Young Man on Choosing a
Mistress" and "A Letter to the Hoyal Academy at Brussels." "'Vhen the United States became a nation, none
of the fathers of the country were any more concerned
than Franklin "·ith the question of pornography. John
Quincy Adams had a strongly puritanical bent for a
man of his literary interests, and even he wrote of Tom
Jones that it was 'one of the best novels in the language.' " Loth, supra, at 120. It was in this milieu
that Madison admonished against any "distinction between the freedom and licentiousness of the press."
Padover, The Complete Madison 296 (1953). The An-
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thony Comstocks, the Thomas Bowdlers and the Victorian hypocrisy-the predecessors of our present obscenity laws-had yet to come upon the stage."
Julius Goebel, our leading expert on colonial lavY, does
not so much as allude to punishment of obscenity. 3 J.
Goebel, Development of Legal Institutions (7th rev.
1946 ed.); J. Goebel. Felony and Misdemeanor (1937);
J. Goebel & T. Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial
New York (1944).
Nor is there any basis in the legal history antedating
the First Amendment for the creation of an obscenity
exception. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413,
424 (DouGLAS, J., concurring). The first reported case·
involving obscene conduct was not until 1663. There,
the defendant was fined for "shewing himself naked in
Separating the worthwhile from the worthless has largely been
a matter of individual taste because significant governmental sanctions against obscrne literature arc of relatively recent vintnge, not
having developed until ihr Victorian Age of the mid-19th century_
N. St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 1-85 (1956). See 1 T.
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 468-469 (1970);
J. Paul & M. Schwartz, Federal Censorship c. 1 (1961); Report of
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 348-354 (1970). In
this counlry, the fir,;t federal prohibition on obscenity \Yas not until
tho Tariff Act of 1842, c. 270, § 28, 5 Slat. 566. England, which gave·
us the infamous Star Chamber and a history of licensing of publishing, did not raise a statutory bar to the importation of obscenity
until 1853, Customs Consolidation Act, 16 & 17 Viet. c. 107, and
waited until 1857 to enact a statute which banned obscene literature
outright. Lord Campbell's Act, 20 & 21 Viet. c. 83.
3
The only colonial statute mentioning the word "obscene" was
Acts and Laws of the Province of Mass. Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712),
Mass. Bay Colony Charter & Laws 399 (1814). It did so, however,
in the context of "composing, writing, printing or publishing . . .
any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon, in imitation or in mimicking of preaching, or any other part
of divine worship" and must, therefore, be placed with the other
colonial blasphemy laws. E. g., Act for the Punishment of Divers
Capital and Other Felonies, Acts and Laws of Co1m. 66, G7 (1784);
Act of 1723, c. 116, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty 1799).
2
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a balkony, and throwing down bottles (pist in) vi &
armis among the people in Covent Garden, contra pacem,
and to the scandal of the Government." Sir Charles
Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K. B. 1663). Rather
than being a fountainhead for a body of law proscribing
obscene literature, later courts viewed this case simply
as an instance of assault, criminal breach of the peace,
or indecent exposure. E. g., Bradlaugh v. Queen, L. R..
3 Q. B. 569, 634 (1878); Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849,
851 (K. B. 1727) (Fortescue, J., dissenting).
The advent of the printing press spurred censorship,
in England, but the ribald and the obscene were not, at
first, within the scope of that which was officially banned.
The censorship of the Star Chamber and the licensing of
books under the Tudors and Stuarts was aimed at the
blasphemous or heretical, the seditious or treasonous. At
that date, the government made no effort to prohibit the
dissemination of obscenity. Rather, obscene literature
was considered to raise a moral question properly cognizable only by ecclesiastical, and not the common law,
courts. 4 "A crime that shakes religion, as profaneness
on the stage, &c. is indictable; but writing an obscene
book, as that intitled, 'The Fifteen Plagues of a Maidenhead,' is not indictable, but punishable only in the Spirit-·
ual Court." Queen v. Read, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (K. B.
1708). To be sure, Read was ultimately overruled and
the crime of obscene libel established. Rex v. Curl, supra.
It is noteworthy, however, that the only reported cases of
obscene libel involved politically unpopular defendants.
Rex v. Curl, supra; Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (K. B ..
1770).
In any event, what \Ye said in Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252, 264- 265 (1941), would dispose of any
Lord Coke'i:l De Libelli::; Famo~ is , 77 Eng. Hep. 250 (1606), for
example, was the definitive statement of the common law of libel
but made no mention of the misdemeanor of obscene libel.
1
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argument that earlier restrictions on free expression
should be read into the First Amendment:
"[T]o assume that English comnwn la\v in this field
became ours is to deny the generally accepted historical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common law on
liberty of speech and of the press.' More specifically, it is to forget the environment in which the
First Amendment 'vas ratified. In presenting the
proposals which were later embodied in the Bill of
Rights, James Madison the leader in the preparation
of the First Amendment said: 'Although I know
whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom
of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question
in [Parliament], the invasion of them is restricted
by able advocates, yet the .l\:Iagna Charta does not
contain any one provision for the security of those
rights, respecting "·hich the people of America are
most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights
of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people,
arc unguarded in the British Constitution' "
This Court has nonetheless cngrafted an exception
upon the clear meaning of words written in the 18th
century. But sec Bridges v. Californ·ia, 314 U. S. 252,
264-265; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233,
249.
Our efforts to define obscenity have not been productive of meaningful standards which I have tried to demonstrate in Miller v. California, ante - , decided this
day. What is "obscene" is highly subjective, varying
from judge to judge, from juryman to juryman.
"The fireside banter of Chaucer's Canterbury Pilgrims was disgusting obscenity to Victorian-type
moralists whose co-ed granddaughters shock the Victorian-type moralists of today. Words that are ob-
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scene in England have not a hint of impropriety in
the United States, and vice versa. The English
language is full of innocent words and phrases with
obscene ancestry." Brant, The Bill of Rights 490
(1965).
So speaks our leading First Amendment historian;
and he went on to say that this Court's decisions "seemed
to multiply standards instead of creating one." I d.,
491. The reason is not the inability or mediocrity of
judges.
"What is the reason for this multiple schlerosis
of the judicial faculty? It is due to the fact stated
above, that obscenity is a matter of taste and social
custom, not of fact." !d., 491-492.
Taste and custom are part of it; but as I have said on
other occasions,G the neuroses of judges, lawmakers, and
of the so-called "experts" who haYe taken the place of
Anthony Comstock, also play a major role.
Finally, it is iropic to me that in this Kation many pages
must be written and many hours spent to explain why a
perso11 who can read whatever he desires, Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, may without violating a law
carry that literature in his brief case or bring it home
from abroad. Unless there is that ancillary right, one's
Stanley rights could be realized, as has been suggested.
ouly if one \\Tote or designed a tract in his attic, printed
or processed it in his basement, so as to be able to
read it in his study. United States v. Thirty Seven
Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 382 (Black, J., dissenting).
Most of the items that come this way denounced as
"obscene" are in my Yiew trash. I "·ould find few, if
any, that had any redeeming social value to m<'. But
'vhat may be trash to me ma.y be prized by others.r·
"Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U. S. G29, GG1-G71 (dissrnting).
n I d., at 491.

I
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Moreover, by ;vhat right under the Constitution do five
of us have to impose our set of values on the literature
of the day? There is danger in that course, the danger
of bending the popular mind to new norms of conformity. There is also danger in tolerance, for tolerance often leads to robust and ribald productions. Yet
that is the plain thrust of the First Amendment.
Irving Brant summed the matter up:
"Blessed with a form of government that requires
universal liberty of thought and expression, blessed
with a social and economic system built on that
same foundation, the American people have created
the danger they fear by denying to themselves the
liberties they cherish." Op. cit. supra, at 493.
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting.
We judges who work at the appellate level have an
understandable tendency to write essay-like opinions that
announce general constitutional principles, but often are
far removed from the gritty facts of the case.
Today we send a man to prison for distributing brochures which advertised books and a movie. A basic
premise of criminal law under our Constitution is that
it must give fair warning. I subrnit that the law of
obscenity as defined by legislatures and by courts is so
vague as not to give fair warning. Some make it a crime
to sell a book which deals with sex "in a manner appealing to prurient interests." 1 Some define obscenity as
literature which is "patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary standards." ~ Others make a book obscene when it is "utterly without redeeming social imRoth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 487.
California defines "obscene matter" as "matter, taken as a whole,
the predominant appeal of which to tho average person, applying
contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion ; and is matter which
taken as a whole goe::; substantiaUy beyond customary limits of candor
in description or representation of such mailers; and is matter
which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social imparlance." Calif. Penal Code § 311 (a).
~ 35-! U. S., at 489.
1
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portancc." 3 Some condemn it if its "dominant tendency
might be to deprave ot· corrupt a reader." 4 Others look
not to the content of the book but to whether it is advertised "to appeal to the erotic interests of customers." 5
Some condemn only "hard-core pornography"; but even
then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been said
of that definition , "I could never succeed in fdefining it]
intelligibly," but "I know it when I see it." 6
Those are the standards we ourselves have written into
the Constitution. 7 Yet how under these vague tests can
"·c sustain convictions for the sale of an article prior to
the time when some court has declared it to be obscene. I submit that prior to a court's declaration that
a specific publication is "obscene," th e la.w is far too
vague to send men to prison a.ncl yet satisfy th e requirements of clue process.
I d., 484 .
Id ., 502 (Harlan , J.).
5 G£nzburg v. United Stat es, 383 U . S. 463, 467 .
G Jacobelli8 v. Ohio, 378 U . S. 184, 197.
3

4

At the conclusion of a two-~• ra r ~ tudy , the U. S. Commi ~8 i o n on
Obscenity and Pornography determined th::tt the ~ t :md a rd s we hn,•e
written interfere with conRtitutionally protectrd m aterials:
"Society's attempts to lrgiRlatc for adults in thr arra of ob~ c enity
h n n~ not been successful. Pre;-;cnt laws prohibiting the consensual
sale or distribution of explicit sexual mnt crials to adults are rxtremely
unsatisfactory in their prnciiral applirntion. The Constitution permits material to b e clermrd ' ob~ c en e ' for adults only if , as a whole,
it appeals to the ' prnrient' interest of the ::t\'erage p e r~ on , iH' patently
offensive' in light of 'community st nndards,' and lacks 'redeeming
sorial value.' These Yal!;ue and hi!l:hly subjecti,·e aesthetic , psychological and morn! tests do no t pro,·ide meaningful guidance for l:lw
enforcement offirinls, juries or courts. As a result , law is inconsistently and som etimes erroneously applied and the distinctions
m ade by courts hrtween prohibit ed and permissible ma terials often
appear indefensibl e. Error;; in the npplication of the lnw nnd uncertainty about it s srope also cau ~ c intcreferenre with the communication of constitutionally protected materirrk" Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 59 (1970) .
7
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Yet we approved a conviction that sent Ralph Ginzburg to prison for five years s under those standards. This
petitioner fares better, getting only 60 clays in Jail. Yet
he could not possibly know whether the literature he
offered would be held obscene. As Mr. Justice Harlan
has said:
"The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is
that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's
decisions since Roth which have held particular material obscene or not obscene would find himself in
utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas,
390 u. s. 676, 707.
The decision of what is or is not obscene is a purely
personal decision by each judge, based on his tastes, his
background, and perhaps his neuroses. Mr. Justice Black
said in Kingsley International P1'ctures Cor]). Y. Regents,
360 U. S. 684, 590-691, that
"Such an individualized determination cannot be
guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards.
Accordingly, neither States nor moving picture
makers can possibly know in advance, with any fair
degree of certainty, "·hat can or cannot be done in
the field of movie making and exhibiting. This
uncertainty cannot easily be reconciled with the rule
of law which our Constitution envisages."
We should have too much pride in the rule of law and
in guidelines that keep a law from being a trap to fine
or imprison people for violating such vague laws. 9 "A
s Ginzburu v. United States, 3R3 U. S. 46;).
~It id no nn~wer to ~ny that Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476,
491-492, settled for all time the question whether obscenity standards arc w1constitut ionaUy vague. There, the Court noted "that
lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due
process." The Court then concluded that the "standard[s] for

70--73-DISSENT
4

MILLER v. CALIFORNIA

failure of a statute limiting freedom of expression to
give fair notice of what acts will be punished and such
a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions,.
protected by the principles of the First Amendment,
violates an accused's rights under procedural due process
and freedom of speech and press." Winters v. New York,
333 U. S. 507, 509-510. "[T]here is no extemalmeasuring rod for obscenity," Smith v. California, 361 U. S.
147, 165 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Our obscenity
decisions have been "left to a majority of this Court on
a case-by-case basis," ibid. (Black J., concurring), without the formulation of the predictable standards required
by Winters.
judging obscenity ... [it had] discus~ed, g[a]ve adequate warning
of the conduct proscribed .... " I d., at 491.
The cases relied upon to reach that conclusion were wholly inapposite to the standard of ;)recision necessary for the regulation of
constitutional frredoms surh as thosr serured by the First Amendment. "[T]his Comt has intimated that stricter standards of
permissible statutory Y::tgue11ess may be applied to a statute having
a potentially inhibiting effort on speech; a man may the less be
required to act at hi::; peril here, because the free dissemination of
ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151.
With one exception, however, the cases relied upon in Roth to gauge
the requisite statutory precision, all dealt with instances of economic
and social regulation where this Court has traditionally applied more
lenient standards than those used in the area of expression. That
sole exception-Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273-is a relic of the
days prior to Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, and no longer
is good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444.
Nor have our later decisions vindicated the determination in Roth
on the precision of obscenity standards. On the contrary, those
decisions have only further blurred the line between the constitutionally protected and that which five members of this Court will
allow to be proscribed and haw resulted in what one commentator
has labeled "a con.-titut ional disaster area." MacGrath, The Obscenity Cases: The Grape~ of Roth, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 7, 59.
Roth was, with all respect, predicated upon an improper premise·
and the ensuing years ha,·e accentuated that error .

.·
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We have struck down, as unconstitutionally vague,.
statutes limiting expression based upon such uncertain
terms as " [ d] escribing or portraying brutality, criminal
violence or depravity ... or sexual promiscuity or abnormal sexual relations." Interstate Circuit v. Dallas~
supra, at 681. So too, with other standards such as
"approve such films ... [as] are moral and proper ...
[and] disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or
immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt morals,"
1Iolmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U. S. 870;
"immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals," Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U. S. 587; "moral, educational or amusing and harmless," Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587; "prejudicial to·
the best interests of the people," Gelling v. Texas, 343
U. S. 960; "sacrilegious," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson~
343 U. S. 495; "criminal news or stories of deeds of bloodshed or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for incitingviolent and depraved crimes," Winters v. New York,
supra.
How can it be maintained that our obscenity decisions
provide any more definite a standard than this plethora
of statutes which we have held to be unconstitutionally
vague? As Mr. Justice Black said in Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U. S. 463, 478-480 (dissenting opinion):
"I think that the criteria declared . . . as guidelines . . . are so vague and meaningless that they
practically leave the fate of a person charged with
violating censorship statutes to the unbridled discretion, whim and caprice of the judge or jury which
tries him ....
"(a) The first element ... is that the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal
to the prurient interest in sex. It seems quite apparent to me that human beings, serving either as
judges or jurors, could not be expected to give any
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sort of decision on this element which would even
remotely promise any kind of uniformity in the
enforcement of this law. . . . [T]he submission of
such an issue as this to a judge or jury amounts to
practically nothing more than a request for the
judge or juror to assert his own personal beliefs
about whether the matter should be allowed to be
legally distributed ....
11
(b) The second element ... is that the material
must be 'patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters ... .'
... [H] ere again the guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with obscenity must depend in the
filial analysis upon the personal judgment and attitudes of particular individuals and the place where
the trial is held ....
11
(c) A third element . . . is that the material
must be 'utterly without redeeming social value.'
This element seems to me to be as uncertain, if not
even more uncertain, than is the unknown substance of the Milky Way. . . . Whether a particular
treatment of a particular subject is with or without
social value in this evolving, dynamic society of ours
is a question upon which no uniform agreement
could possibly be reached among politicians, statesmen, professors, philosophers, scientists, religious
groups or any other type of group. A case-by-case
assessment of social values by individual judges and
jurors is, I think, a dangerous technique for government to utilize in determining whether a man stays
in or out of the penitentiary."
In Rabe Y. TV ashington, 405 U. S. 313, this Court recently held that it was a denial of clue procE"ss to sustain
a conviction under an obscenity statute where the meaning of the statutory word "obscene" was not clarified until
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the conviction was on appeal. Under such circumstances,
we reasoned, the defendant was not given fair notice of
the conduct \Yhich wal3 proscribed. I fail to see the difference between Rabe and the typical obscenity case
where the defendant may not know whether a particular
book or motion picture is constitutionally protected until
his case becomes final on appeal.
If a specific book, play, paper, or motion picture has
in a civil proceeding been condemned as obscene and review of that finding has been completed, and thereafter
a person publishes, shows, or displays that particular
book or film, then a vague law has been made specific.
There would remain the underlying question whether
the First Amendment allmYs an implied exception in the
case of obscenity. I do not think it does and my views
on the isc:ue have been stated over and again. 10 But at
least a criminal prosecution brought at that juncture
would not violate the time-honored void-for-vagueness
tcst. 11
10
Sec United States v. 1!2 200-Ft. Reels of Film, post, nt
Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U. S. 97G, 977; Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U. R. 629, G50; Jarobs v. New York, 088 U.S. 431, 436; Ginzburg
Y. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 482; M emoi1·s v. Massachusetts, 3S3
U.S. 413, 424; Bantam Books, luc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72;
Times Film Co1'JJ. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78; Smith v.
California, 361 U. 8. 147, 167; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684, 697; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508; Kingsley Books, Inr. v. Brown, 354 U. 8. 436, 4.46; S1tperior Films, Inc.
v. Departrnrnt of Education, 346 U. 8. 587, 588; Gelling v. Texas,

343 U. 8. 960.
11
The Commission on Ob,.renity and Pornography has ad\·ocilted
such a procedure:
"The Commission recommends ihe enactment, in all jurisdictions
which enact or retain pro\·isions prohibiting the disReminntion of
sexual materials to adults or young persons, of legislation authorizing
prosecutors to obtain declaratory jud!!:mf'ntl:l as to whether particular
materials fall within existing legal prohibitions . . . .
"A declaratory judgment procedure ... would permit prosecutors
to proceed civilly, rather than through the criminal process, against
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No such protective procedure has been designed by
California in this case. Obscenity-which even we cannot define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send
men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in
a N a.tion dedicated to fair trials and due process.

suspected violations of obscenity prohibition. If such civil procedures are utilized, penalties would be imposed for violation of the
law only with respect to conduct occurring after a civil declaration
is obtained. The Commission believes this course of action to be·
appropriate wheneYer there is an existing doubt regarding the legal
status of materials; where other alternatives are available, the criminal process should not ordinarily be invoked against persons who
might have reasonably belieYed, in good faith, that the books or
films they distributed were entitled to constitutional protection, for
any threat of criminal sanctions might otherwise deter the free distribution of constitutionally protected material." Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 70-71 (1970).
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Messrs. Hamm<md, Foz,

TO:

DATE:

June 8, 19'12

Wllldns&m aad Pamell

~1.

FROM:

Lewta F. Powell, Jr.

Obecealty Cues
All IwW have to come dOirll "off of the face" wttbiD. the nut

week or 10 days at most, I would appreetate aome adYice u to how
thla problem is handled in other countrlea - upeelallJ In Engl&Dd.

Larry is assigned to the obscenity cues, but tt may be that

me

of the

other cHerlts will be free to look Into this before Larry

concludes his present prior assignments.

Although I am awaiting Blll Brennan's oplnicm, we understand
that he is abandoning prior precedents and advocating a new constituticmal
rule which would allow unlimited sale and Viewing of what heretofore

has been regarded u obecene material, prorided caly the lDterut of
mmore and noo-u-tm1 adults Ia

pr~ected.

This "Interest'' approach bdtJally bad CGD81derable appeal to

me.

At least it would be a way of getting this Court oat of the censor-

ship business. Yet, the more I have reflected on the problem over the

put few mcmths, the poeater hu been my coaeem u to the couequencea

"

,,
'

.

2.
of adopting the ''interest" teat. I start from a ccmvlctlOD that the cpaJJty

ola society and a elvUtzattm depends, In stgniftcant degree, upm the
pruence of some moral standards. AIJ a lawyer, and al8o u

ODe

who

bu riewed human nature o.er quite a 8p8ll, I kll<7'r that laws do not

determine moral standards or values. I therefore favor a minimum of
effort by legislatures and c oorts to regulate or restrict what may be

regarded as "immoral" cooduct.

Yet, one of the purposes of law 1s to afford some protectlm to
the sensibilities and to the values of a majority of the people. Thus,
although we have moved

(happily 1 agree) to the mtnl-aklrts aad more

dubiously to the topless and bottomless cabarets, few would argue
(although the munber perbape 18 blereumc) tbat pabllc D&kedaeu 8boald
be allowed Jndtscrtmlnately on the streets and 1n the restaurants, or

that public copulation is protected by Firat Amendment rtgbts. If theH
examples seem extreme (and to some they would not), consider what
would have been sald a couple of decades ago with reapect to the lep.lUy
of the topleas and bottomless cabaret ntertatnment. The point here
is that the movement of optntm, and of law, has been rather dramatteally

toward Increased "freedom" or- u viewed by many- lDcreaaed lieenae.

:

3.
However one may view the trend, I am unpersuaded that thoae
who wish to enrich themselves by proctactng, selling, ablbltlng and

pandertng some of the filth that 18 now available, ahould be accorded
a prtYlleged sanctuary by this Court. If we 'filidafo the "interest,. doctrine
there will be a flood of material deeply offensive to many - tf not most ettlt:ens. WUltng purchasers will exist by the t8H of thOWJI.Dds.

The

pornography which they purchase will not be locked in theffamUy wall
safe, and viewed or read cwaly In private. We know perfectly well that
tt wtll be widely disseminated, and that 1n tact it wUl reach the young

throagh all sorts of channels.

Although I have had no opportunity to study Justice Harlan's
views with any care, Jay has summarized them briefly on pp. 1216121 'I of hts Virginia l .aw Review article on Harlan. Harlan would

allow the state• wide, but not wholly unrestricted, latitude to regulate

obscenity at the intrastate level. The Congress would, of course,
eoottnue SliCh regulattc:m as it deems appropriate with respect to
interstate comnMirce.

I woald like to hear more about the pros and ems of the
Harlan view.

But the intUal purpose of this memorandum

wu to request that

one of you do such research as may be necessary to determine how
England deals with this problem.
L. F. P., Jr.
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Memorandum of MR. JuSTICE BRENNAN.
I think that the time has come when the Court should
admit that the standards fashioned by it to guide administration of this Nation's obscenity laws do not work,
and that we must. change our constitutional a,pproach
i£ we are to bring stability to this area of the law. This
memorandum will trace the sources of the difficulty and
propose a solution.1
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1057) , of course,
held that obscenity, although expression, is not within
the area of speech or press constitutionally protected
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against
fed eral or state infringement.2 But Roth also emphasized that "sex and obscenity are not snyonymous," id.,
at 484, and that sexually oriented matter not obscene
has the full protection of the Constitution, this because
1 I do not acldrt>ss here the problem of live performances involving
sexual acts, which may bring into play ronsiderution c not rclrvant
to the analy::>iR of writ ten, pirtorial, or three-dim en ~iona l sexually
oriented expression.
:! Even under Roth, it should be pointed out, governmental regulation of obscenity has been subject to the commands of reasonableness under the Due Process Clau::>e, sec GinsbeTg v. N ew YoTk, 390
U. S. 629 (1968), and the Federal Government has been limited to
the exercise of its enumerated powcri:) .

~f/t.J/1"'(_ ~

f'
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"[s]ex, a great and mysterious motive force m human
life has indisputably been a. subject of absorbing interest through the ages; it is one of the vital problems
of human interest and public concern." Id., at 487."
The core of our problem has been our inability to
provide tools that effectively separate obscenity from
other sexually oriented expression that has constitutional protection, so that our laws will operate only to
suppress the former. We have insisted that because
"the freedoms of expression . . . are vulnearable to
gravely damaging yet barely visibly encroachments,"
only "procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected rsexuall expression"
can be tolerated. Bantam. Books, Inc. v. Sulliva·n, 372
U. S. 58, 66 (1963). In that respect, we have merely
applied the larger principle . that "[t]he separation of
legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for ... sensitive
tools . . . . " Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525
(1958). Candor compels the frank admission that we
have not fa~ wned t.Iiose •rscnSitiVe tools"" m t he obscen-

-----------------------------------------------------

I
aJ.- • •

f .;#tAt'

-61r~

/Aitl..·~ Cj ~

"A~ to all ~uch problem~. thi~ Court said in Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88, 101-102.
"'The freedom of ~perch and of the prc~s gnnr:mtcecl b.v the
Constitution embmee~ nt t hr lrast thr librrty to discu~s publicly and
1rnthfnlly all matters of ]ntbh:c concern, without previous restr.'lint
or fC'nr of snbseqnrnt puniRhmc·n1. Thr rxigenciep of the colonial
period and the efTorts to secure freedom from oppressive administration dcvrloprd a broadcnrcl concPption of these librrtirs as adequate to suppl~· the pnblic nrcd for information and education with
reswct to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom of discu~sion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrnre all issues about 1vhirh information is needed or appropriate

to enable the mrmbers of satiety to cope 1cith the exigencies of thrdr
period.'

(Emphnsi~

added.)"

al~o, e. (f., Thomas v. Collins, 323
U. S. 516, 531 (1945) ("the rights of free speech and a free press
nrc not confined to any field of human interest").

Both, 354 U. S., nt 487-488. Sec

."
·-~
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ity area. The attempt, as the late Mr. Justice Harlan
observed. has only "produced a variety of views among
tho members of the Court unmatched in any other course
of constitutional adjudication." Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704-705 (1968) (separate opinion). He concluded that "rt]he upshot of all this divergence is that anyone who undertakes to examine the
Court's decisions since Roth which have held particular
material obscene or not obscene would find himself in
utter bewilderment." !d., at 707. At the outset a brief
review of that divergence is in order.
I

All but two members of this Court who have addressed
tho question since Roth have shared tho view that there
is something called "obscenity" outside the ambit of
the First Amendment. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once
remarked, "Even the author of 'Laciy Ch; ttorley's
Lover' ... knew there was such a thing as pornogrl:!:Phy,
dirt for ....dirts,sg.~ .. .! ' Kingsley P2ctu res Cor;:-v.
Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 692 (1959). Yet a majority
have not been able to settle on a satisfactory definition
for obscenity in the context of a complete bar on its
dissemination. In Roth five members of the Court did
conclude that obscenity could be determined in terms
of '\\'hether to the avera.ge person, apply contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the materia.l as a whole appeals to prurie11t intf'rest." 3!)4 U. S.,
at 489. But agreement on that test-achieved in the
abstract and without reference to the particular material
before tho Court, sec id., at 481 n. 8-was short-lived.
Tho painful history of the Court's subsequent decisions need not be recounted in detail. It is sufficient
to note that by 1967 the following views had emerged:
Mr. Justice Black and MR. JusTICE DotrGLAS consistently mainta'iil'ed that government is wl;ny powerless

j

.
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to regulate any sexually oriented matter on the ground
of its obscenity. See, e. g., Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U. S. 643, 476, 482 (1966) (dissenting opinions);
Jacobellis " · Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion); Roth, 354 U . S., at 508 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, believed
that the Federal Go;
ment in the exercise of its enumerated powers could control the distribution of "hardcore" pornography, while the States ·were afforded more
latitude to "[ban] any material which, taken as a whole,
has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings
to treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner,
under rationally established criteria for judging such
material." Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 204 (dissenting opinion). See also, e. g., Ginzburg v. United StaLes,
supra, at 493 (dissenting opinion); A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205, 215 ( 1964) (dissenting opinion
joined by Clark, J.); Roth, 354 U. S., at 496 (separate
opinion). MR. JusTICE S'I'EWART regarded "hard-core."
pornography as the limit of both federal and state power.
See , e. () ., "Gi'l7.zbuhg v. United States, supra., at 407
(clissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra., at 197
(concurring opinion).
The view that had the most, but not majority, SUI1port was the one adopted by Mr. Chief Justice W an·en,
Mr. Justice F~s, and myself-namely, that Federal
or State Governments could control the distribution of
material where "three elements . . . [independently]
coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient inttrest in sex; (b) tho material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U. S. 413, 418 (1966). Even this formulation, how-

--
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ever, concealed differences of opinion. Compare Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 192-195 (BRENNAN, J., joined
by Goldberg, J.) (community standards national), ·with
id., at 200-201 (Warren, C. J., joined by--cra;k, J., dissenting) (community standards local). 4 Moreover, it
did not provide a definition covering all situations. See
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966) (prurient
appeal defined in terms of a deviant sexual group) ;
Ginzburg v. United States, supra ("pandering" probative evidence of obscenity in close cases). See also
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (obscenity
for juveniles). ~r, finally, as I mentioned, did it ever
command a majority of the Court. Aside from theother viewsCiescnbeCT a"'5ove, M r. Justice Clark believed
that "social importance" could only "be considered together with evidence that the material in question appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive."
:Memoirs v. ,Mas.sachusetts, supra, at 445 ( djssenting
opinion). Similarly, MR. JusTICE WHITE held "a publication to be obscene if its predominant theme appeals
to the prurient interest in a manner exceeding customary
limits of candor," id., at 460-461 (dissenting opinion),
and regarded "'social importance' ... not [as] an independent test of obscenity, but [as] relevant only to
determining the predominant prurient interest of the
m~terial . . . . " I d., at 462.
In the face of this divergence of opinion the Court
began the practice in 1967 in Redrup v. New York, 386
U. S. 767, of per curiam reversals of convictions for the
4
On the question of community standards sec also Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970) (BLA~KMUN, J., joined by BunGER, C. J .,
and Harlan , J. , di~scnting) (flexibility for state standards); Cain v.
Kentucky, 397 U. S. 319 (1970) (BunGER, C. J., dissenting) (same);
Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
joined by STEWART, J.) (national standnrds in context of federal
prosecution).

I
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dissemination of materials that at least five memLers
of the court, applying their separate tests, deemed not
to be obscene." This approach culminated the attempt
in Roth to separate all forms of sexually oriented expression into two categori0s-thc one subj0ct to full
governmental suppression and the other beyond the reach
of governmental control to the same extent as any other
form of speech or press. Neither the Reclrup approach
Hor the underlying effort in Roth can be allowed to continue further, for experience has shown that both are
flatly inconsistent with abiding principl0s marked out
by our obscenity decisions themselves.
II

The touchstone for analysis in the First Amendment
area is the principle that " [ w] hen we deal with the
complex strands in the web of freedoms which make
up free speech, the operation and effect of the method
by which speech is sought to be restrained must be subjected to close anaiysis and critical judgment in the
light of the particular circumstances to which it is npplied." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 ( 1958). The
authority for this principle and the ramifica.tions of its
application may be found in no better place than our
obscenity decisions. Thus, in Roth we said.
"The fundamental freedoms of speech and press
have contributed greatly to the development and
well-being of our free society and are indispensable
r. No less thnn 31 en~'<'~ hnw hern di~po,rd of in this fashion. Aside
from the three rn~cs rc,·rr~rcl in Redrup, these are found nt 388
U. S. 440, 441, 442, 44~. 444, 446, 447, 44!-l, 452, 45~, 454 (1967);
~89 U.S. 47, 48 , 50, 89,57:3, 578 (1967-1968); ~90 U.S. 340 (196 ) ;
392 U. S. 6!55 (1968): 397 U. S. ~19 (1970); 398 U. S. 278, 434
(1970); 399 U. S. 524 (1970); 401 U. S. 100G (1971); 402 U. S.
938 ( 1971) ; 404 U. S. 806, 988 ( 1971) (two derisions report eel at
988).
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to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the
by the States. The door barring federal and state
intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar . . . . "
354 U. S., at 488.
The applications of this principle have been numerous.
First. we have held that the defini_!ion of obscenit_y must
provide adequate notice of exactl what is prohibited
from 1sscnunatwn. See, e. g., Rabe v. TV as 7,mgton,
U. S. - ; Interstate Circuit, l11c. Y. Dallas, 390
U. S. 676 (1968); ·w inters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507
(1948). Of course, essential to the administration of
all our criminal laws under the Due Process Clause is
that "all [persons 1 arc entitled to be informed as to
what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). Anything less is a
denial of fundamental fairness and an invitation to
arbitrary and uneven enforcement of the la\Y. See.
e. g., Papachristou v. Cily of Jacksonville, 405 U. 8. 156
(1972). But the necessity for notice has particular importance in the area of First Amendment freedoms. As
this Court has indicated, "stricter standards of pennissiblc statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute
having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man
may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser."
Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151 (1959).
Like,Yisc, \\·c have indicated that the definition of
obscenity must be effective to safeguard protected expression. For this reason Roth rejected the test of Regina
1. Hicklin, [18G8] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, that "[judged]
obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most
susceptible persons" and therefore "might \\"ell encompass material legitimately treating \\"ith sex .... " 354
U. S .. at 489. Cf. Mishkin v. l\'ew York, 383 U.S. 502,
509 (1966). Also for this reason no "enactment . . .
[may] reduce the adult population ... to reading only

1
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'vhat is fit for children," Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S.
380. 383 (1957); cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U. S. 58, 71 ( Hl63), nor may a statute "11revent
the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture
advocates an idea . . . . " Kingsley Pitcures Corp. v.
Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959). Cf., e. g., Gooding
v. Wilson,- U.S.- (1972). In sum:
"The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth . . . [is] the danger of tolerating, in the
area of First Amendment fredoms, the existence
of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant,
367 U. S. 717, 733. These freedoms arc delicate
and vulnearable, as ''"ell as supremely precious in
our society. The threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. Cf. Smith v. California,
[361 U. S.], at 151-154; Speiser v. Randall, 357
357 U. S. 513, 526. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432-433 (1963).
The same principle that has commanded this result
has also dictated that "a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity .... "
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 731 (1961).
"Rather, the First Amendment requires that procedures
be incorporated that 'ensure against the curtailment of
constitutionally protected expression . . . .' " Blount
v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 416 (1971) (quoting Ba-;{;m
B.Q_oks, -.
Inc. v. Sullivan, supra). Thus, for example:
"to avoid constitutional infirmity a scheme of administrative censorship must: place the burdens of
initiating judicial review and of proving that the

-

-
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material is unprotected expression on the censor;
require 'prompt judicial review'-a final judicial
determination on the merits within a specified, brief
period-to prevent tho administrative decision of
the censor from achieving an effect of finality; and
limit to preservation of the status quo for the shrotest, fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution, any restraint imposed in advance of the
final judicial determination." !d., at 417 (summarizing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51. 58-60·
(1965). See also, e. g., United States v. ThirtySevP.n Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 367-375 (1971);
Lee Art Th.eatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636
(1968); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S.
205 (1964) (plura.lity opinion).
In a similar vein the First Amendment has been held
not to allow the possession of obscene material to b~
made a crime without some proof of the possessor's
knowledge of its contents, Smith v. California, 361 U. S.
147 ( 1959), for "proof of scienter" is necessary "to avoid
the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material and to compensate for the ambiguities
inherent in the definition of obscenity." Mishkin Y.
New York, supra, at 511. See also Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U. S. 629, 644-645 (1968). Nor has it been
permissible for courts to eschew their responsibility to
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generalized definitions, the constitutional problem
in the last analysis becomes one of particularized
judgments which appellate courts must make for
themselves." Roth, 345 U. S., at 497 (Harlan, J.)
(separate opinion).
This rule, although once a mooted point," was firmly
established by R earup~v. "f! ew Y ork, 386 '0. S. 7(f/ t10li7),
and 1t progeny, see n. 5, supra, a!J!:l?Plicable to fue
obSceJu ty no less than to any other area in volvin free
e~ion. ee, e. g., 'ew or c '2mes Co. v. Sulliva11,
3~ S. 254, 284-285 (1964). It "·as indeed but
another application of the principle "that procedures be
incorporated that 'ensure against the curtailment of
constitutionally protected expression . . . . ' "
Fiften yeara experience since Roth has brought me
to the firm conclusion that the effort to safeguard First
Amendment values exemplified in the foregoing review
has failed of its objective because certain predicates of
~ :
Roth have proved to be U11souncl. No definition of ob~~.t- ~
scenity we have yet devised is itself completely un~
~ ambiguous, though various tests have been upheld under
t __...
0-"
..(he Due Process Clause. See Gi:nsberg v. l\"ew York,
J>&A ·
~
s_upra, at 643 (modified Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
~ U.S. 413,418 (1966), test); M'ishkin v. New York, supra,
a.t 506-507 ("hard-core" pornography); Roth, 354 U. S.,

.>.

f

u CompnrC' Ginsbl'rg v. New York, 300 U. S. 629, 672 (1968)
(FortnR, .T., di~~mling), Jacobl'llis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 187-190
(1964) (BnF<NNAN , J., joinrd by Goldbrr~ ..T.), Manual Entr1·pri..~l's,
Ill('., v. Day, :370 U.S. 478,488 (Il::lrlnn, .T., joinC'd b~- R'l'E,YAnT, .T.),
and Kingsley Pictures Co1'p. v. Regents, ::lGO U. S. 684, 695-597
(FrankfttrtC'r , .T., eonrurring) , 708 (Harlan, .T., joinrd b~r Frnnkfurlcr,
.J., ::mel \VhittnkC'r, .T. , romurrin~) (1950), with lValke1' v. Ohio, 308
U. S. 43-1: (1970) (Bunr.EH, C . .J., di~:-;cntin~). Jacobl'llis v. Ohio,
supra, n,t 202-208 (Wnrren, C ..T., joinrd by Clark, .J., di~sC'nling),
Uoth, 354 U. S., at 492 n. 30, and Kingsley Book~, Inr. v. Brown,
:354 U.S. 4:36, 4~7 (1957) (BHE~KAN, .T., di~~C'ntin~).
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at 491- 492 (Roth test). Indeed, the Court has more
than once previously acknowledged that "constitutionally protected expression . . . is often separated from
obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line." Bantam
Book, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963). See also,
e. g., .il!?'.shkin v. New York, supra, a.t 511 (quoted p. - ,
supra). In any event, the current multitude of standards, when added to "the perhaps inherent residual
~
~
vag ueness" of each, Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S.
464, 475 n. 19 (1966), c~ n no longer possibly be said ..a-~ .. J... ,~~.-/
to "give ade uatc "·arning of tho conduct proscribed
an mar\: ' ... boundanes su c1ently Istinct for .JUC ges
and juries fairly to administer the law ..... ' " Roth,
354 U. S., at 491. As Mr. Justice Black said "after the
fourteen separate opinions handed down in [the trilogy
of cases decided in 1966.1 no person, not even the most
learned judge much less a layman. is capable of k11owing
in advance of an ultim.atc clccisio11 in hi particular
case by this Court whether certain material comes within
the area of 'obscenity' .... " Gi11zburg v. United States,
supm, at 480-481 (dissenting opinion). See also the
statement of Mr. Justice Harlan in Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676:7'07 (1968) (separate opinion), quoted p. - , supm. The result ha.s been not
merely to make "fb] ookselling ... a hazardous profession." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 674 (Fortas,
J~7
J., dissenting). \Ve have also necessarily paid an intolerable price by chilling the free dissemination of ideas
in the area of protected expression.
The practice of per curiam reversals, instituted in
Redrup v. New York, supra, has only compounded the
uncertainty of the test of obscenity by announcing no
rationale of decision. At the same time, it has thereby
given at lca.st the appearance of arbitarary action by
this Court, see Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U. S. 278 (1970)

..............

-
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(Harlan, J., dissenting), and placed a heavy toll on our
judicial resources. 7 Most important, no less than the
procedural schemes struck down in such cases as Blount
v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410 (1971), and Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), it hR.s resulted in the effective
censorship of protected expression by leaving lO\\·er court
determinations of obscenity intact despite the fact the
status of the material alleged to be obscene is entirely
unsettled until final review here. 8 It bears emphasis
that the fundamental vice of this approach is not that
courts are called upon to make their o"·n determinations
of obscenity vel non, but that the st.anclard by which
they are required to do that is left wholly ambiguous.
Redrup, in other words, although firmly esstublishing
the thoroughly sound requirement for de novo judicial
review of allegedly obscene matter, see p. -, supra,
cannot be used as a substitute for defining the test of
obscenity itself without also unduly burdening our courts
and, more importantly, infringing free speech.
The inability of five members of this Cort to agree
on a standard of obscenity and the practice, as a result,
7 The havoc wreaked on lower courts attempting to comply with
the covert conrlu~ions we havr rrached under our Redrup deci8ions,
sec n. 5, supra, is vividly demonstrated by the painstaking rJTorts
recently made by 1he Court of Appeals for the Di~trirt of Columbia
to establish and rationalize the kinds of materiab we haYe found not
to be obscene. See Iluffman v. United States, No. 23 ,782, slip op.,
at 13-28 (decided Oct. 7, 1971).
8 In Interstate Circuit, In c. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 690 n. 22
( 1968) (emphasis added), the Court indicated that "[t]he assurance
of a 'prompt final judicial deri~ion' [neces~ary to make certain that
the censor's determination of obscenity does not become prematurely
final] . .. is made
by the guaranty of a speedy determination
in the trial court .
See also Teitel F'ilm Corp. v. Cusack, 390
U. S. 139 (1968). But "speedy determination in the trial court"
suffices only if there is some a~surance that that judgment is probably correct. By leaving the trst of obscenity ob~cure, Redrup has
completely undermined the basis for any such assurance.
0

0
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of resorting to an unarticulated determination of its
existence on a case-by-case basis arc, however, not the
fundamental difficulty, but rather are symptomatic of
more pervasive problems. Prophetically, Mr. Justice
H rlan criticized the Court in Roth f2!: "[a~ ] that
'o]?scenity' ~ a ~culiar genus o 'speech and pr:._ess' '~
is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy
is a m011_g Other plants." 354 U. S., at 497 (separate
opinion ).Anci M r. Chief Justice Warren stated in a
related vein that obscenity is a function of the circwnstances of its dissemination:
"It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person.
The conduct of the defendant is the central issue,
not the obscenity of a book or picture. The nature
of the materials is, of course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials
are thus placed in context from which they draw
color and character." I d., at 495 (concurring opinion). See also, e. g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S.
184, 201 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 445-446 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
These observations--that the obscenity of any particular item may depend upon nuances of presentation and
the context of its dissemination-have been recognized
by a majority of this Court, see Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U. S. 463 (1966), and indeed underlie and
have been confirmed by our Redrup experience. Thus,
for example, our cases have been deciphered to distinguish between the mere depiction of genitalia and
even the suggestion of a semi-erect peuis, on the one
hand, and the presentation of nude models with full
erections, on the other. See Huffman v. United States,
No. 23,782, slip op., at 21-22, 23-24 (CADC 1971).
Similarly, Redrup itself suggested that obtrusive exposure to unwilling individuals, distribution to juveniles,

14

MILLER v. CALIFORNIA

and "pandering" ma.y also bear upon the determination
of obscenity. See 386 U. S., at 769. These sorts of
distinctions, needless to say, are judgmental and can
only be applied on "a case-by-case, sight-by-sight" basis.
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 516 (1966) (Black,
J., disenting).u
These considerations, of course, call into question
whetl1er any standard of obscenity may meet t he test
of certainty ancl l ack of overbreadth required by the
Due Process Clause ancr the First Amendment. They
suggest indeed that no one definition, no matter how
narrowly drawn, can possibly suffice for all situations,
cf. the discussion of the Memoirs v. Massachusetts test,
p. -, supra, or carve out fully unprotected expression
from all media without also creating the substantial risk
of encroachment upon Due Process and First Amendment values. Although obscenity exists and, as it has
been said, we "know it when [we] see it," Jacobellis
v. Ohio, supra, at 107 (STEWART, J., concurring), words
are evidently inadequate to describe it in advance with
sufficient specifi"ci ty to precluae an a bndgement of the
free and precious traffic in ideas. In Roth " ·e held
that the fact "'[t]hat there may be marginal cases in
n Cf. Fullrr, Chnng;ing Sorirt~· Puts Tn~te to thr Test , The Nntionnl
Observer, .Tunc 10, 19i2, n t 24:

"Context is Rvcn}thing
"Context is the es~cncc of e~thrtic judgment . . . . Thrrc is a
world of differen('c bet ween Plnyboy n nd lr~~ prrtentious girly mngnzines on the one hnnd, and on the other, The Nude, a picture
selection from the whole hi~tory of art, by that fine tenchrr and
interpreter of civilization, Kennrth Clark. People may be jn~t as
11akcd in one or the othrr, the bodies inhrrrntly just ns benutiful,
but the context of the formrr is Yulgar, of 1he latter, esthetic.
"The snme \Yorcls, the ~::nne actions, thnt are chenp and tawdry
in onr book or pln~r may contribute to the sublimity, comic uniYersality, or tragic power of others. For a Yiahlr theory of taste,
context is nll. ...
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" ·hich it is difficult to determine the side of the line
on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient
reason to hold the [test of obscenityl too ambiguous to
define a criminal offense.' " 354 U. S .. at 491-492. Our
experience since Roth, however, has demonstrated that
the "marginal cases" arc neither the few nor the atypical.
1 conCTude accordingly that the Constitution requires
us not only to abandon the effort following Redrup to
pick out obscene materials on a case-by-cas~is, but
also to reconsider the attempt altogether under Roth
to define a category of all sexually oriented exprc!"sion
that may properly be subject to outright suppression by
government.
Last Term, in an opinon I joined, the Court noted:
"[T]here is developing sentiment that adults
should have complete freedom to produce, deal in,
possess and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them and that the law's involvement with obscenity should be limited to those
situations where children arc involved or where it
it necessary to prevent imposition on unwilling recipients of " ·hatr\'er age. The concPpts ii1volved
arc said to be so elusive and the laws so inherently
unenforceable without extravagant expenditures of
time and effort by enforcement officers and tho
courts that basic reassessment is not only "·ise but
essential." United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351,
357 (1971).
The Court, nevertheless, concluded that "the task of
restructuring the obscenity laws lies with those "·ho
pass, repeal , and amend statutes and ordinances." Ibid.
With all respect, I must now disassociate myself from
that view. The law of obscenity has been fashioned by
this Court-and necessarily so under our duty to enforce the Constitution. If that law now offends' the
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constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause
and the First Amendment, as I believe it does, the
remedy is one this Court, expounder of the Constitution, must provide.
III
~

...................

.,.

Since obscenity has not and cannot be defined in advance with sufficient specificity to prevent encroachment
on protected sexually oriented expression, it follows that ~:-..~ .....t..e.,_
it may not be wholly suppressed, at least in the absence , ~ ' ' J
1
of a demonstration of some 'subordinating governmental'
interest requiring that result. 10 No such interest exists. ....._ • /_ ~ .,G..Jt_
The Court indeed has already reached the conclusion
~ ~ ..1'1- .,.,..~
that total suppression of obscenity is impermissible in
- ' - ~ ~~
view of the impossibility of satisfactorily defining it and
~ ~
the absence of countervailing considerations. In Stan~--- L~:.__
...
......
ley v. Geo!£,ia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), the Court
~'f lAA.~.
held "that the First and Fourttenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material
a crime." The Court reached this result only after
finding it irrelevant "that obscene materials . . . are
arguably devoid of any ideological content. The line
between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all." Id., at 566. The
Court also necessarily rejected the notion that there
is a legitimate state concern in the "control [of] the
moral content of a person's thoughts." Id., a,t 565.
Nor d~d the Court find any subordinating interest based
onlJiegrow1d ''that exposure to obscene materials may
lead to Ge'Viant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual v1ot/"'A.J -u-C)

--o -----

-

10
No such interest, of course, had to be shown in Roth, for it was
there assumea- fncorrcctly, aR CXpenence has proven-that obscenity
could be separated from other sextwlly oriented material wiLhout
impairment of First Amendment values. See 354 U. S., at 486-487.
See also, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969).
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lence." !d., at 566. The Court explained, id., at
566-567:
"There appears to be little empirical basis for that
assertion.[uJ But more important, if the State is
only concerned about printed or filmed materials
inducing antisocial conduct, 'vc believe that in the
context of private consumption of ideas and informn.tion we should adhere to the view that '[a]mong
free men. the deterrents ordinarily to be applied
to prevent crime arc education and punishment
for violations of the Jaw . .
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)."
Finally, the Court found unpersuasive "the argument
that prohibition of possession of obscene materials is a
necessary incident to statutory schemes" serving legitimate state interests. !d., at 567. "[W]e do not think,"
the Court said, tha.t those interests "would justify infringement of the individual's right to read or observe . . . . Because that right is so fundamental to
our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may
11

Indeed, since Stanley wns decided, the President's Commission

o~Obsec~r an ~ ph:v has concluded:

n sum, empinca re~ , rch designed to clarify the question has
found no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials
plays a significant role in the eausation of delinquent or criminal behavior among youth or adults. The Commis~ion cannot conclude
that exposure to erotic materials i~ a faclor in the causation of sex
crime or sex dclinquenc~'·" Report of the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography 27 (1970) (footnote omitted).
To the contrary, the Commis~ion found that "[o]n the positive side,
explicit ~cxual materials arc sought as a source of entertainment and
information by substantial numbers of American adults. At times,
these materials also appear to serve to increase and facilitate constructiYe communi ration about se:-.'Ual mat tcrs within marriage."
/d., at 53.
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not be justified by the need to ease the administration
of otherwise valid criminal laws. Sec Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959)."
The rc!::ult in Stanley also rested, of course, on othe1·
propositions. The Court held, in particular, that there
is a First Amendment "right to receive information ... , regardless of [itsl social worth ... ," that
"takes on an added dimension" in the context of an
intrusion into the privacy of one's home. Id., at 564.
The Court has recently disavowed the first half of this
st!!:!:ei~ent--and, in n}i v~w, properly so.'" But the
other holdirig'S"of Stan ley are no less true today than
when they were first announced, and, in my judgment,
we should not shrink from the conclusion they logically
c01n pel-namely, tf1ato6sccne materials may not be
t'Ot'aily witiilield from public consumption with,out i.D.fr~1 g_emen ~tec£ecr sexually ori£nted expres~ n.

i
(

'"Although Stan/ry stated that it~ result w.1~ in no way inconsiRtent
with Roth, sec :)94 U. S., at 56:)-564, 5()8, the contrary iR, with all
respect, unquestionably correct. :For, if thc1·e is a "right to receive
information . . . , rrga rdiCSS Of ritR l ~oria] WOrth," the materia];:;
~ubjrct to that right muRt of ncrc~Rity be clothed with Fir~! Amendment 11rotcct ion. Sec Lamont v. Postmaste1' Gcne1'al, :381 U. S. 301,
:307 ( 1965) (concurring opinion). A~ indii·atrd infm, however, I
a.s!!!:crr to the view thnt thrrr i~ a category of exprcs~ion ronrcrnir;g
sex, called 11 ob~ccnity," that is wit hout social value and beyond the
mnbit ot ihc F lr~t. AmcndmPnt,. Th:ll, 111 any event, appears lo have
bern tho i)OS 111on o(the Court la~t Term in United States v. Reidel,
402 U. S. 351 (1971), where the 'right to receive' referred to in
Stanley" wa~ held not to bP "so broad a~ to immunize [commercial]
dealing;; in ob~renity . . . ," id., at :~515, and Roth w:1s re-affirmed.
Sec id., at 354, 35fi. Src nbo United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 375-:377 (1971) (plmalit~· opinion).
Of cour~c. for the rcn~on~ gi\·cn in the text I now di~assoeiate myHe![ from the O]linion~ I joined in United &atcs v. Reidel and United
States v. 'Thirty-Sct•en Photographs, S1l]J7'a. I do so, however, noL
on the ba~i~ of any First Amt•ndmcnt, right to receive obscene material articulated in St:wlcy, but on the altcrnati\·e reasoning of
Stanley discussed in the text.
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W c must, after all, "apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that fredom to be intellectually
and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate
the social organization." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 641 (1943).

IV

•

Nothing in our experience since Roth, however, re- ~
quires that even obscene materials be considered protected expression or that govemment be constitutionally
disabled from any regulation of obscenity. Obscenity
laws have a lon.2i history in this country. Most of the
States that h; iratified the Constitution by 1792 punished the related crime of blasphemy or profanity despite the guarantees of free expression in their constitutions, and Massachusetts expressly prohibited the
"composing, writing, printing or publishing of any filthy,
obscene or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock-sermon,
in imitation of preaching, or any other part of divine
worship." Province Laws, 1711-1712, ch. 6, § 19. In
1815 the first reported obscenity conviction was obtained under the common law of Pennsylvania. See
Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 91. A conviction in Massachusetts under its common law and colonial statute followed six years later. Sec Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). In 1821
Vermont passed the first state law proscribing the publication or sa.Je of "lewd or obscene" material, Laws of
Vermont, 1824, ch. XXIII, No. 1, § 23, and federal legislation barring the importation of similar matter appeared
in 1842. See Customs Law of 1842, § 28, 5 Stat. 566.
Although the number of early obscenity laws was small
and their enforcement exceedingly lax, the situation significantly changed after about 1870 when Federal and
State Governments, mainly as as a result of the efforts
of Anthony Comstock, took an active interest in the
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suppres;;;ion of obscenity. By the encl of the lOth o~n
tury at least 30 States hacl some type of general prohibition on the dissemination of obscene materials, and
by the time of our decision in Rolh no State was without
some provision on the subject. The Federal Government mcauwhile had enacted no less than 20 obscenity
laws brtwecn 1842 and 1956. Sec Roth, 354 U. S., a.t
482-483, 485; Report of t.bc Commission on ObAccnity
and Pomography 300-301 (1970).
This histroy caused us to conclude in Roth ''that
th unconchhonal p11~1ng ot the Fir~ Amend ment [tllat
"Congress shall m.akeno law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . "] was not intended to
protrct cvmy utterance." 354 U. S., at 4813. It ai'SO
caused us to hold, as numerous prior decisions of this
Court had assumed, see id., at 481, that obscenity could
be denied the protection of the First Amendment and
hence suppressed because it is a form of exprcPsion
"utterly without redeeming social importance," 1'd., at
484, a.s "mirrored in the universal judgment that [it]
should be restrained .... " Id., at 485. I depart from
these Yie"·s only insofar as is necessary to prescl'\'e constitutiOnally ""i)Totectcd expressiOn.
Our cases have i 'narkccl oUt' t"·o special govemmental
concerns in the regulation of ob scem ty-the prevention
01 offensive exposure to unwilling individuals and dissemination to juvcnilcP."l These concerns cannot them' "Sec Rabe Y. Tra~hington , - U. S. - , - (1972) (ronrmring
opinion); United Stott's v. R eidel, 402 U. S. 351, 360-3fl2 (1971)
(srparnto opinion); R01ca11 Y. Post Of!ir·e De7Jt .. 397 U. R. 728
(1970); Stanley v. Geomia, 394 U.S. 557, 5fl7 (1969); Ginsbera v.
New ro1'k , :390 U.S. 629 (eourt opinion). fl74-G75 (di~srnting; opinion) (1968); Redrup v. l':ew Yo1'k, ;)Sfl lT. S. 7fl7 , 769 (19()7); R('(lmond v. United Stott's, 384 U. S. 2fl4, 265 (19flfl): Ginzbma Y.
United States. 383 F. S. 43fl (rom I opinion), 498 n. l ( diNsrnting
opinion) (19flfl); ilfemoirs v. ilfassathusetts, 38::! U.S. 413, 421 n. 8
(plurality opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 195 (opinion

I
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Rrlves justify a total suppression of obscenity with its
conscqucn t deleterious effect on protected expression. 11
But neither are they beyond accommodation with First
Amcndn1cnt values. Insofar as offensive exposure is
concerned, the definition of obscenity 1·s, as we shall
shortly sec, susceptible to sufficient specificity to make
any residual ambiguities tolerable so long as consenting
persons can obtain any and all material they desire.
Cf. Ginsberg Y. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 674-675 (1968)
( lj"ortas, J., disenting). Moreover, the impact of even
those ambiguities can be ameliorated by app. ropriate procedural safeguards such as in rem proceedings against
borderline material before any pro ecution. 1'' Cf. Jlf emairs Y. Massachusetts, 383 F S. 413, 458 n. 3 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Other considerations justify restrictive regulation of
distribution to juveniles, provided that the definition of
ubscenity is similarly limited in this area and. enforcement proceedings are hedged " ·ith the same procedural
guaranties. \Vc have already recognized that "rtlhe
State ... has an independent interest in the well-being
of its youth." Ginsberg Y. 1\few York, supra, at 640, that
may be pursued. to some extent at least, "even where
.T .• joinrd h~· Goldhrrg, .T.), 201 (dis~enting opinion)
Sec nlso Report of tho Commi~~ion on Obscrnity and
Pornogrnph:· 300-301 (1970) (focu~ of enrl~' oh~rrnity lnws on proicction of youth).
11
See, e. g. , Shelton \'. Tur·ker, 3G-l- U. 8. 479, 488 (1950):
of

BHJ>NNA .l \',

(1954).

" rEJwn though ihr !!'Onrnmrntnl purpm:e br legitimate nnrl 8uh~tnntial,

that pmpo~P cannot be pur~urd b~· mean~ thnt bro:ldly ~tine
fund:unrntnl pcr~on:1l librrtirs when th<· rncl ran be more nnrrowl~·
achieYe<l. The brrnclth of lep;i~lnt i1·e ahridgemrnt mu Rt be vie11·ed in
ihc light of lr~~ dra~tic me;m~ for achir1·ing ihe ~amc bno:ir purpose."
fkr al~o pp. - - - , supra.
Jr. See, e. g., the model derl:uatory judgment and injunction stntute n•commenc!Pcl hy the l)re~idrnt'~ Commi~~ion on Obscenity and
Pornography ~et out in the apprnclix to this memorandum.

I
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tlwrc is an invasion of [their l protected freedoms
''
!d., at 638."' We have also recognized that, rather than
definitively determining for itself the material harmful
for child consumption, the State may support "the
parents' claim to authority i11ti1'e1r own hou~eholcl to
dir ect fh~earing of their children ... ," 1'd., at 6~0. by
prohi5lting cTist ribution Of certain material without
ental conse1it -Together, tl 1ese interests support the reg- ~
ulatwn under precisely drawn statutes of dissemination
of obscenity to juveniles, despite their own claims to
Fir t Amendment freedoms. Although a rasua.l link between exposure to obscenity and adverse consequences
on the process of growing up is yet to be established. it
is, neverthele~s, still true " 'that a casual link has not
been disproved either.'" I d .• at 642. 1' A complete
prohibition on distribution to the young would not be
defensible on this state of scientific knowledge, but cer-

pa..

I

Hl

Cf. Ginsbrug

J.,

Y.

N('w 1·o1'k, 390 U. S. 629. 649-G!SO (HHlR)

("a Stntr mny prrmi~~ibly detrnninr that,
nt lea~[. in some precisely drlinrnlecl m·eas, a child ... is not j)ORscssccl
of that full caparily for individual choice which is thr prr~upposition
of First Amendment gnnmntf'rs").
17 Sec Report of the Commi~Rion on Obscenity nnd Pornography
56-57 (1970): "rEJxteno,:ivf' Pmpirical inve~tigationR do not indicnte
any cnusal rf'lnt ion~ hip bet wern exposure to or u~e of explicit HOXtwl
materials and such Rocia l or individunl Jwrms surh as crime, delinquency, sexual or non~f'xual deviancy, or sf'verc emot ionnl disturbances. Thr ab~cncc of cmpiricnl evidence sup 1ortin such :1
causnl relation~hip also a )j) 1rs to JC rx )O~ure of children to rrotic
rna teria s. However, insu icirnt rcsearch is Jll'c~ent y avnilablo on
m eet Oll tJw expOHlii'C of chldrcn to 8exua!Jy explicit mntcrials t 0
enable us to reach conclu~ion~ with the same de~rec of confidmcc
as for adult rxposurc. Stron~ ethical fef'ling~ again::;t experimentally
exposing children to sexually explicit rna tcrials considerably reduccd
the po~::;ibilily of gathering the neccs,.:ary data and information rcgnrding young persons."
(STEWART,

concurTin~)

I

tlw
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tainly a ban on dissemination without parental consent
"·ould be!b
We need not and should not at this tin1e clct.ail the
reg ~Iator schemes for the control of offensive exposure
an l listribution tp 1e young t 1a wou pass constit Utional muster. That must await concerete legislative
attempts to deal with those problems. It is sufficient (
at this point for us merely to provide the broad considerations that must constitutionally be brought to bear
on their analysis. In my judgment. these considerations
are as follows:
18 See id., at 57: "In view of the limited amount of information
concerning the effect~ of ~exu nlly explicit material~ on children, other
consideration~ ha ,.e a~~umed primary importance in the Commission's deliberation~. The Commi~~ion has been influenced , to a conRiderablc degree, b~· itB finding that a large majorti~' of Americans
believe that children should not be exposed to certain sexual materials. In a deli tion. 1he CommiHsion takes the view that parents
should be free to make their own conclusion~ regarding the su itability
of explicit Sl'Xual materailB for their children and that it is appropriate for legislation to aid parents in controlling the acN'SS of their
children to such mnterials during their formative years. The Commission recognizes that legi~lation cannot possibly isolate children
from such materiab entirely; it also recognizes that exposure of
children to sexual materials mny not only to no harm but. mny, in
certain instanee~, actually facilitate much needed communication between parent and child oyer sexual matter~. The Commission is
aware, as well, of the con~iclernble danger of crenting an unnatural
attraction or enhnmed intcre~t. in certain materials by making them
'forbidden fruit' for young person~. The Commission belie,·es, however, that these considerations ran and should be weighed by individual parents in determining their attitndrs toward the exposure
of their children to sexual materials, and that legislation should nid,
rather than undermine, such parental choice." The laK sustained
in Ginsburg v. New York, it ~bo uld be stressed, sought only to support the parent's judgment in this regard; it did not attempt to
impose an outright ban on the consumption of :my materials by
children. Sec 390 U. S., at 369.
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First. The definition of obscenity proscribed from
unconsented display must be as precise as words will
allow and not include protected expression. The precise
terms and reach of the definition in this context, however, must depend upon the circumst.ances of the unconsented exposure at issue. As this Court indicated
in Cohen Y. Calijo1'nia, 403 U. S. 15 (1071):
"Of course, the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically
to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving
offense. See, e. g., Organization for a BeLter Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 (1971). While this Court
has recognized that government may properly act
in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the
privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas
which cannot be tota.lly banned from the public
dialogue, e. g., Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S.
728 ( 1070), we ha vc at the same time cousistcntly
stressed that ',ve are often "captives" outside the
sanctuary of the home a.nd subject to objectionable
speech.' !d., at 738. The ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is,
in other words, dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests arc being invaded in
an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader
vimY of this authority would effectively empower
a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter
of personal predilections."

l

Thus, the homeowner may be accorded unreviewable discretion in insula.t ing himself fron1 mailed advertisements
for matter he deems to be obscene. Rowan v. Post
Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1070). Cf., e. g., Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (Hl40). The passer-by on the
street, on the other hand, is entitled to far less protection. "[T]hc streets are natural and proper places for

I
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the dissemination of information and opinion
"
Schneider\'. Stale, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). Cf. P?Jblic Utilities Cmmn'n Y. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451 (1952).
At a minimum, these principles require, in practical
application, that the definition of obscenity han·ed from
public cli8play be restricted to pictorial or thrce-climcnsi.Q!l_al reprcscntati~ fundar~ci1ta lfy offu nsivc sexual
acts t hat go beym1d the mere depiction of nudity, sec,
Felton v. City of Pensacola, 300 U. S. 340 ( 1968); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372 (1058),
and that arc described with particularity (for example,
human sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, and
so forth).'"
Purely t xtual materials must be "·holly excluded
ft~ t_le j efinition.
nc eec, researc 1 c 1sc oses no case
in whlch this Court has sustained a determination of
obscenity of a book, except for M ishldn v. New Y orlc,
383 U.S. 502 ( 1966). But even there the books at issue
generally had "covers with drawings of scantily clad
women being "·hipped, beaten, tortured, or abused."
Id., at 505. This experience reflects the impossibility
of defining obscene language--a conclusion buttressed
by this Court's decision only last Term in Cohen \'.
Califomia, supra. The Court there overturned a conviction for disturbance of the peace by \\'Caring in public
a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." "[V-Ierbal tumult, discord, a.nd even offensive utterance," the
Court reasoned, " ... are ... , 1\'ithin established limits,
in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring
values IYhich the process of open debate permits us to
" Sec, e. g., § 8 (d) (i) of the modd ~tatr stntutr rccommendrd
b~· the Prr~idrnt'~ Commi~~ion on Ob;rrnit~· nnd Pornogmphy set
out in thr :1pprndix to thi~ mrmorandnm. Under this nppro:wh, it
~houlcl br nolrcl, tbrrr is no nrrd for the Roth requirement that
matrrial~ br "tnkrn a~ a wholr," 354 U.S., nt 4S9, in thr eynltwtion
of thrir obscrnit~·. Rabc v. Washington, U. S. - , n. 2
(1972) ( eoncurring opinion).
1

I
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achieve." 403 U. S .. at 24-25. More particularly, the
Court held that distinction<>. a.ccording to the offensiveJJess of 'vorcls are "inherently boundless." ld., at 25.
"For, while the particular four-letter word being
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most
others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that
one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indcccl, we
think it is largely because governmental officials
cannot make principled distinctions in this area,
that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and
style so largely to the individual." Ibid.
Accordingly, the Court rcfmcd to "indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without
also running a substantial risk of "'Upprcssing ideas in
the process." ld., at 26. 20
Cohen, of course, was not an obs.Q.cnit~ caf e, sec id.,
at 2'o,""nor did the statute undc1:;--which the prosecution
was brought reflect a specialized concern for the "plight
of the captive auditor." I d., at 22. The reasoning of
that decision is, neverthelcs, fully apposite here. The
im )0Ssibilit of "wincipled distinctions" in the
of offensive utterance 1s m no wa
w 1en the

area

20

The Court also observed, 403 U.S., at 26:
"[M]uch linguistic cxprc~~ion ~rrves a dual communicative function: it convrys not only idras cnpnble of rebtivdy precisr, drtached
explication, but o1 hcrwise inexpressible rmot ions as wrll. In fact,
words arr oft rn chosen a~ much for 1hrir emoti\'C' as their cognitiYc
force. We ennnot sanction the view thnt the Con~titution, while
solicitious of thr cognitiw content of individunl speceh, has little or
rd~lummoly!N rirriiioitn: noml io
no regard for that rmoti1·e function whch, practically speaking, may
often be the more important clement of the ovrrall mess:1gc sought
to be communicated."
Thi~ observntion, if anything, hns even more force in the context of
erotic literature.
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even m the con text of a statute limited to the prevention of public exposure to obscene matter the risk
of abridgement to the communication of offensive ideas,
wholly protected by the Constitution, see e. g., Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684 (1959), far
outwe.ighs the inconvenience and annoyance from the
display of "obscene" literature. "1 Words. as we all know,
are the foremost medium of ideas. Conversely, the offensiveness of exposure to "obscene" books is, to a sigIlificant extent, within the control of the beholder.
Unlike pictorial or three-dimensional depictions of sexual
acts, 'vritten descriptions may bring offense only gradually as the viewer chooFes to continue reading.
Second. Similar considerations obtain in the case of
th e-rcgtilation of distribution of obscene materials to
juveniles. It is, of course, no "answer to an argument
that a particular regulation of expression is vague to
say that it was adopted for thC' salutary purpose of
protecting children. The permissible extent of vagueness is not directly proportional to, or a function of,
21 Rre Rrport of the Commi~~ion on ObRrenity and Pornography
GO-fil (1970): "The moclrl sbte stntutr rrcommcnclcd by the Commis~ion (which would al~o br suitable for rnnrtmrnt in appropriate
instancr~ by lora! government unit~ and by thr frderal government
for area~ whrrr it haR general lrgislative juri~dirtion) prohibits the
display of certain potentially offrnsi,·r srxnally explicit pictorial
material~ in places easily visible I' rom public t borough fares or the
property of others. Vrrbal material8 arr not included within the
rerommenclrd prohibition. There apprars to be no satisfactory way
to define 'ofTrnsive' worchi in lcgislativr in order to make the parameter~ of prohibition upon their cli~pla)· both clrar and suJiiciently
limited so as not to encbngrr the communication of me.:;sag;rs of
serious social comrrn. In addition, thr fact thnt thNe are few, if
any, 'dirty' words whirh do not already apprar fairly oftrn in conver~ation among man~· Amcri<"ans nnd in mmc ,·rry widely di~tributecl
book~ and filmH indicntr~ that suc·h word~ arc no longer capable of
cmiHing t hr very high clegrrr of ofTen~e to a large number of persons
whirh would justify ~uch legi~lative interference."
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the extent of the power to regulate or control expression
with respect to children." Inter-Stale Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U. S. 67G, 689 ( 1968) . Sec also Rabeck v.
New Yorl-c, 391 U. S. 462 (1968). This is so in part
because "[t]he vices [of vaguenessl-the lack of guidance to those who seek to adjust their conduct and to
those who seck to administer the law, as vvell as the
posf'lible practical curtailing of the effectiveness of judicial review-are the same," whether the regulation is
directed at the protection of children or adults. Interstate Ci1·cuit, Inc. v. Dalla.s, supra, at 689-690. It is
also so because the young as well as the old have First
Amendment rights, sec Wisconsin v. Yoder, U. S.
-, (dissenting opinion); Rowan v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 741 (1970) (concurring opinion);
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
even if these arc subject, to some degree, to qualification
by government. See p. - , supra.
As a result, the same rca~ns that COlQpel the funitations described above on the definition of obscenity p roI1i5itcd from public disl?lay also dictate equivalent
sti~"ction;-r;:;-;5sccnity 1~·s for .jl.tveiuTes. H ere. again,
tlic definition must f~ 071 pictcm al or thre('-dillwnsional representations of fundamentally offC'nSi\·e eexnal
acts that extend beyond the mere dipiction of nudity
and that arc defined with particularity.~" Purely textual
materials must be exclucl0cl. The impossibility of sufficicntspecificit~ an ydcfinition beyond theE=e limita-

;;=

"~There i~, hmYrYrr, onr importnnt difTcrcnrc. Unlike thr raRe
of obscenity pro~rribed from 11ublir diRpl:l)', ~ce n. 19, SU]J?"a, the
dcflnition hrrc muR( proYidr thnt thc mntcrinl :dlcgcd to bc obRcene
be judged :tli a wholc. A it hough this, of ro ur::;P, adds n mcnRurc of
nnrertninty to thr definition, there nppcnn; to be no other wny to
bc no othrr wny to nN,.;ure thnt the yonng nrc not dcnird nccc~s to
socinlly valunblc mnteriak Sec, e. g., § 2 (d) (ii) of thc model
~tate statutP reromnwndecl by the Prc~idrnt'~ Commission on Obsrrnity and Porr10grar1hy sct out in the :q1pcndix to this mcmornndum.
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tions is a fact our current information on the effects of
exposure to erotic material cannot just;ify brushing aside. 2 "

v
In sum, I believe it is time for us to let the Nation
know that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit federal and stat~es1gnea "·holly to s1tppress
o~ ancT" san ction only laws preciseiY drawn _!:o
control its diss0mination through safeguards agaii1st offensive expot:ur<' to unwiJJing individuals and distribution
to children without parental consent. Under these laws
govemment could prohibit pornograplwrs from puffing
fundamentally offensive pictorial or three-dimensional
depictions of sexual acts beyond offering "adult materials" and prohibit their sending samples except upon
request. They could also require the bookseller or magazine !'tand to enclo~e such materials out of sight of cus~:l Srr n rport of t hr Commi~'ion on Obscrnit)' and Pornography
58 (1070):
"The Commi~~ion brlir,·r~ that on!)· pictorial material ~hould fall
within prohibition" upon ~air or commercial diRplay to young per~onR. An attrmpt to definr prohibited t!'xtual materi[!Js for young
prr~on~ with thr Rmnr degree of sprrifirity ns pietori<il materials
\roulcl, thr Commi"~ion belirl'r~. not hr nch·iRnblr. Many worthwhile
textual \rorks, containing eonsiderable Yalue for roung pcr"ons, trent
sex in an explicit manner and arc pre~ently available to young persons. There npprtm< to be no sat is factory way to distinguish,
1hrough n workable legal definition, bel wrrn 1hrsr works and those
which lll:l)' be deemed inappropri;~tr by ~ome prr~on~ for commercial diRtribntion to young prr~on~. AR a result, thr inclusion of
textu<il matcrinl within jiii'CJJile lrp;i~lali1·c prohibitions would poRe
ron~idcrnble ri~k;; for denier~ and cli~lributors in determining what
hook" might lrgall)' br sold or di~pl<i)'ed to young J1C'l'Rons and would
thus inhibit the entire distribution of verbal mntcrinls by thme
denier~ who do not wish 1o cxpo~r themsclvc~ to such risks. Th!'
"pcculatiYe risk of h3nn to ju1·eniles from ~omr tcxtu3l material
doe~ not justify t he~e dangrr~. The Commis::;ion bclic,·es, in addition, that pareJJial concern o1·er the material rommcrcailly m·ail::tblc·
to children most oftrn apj)]irs to piC'torial matter."
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tamers in an area prominently labeled "adult materials"
where only those wanting to do so would be admitted.
The motion picture exhibitor could be similarly required
to limit his advertising and admission practices.
The approach I have outlined does not guarantee a
solution to what Mr. Justice Harlan called "the intr::lCtablc obscenity problem." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704 (1968) (separate opinion). See
also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,456 (1966)
(dissenting opinion). It does, however, frankly admit
that our current doctrines and practices have not ·worked
and docs seek to accommodate the various interests and
values that experience has shown to pervade this area
of the law. I believe that this accommodation may
bring the stability to our law that we have sought and
110t achieved-and, furthermore, may do so with mini~
mal hazards to protected ex12rcssion . If cxpcncnce
l);ove"S the contiiry, the questi~n can agam be
re-examined.

APPENDIX*

Drafts of Proposed Leoislat.ion
A. RECOMMENDED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
REPEAL OF EXISTING LAWS
The following federal statutes prohibiting the consensual distribution of "obscene" material to adults are
hereby repealed: 18 United Stntes Code, Sections 1461,
1462, 1464, 1465; 19 United States Code, Section 1305;
39 United States Code, Section 3006.
B. RECOMMENDED STATE LEGISLATION
SECTION 1. REPEAL OF EXISTING LAWS
The following statutes prohibiting the distribution of
obscene material to adults are hereby repealed:
[Cite appropriate state statutes.]
SECTION 2. SALE AND DISPLAY OF EXPLICIT
SEXUAL MATERIAL TO YOUNG PERSONS
(a) Purpose.-It is the purpose of this section to regulate the direct commercial distribution of certain cxphmt
sexual materials t~ young persons iii order to aiel parents
in supervising and controlling the access of children to
such material. The legislature finds that whatever social
value such material may have for young persons can
adequately be served by its availability to young persons through their parents.
(b) Offenses Defined.-A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he
(i) kno\Yingly disseminates explicit sexual material,
as hereinatfer defined, to young persons or
-::·Report of the Commi~~ion on Obscenity and Pornography 65-69
(1970) (fooLnotes omitted).
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(ii) if ho knowingly @splays explicit sexual material for sale in an area to which young persons have
access, unless such material has artistic, literary, historical, scien tific, medical, educat wna.l or ci"ti'1er similar
s~J valliCl();· acl ~
Penalty.-Whoever violates the provisions of this
section shall be liable to !)eft to state option].
(d) Definitions.-For the purposes of this section:
( i) "Young person" means any person Joss than
years of age;
(ii) "Explicit sexual material" means any pictorial
or three dimensional material including, but not limited to, books, magazines, films, photographs and statuary, which is made up in whole or in domi11ant part
of depictions of human sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy ( i. e., bestiality or oral or anal intercourse),
direct physical stimulation of unclothed genitals, or
flagellation or torture in the context of a sexual relationship, or which emphasizes the depiction of uncoven~d adult human genitals; provided however, that works
of art or of anthropological significance shall not be
deemed to be within the foregoing definition.
(iii) "Disseminate" means to sell, lease or exhibit
commercially and , in tho case of an exhibition, to sell
an admission ticket or pass, or to admit persons who
have bought such a ticket or pass to tho premises whereon
an exhibition is presented.
(iv) "Display for sale" in an area to which young
persons have access means display of material for sale
so that young persons may see portions of the material
constituting explicit sexual pictoria.l material.
( v) An offense is committed "knowingly" only if
(A) the defendant knew that the recipient of material
was a young person, as herein defined, or had grounds
to believe it probable that the recipient was a young
person as herein defined and failed to make reasonable

-rcf
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mqumes to determine the age of the recipient; alld if
(B) (1) the defendant was aware of contents of t.hc
material clearly within tho definition of explicit sexual
material contained in part (ii) of this subsection, or
(2) hacl reason to know that the contents of the material
wore likely to fall within the definition of explicit sexual
material and failed to examine the material to ascertain
its con tell ts.
(e) Dofenses.- It shall be an affirmative defense to
a prosecution under this section for the defendant to
show:
(i) That the dissemination was ml!de with the fOnsent of a parent or guardian of the recipient, that the
dclenclant was misled as to tho · existence of parental
consent by a misrepresentation of parental status, or
that the dissemination was made to the recipient by his
teacher or clergyman in the discharge of official
responsibilities;
(ii) That the recipient was married, or that the
defendant was misled in this regard by a misrepresentation of marital status.
(f) Exemption for Broadcasts.-The prohibition of
this section shall not apply to broadcasts or telecasts
through facilities licensed under the Federal Communications Act, 47 U. S. C. Section 301 et seq.
(g) Limitation Upon Effective Period of Legislation.This Act shall be effective for six years from the date
of enactment and shall becorne 11u1l and void thereafter
unless reenacted.
SECTION 3. PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF EXPLICIT
SEXUAL MATERIALS
(a) Purposo.-J t is the purpose of this section to
prohibit the"w n' public display of certain explicit sexual
mater1:;J.s, in order to prot,oct })ersons from potential
o'ffens e thwugh "ill.voluntar:i exposure to such materia.ls.
(b) Offense Defined.-A person is guilty of a mis-

70-73-MEMO (A)
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dem.eanor if he knowingly places explicit sexual material
upon public display, or if he knowingly fails to take
prompt action to remove such a display from property
in his possession after lea.r ning of its existence.
(c) Penalty.-Whoever violates the provisions of this
section shall be liable to fleft to state option l.
(d) Definitions.-For the purposes of this section:
(i) "Explicit sexual material" means any pictorial
or three-dimensional material depicting human sexual
intercourse, rnasturbation, sodomy ( i. e., bestiality or
oral or anal intercourse), direct physical stimulation of
unclothed genitals, flagellation or torture }";; the cont~t
of a sexual re!a1ionship, or emphasizing the depiction of
adult human genitals; provided, however, that works of
art or of anthropological significance shaH not be deemed
to be within the foregoing definition. In determining
whether material is prohibited for public display by this
section such material shall be judged \vithout regard
to any covering which may be affixed or printed over
the material in order to obscure genital areas in a depiction otherwise falling within the definition of this
subsection.
(ii) Material is placed upon "public display" if it
placed by the defendant on or in a billboard, viewing
screen, theater marquee, newsstand, display rack, window, showcase, display case or similar place so that
matter bringing it within the definition of subparagraph
(i) of this subsection ~ easily visible from a pubjjc
thorouo-hfare or from the ro ert of others.
e Exception for Broadcasts.-The prohibition of this
sect.ion shall not apply to broadcasts or telecasts through
facilities licensed under the Federal Communications
Act, 47 U. S. C. Seccion 301 et seq.
(f) Limitation Upon Effective Period of Legislation.This Act shall be effective for six years from its date
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of enactment and shall become null and void thereafter
unless reenacted.
C. MODEL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND
INJUNCTION STATUTE
(a) Creation of Remerly.-Whenever material is being or is about to be disseminated in violation of [insert
citation to applicable legal prohibition or prohibitions],
a civil action may be instituted by the State against any
disseminator or disseminators of the material in order
to obtain a declaration that tho dissemination of such
material is prohibited. Such an action may also seek an
injunction appropriately restraining dissemination.
Such !lct.ion may be initiated by any county prosecutor
[or other prosecuting official authorized to represent the
State in criminal proceedings].
(b) Venue.-Such an action may be brought only in
the Court of the county in which any disseminator resides, or which the dissemination is taking place or is
about to take place.
(c) Partios.-Any disseminator of or person who is
about to be a disseminator of the material involved may
intervene as of right as a party defendant in the proceedings. In addition to the named defendant, tho
Attorney General shall undertake to give notice, to the
producer, manufacturer or importer of the material, and
the wholesale distributor (if a.ny), that they may exercise this right.
(d) Procedure.-[The court of initial jurisdiction]
shall give expedited consideration to actions brought pursuant to this section. A hearing shall be held within
days of the filing of htc complaints and final judgment
da.ys of the filing of the complaints and final judgment rendered within
days of the terminatio11 of the
hearing. Appeal from the decision of the [court of ini-

70-7:3-ME::\TO (A)
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tial juriscl.iction] lies only to the [highest court of the
jurisdictionJ. A notice of appeal shall be filed \\·ithin
days of the final judgment of the [court of initial
jurisdiction] and the [highest court l shall hear and consider the appeal within
days of the filing of a notice
of appeal and shall render final decision within
clays
after hearing the appeal. A declaration in an action
brought pursuant to this section shall not be deemed
final for any purpose until the final decision of the
[highest court] is rendered or until the time to file a
notice of a.ppcal from the decision of the rcourt of initial
jurisdiction] has expired. No restraining order or in.i unction of any kind shall be issued restraining the dissemination of any work on the ground of its obscenity
prior to the completion of the adversary hearing required
by this subsection.
Any defendant may assert a right to the trial of the
issue of obscenity by jury in aet.ions brought purt:uant
to this section.
(e) Usc of Declaration.- A final declaration obtained
pursuant to this section may be used to establif:'h scienter
or to form the basis for an injunction and for no other
purposes. The Attorney General may undertake to notify any person of final judgment pursuant to this section as a. means of affording such person actual notice
of that judgment, but such notice shall not have effect
in establishing scienter if the person to ·whom it is communicated was knom1 to the Att.orney Genern.l as a
producer. manufacturer, importer or "·holesale distributor of the material involved and was not given notice
of his right to intervene pur:::uant to subl:'ection (c) of
this section.
(f) Definitions.-For purposes of this section:
(i) "Disseminate" means to sell, lease, or exhibit
commercially

70-7:3-lVIEl\fO (A)
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(ii) "Disseminator" means any person who imports,
produces, manufactures or engages in wholesale dsitribution of any material intended to be disseminated, or
any person who disseminates any material.
(g) Inconsistent La·ws Superceded.-All laws regulating the procedure for obtaining declaratory judgments or
injunctions which are inconsistent with the provisions
of this section shall be inapplicable to proceedings
brought pursuant to this section.
(h) Prosecution Policy.-From and after the enactment of this Act criminal prosecutions shall be brought
prior to the obtaining of a declaration under this Act
only in cases of material which is unquestionably within
the applicable definitional provisions. In all other cases,
the provisions of this Act sha.ll be used prior to prosecution, which shall not be based upon conduct engaged in
before notice of a declaration obtained pursuant to this
Act. Prosecutions brought contrary to this subsection
shall be dismissed by the trial court; the trial court's
decision in this regard shall not be reviewable in appeaL
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Question.'~f .ObscefdtJ-·
By Nancy Poland
Special to The Washington Post

Francis Aungier Pakenham, seventh Earl of Longford, is a peer of the realm.
He was Leader of the House
of Lords from 1964-68; First
Lord of the · Admiralty in
1951; Minister of Civil Aviation under Clement Atlee;
Secretary of State for the
Colonies under Harold Wilson; Lord-in-Waiting to King
George VI.
He is the only man in
England, now living, who is
a double peer, a peer both
by right of descent and in
recognition of outstanding
public service. He is a
descendant of the wife of
the Duke of Wellington. His
wife is Lady Elizabeth Longford and his eldest daughter
is Lady Antonia Fraser, two
of England's best (and best
selling) historians. He is the
author of seven books, including a definitive study
of Ireland called "Peace by
Ordeal."
And 1 he is one of 25
knights of the Order of the
Garter, founded 1348, whose
motto is "Evil to him who
evil thinks."
Lord Longford, tall and

Official Study Group on ,Porpatrician,, strides into the
grill room of the Coonaught nography. The study was inHotel in London, looking spired by ''0! 'Calcutta!"
Longford saw the sex revue,
all these things. To the head
waiter's "M'Lord?" he reand walked out, reSolved to
plies,_··"Matti~i," gives an · look at the . "whole question
of obscenity/' The group will
abso1utely dis11rming smile,
issue its report to t'he naand settles back to talk
tion in September.
about pornography.
Besides provoking indignaPornography has made
him a popular public figure
tion, which doesn't surprise
him in the least, the study
in England.
And not so popular.
has also made him a pop
He is chairman of an un- hero, which delights him.
"To be known so well is
stimulating, at my time of
life," he admits. "It is stimulating to make contact with
people: One doesn't make
contact in the House of
Lords."
One of the contacts he
• Perkins H a r n l y makes
cheri!ihes is a 12-year-old boy
$50 a week as a cafeteria who
recognized him from
worker. Bnt he expects to pictures: "Oh, you're the
make $800 to $500 on each
chap who wants to stop the
of his watercolors, which
strip clubs!" Then there was
he paints after work. Story,
the taxi driver who, outside
Pap,e F3.
the Connaught, s pot t e d
Longford and called: "I'll
• Tl7 olf Trap Fa r m Park
take you! Maybe I'll get a
"is one of the loveliest set· dirty book?"
ting.~ for entertainment in
Lord Longford is aware of
the world," writes critic the delicacy of his position.
"There is a strong feeling in
Paul Hume. Tl7 olf Trap's
second season opens Fri· England that things have
day. Story Page F4.
See LONGFORD, F6, Col. 1
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Lord Longford: Taking a Look
LONGFORD, From Fl

gone too far, and there is
just as strong a feeling
against interference. But
porn~graphy is a subject
,t hat people want discussed."
He is not simplistic. He is
the first to admit that any
public inquiry into pornography, even defining the
term, "creates mosrt difficult
questions." The greater the
debate, "the wider the impact.''
"Some people would say
I have done positive harm
by arousing all this interest
in pornography.' I don't accept that view myself because in the nature of
things, if you are going to
attack an evil you have to
refer to it and describe it.
People- have to know the
battle's on. But it can be
argUed that all this talk
about pornography has put
it in people's minds."
The English pr,ess has cooperated. The porn commission is high on publicity. It
ranks second to Northern
Ireland in notoriety. Last
fall it went to Denmark to
study obscenity in a country
which no longer exercises
control of any kind. Longford led and the press chaperoned. There were pictures
in London papers of nude
gir~s in sex clubs. But the
pil!ture that aroused indignation was one of Longford
and a shapely girl member
of the group returning
through customs with stacks
of erotic books and magat:ines (for research).
"' Lord Longford is no archetype reactionary reformer.
f. former Oxford don, he
lunches at the Playboy Club
I.n London and speaks from
the pulpit of Coventry Cathedral. He calls himself "a
fellow-traveling member of
Women's Lib."
At Coventry, he declared
himself for the permissive
society when it meant a
"more humane approach to
the outcasts of society, such
l!.s unmarried mothers, drug
.addicts, and prisoners."
But when a state encouraged sexual promiscuity,
~indulgence, the abroga•
of moral principals,
'~e was "utterly and un'ngly against it."
\ Longford is a prac...-Jlitican. "We really
....st convince the nation

BY Fay Godwin

Lord Longford
that we do care for human
liberty at least as intensely
as the most ardent human'
ist," he says in response to
critics who accuse his study
group of seeking to limit
freedom of expression.
He left his post as Leader
of the House of Lords in the
last Labor government to
oppose the Abortion Act. He
still is defending his position. Opponents of abortion
are a minority like Jews or
Catholics or Irish Nationalists, he argues, and minorities need leaders.
He does not call pornography a minority issue in Britian, nor himself its "suitable" leader.
"Whoever
became
a
leader on that subject would
be corrupted, he says
quickly, not in the sense of
acquiring a taste for pornography. I mean, it would bedifficult to give a lead withOl,lt becoming self-righteous.''
"To go around pronouncing evil and smut and filth,
I think would turn one into

the most dreadful prig,
really. The spiritual danger
of that kind of campaign
would be shattering. But in
terms of leadership, what
really matters is the attitude of the young.''
There are young people
on the commission, and such
disparate older members as
pop singer Cliff Richard and
DaVlid Holbrook one of
England's leading humanists and scholars.
Recommendations await
the commission's report, but
Lord Longford offers some.
Sensitive to the politician's
art of the possible, he feels
there would be "great resistance to the re-establishment
of a censorship board in
England and so I doubt we
would recommend one. An
idea to put forward is
a strengthening of the law to
prosecute offenders, a law
to serve as a "restraint, with
offenders being tried before
a judge and jury."
Does he really think thl:!

public would support such
restraints? Lord Longford
surveys
the
Connaught
Hotel scene, almost a caricature of proped respectability, and says slyly, "I think
we'd get a good verdict
here; that gentleman there?
And his lady, certainly."
In Soho and such places,
where the porn shops flourish, there might be "heavy
financial penalties" for porn _
brokers. Publishers and
producers he thinks would
be less likely to purvey porn
if public opinion discouragead them.
The commission's report
will include a section on violence. Recently The London
Sunday Mirror ran a series
attacking violence in . the
arts; recently three films"Straw Dogs," "The Devils,"
and "A Clockwork Orange"
-were banned by local authorities from theaters outside London.
Longford recognizes the
strange dichotomy in publdc
thinking here. "Violence is
not condoned but sex is: but
when people begin to question violence in the arts
they begin then to question
all around. They are, I
think, beginning to question
whether absolute freedom is
a complete right."
But isn't obscenity relative and does not the whole
argument against restriction
turn on this point? Fashions
change: would Oscar Wilde
\ go to prison today, or would
any decent society ban
"Lady Chatterley's Lover"?
Can any law fairly reflect
changing attitudes: what we
now
condone we con·
demned?
As a ca,se in point, I
showed Longford a Washington Post editorial on the
imprisonment
of
Ralph
Ginzburg. Ginzburg went to
jail recently for prurient
material he mailed in 1962.
Longford insists there
must be, through the law,
and a strong law if possible,
a "constant" from which a
jury may decide any individual case brought before it.
He thinks the "relativity"
of public opinion is not a
valid argument. "It is a very
difficult question: one has
to face this fact that standards change. Standards do
depend on public opinion.
But 1! you have any decision
of law, so the jury is the ultimate voice. Juries, in their
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opinion, also change and place in Soho for young
thus there. is not absolute drifters. He had no training
justice. The opinion may in social work and his
change, but changing opin- friends thought he was mad.
ion cannot impinge upon The office was so small ne
justice. The opinion of the and his secretary couldn't
both get into it at the same
time is in the jury. Justice
may be fallible. However, time. They helped about 60
opinion does express itself young people that first year.
Last year 1,300 men and
to the times through the
women between the ages of
jury."
15 and 25 came to New HoriLord Longford is chairzon Center. The common deman of Sidgwick and Jacknominator is need. Many are
son, publishers. He has an
office near the British Mu- "drug disturbed." New Horizon now has a staff of 10
seum. There are no elevators there, you walk up to paid workers and is housed
see the chairman. His office in a derelict orphanage just
off Drury Lane.
isn't plush. It has bare white
John Profumo is on the
walls and a not-new red carboard of directors. Profumo
pet and a loudly ticking
was the Tory Cabinet Minisclock. There are books and
ter involved in the Cliveden
pictures of his wife and a
bottle of sherry, but other- scandals which embarrassed
wise the office is so austere H a r o 1 d Macmillian and
made Christine Keeler fait is monastic.
mous. Profumo's life style
On his desk, on the day I
was the reverse of Longwas there, was a most 'unu- ford's.
sual letter. The ietter was
But, says John Snow, the
from "Her Majesty's Prison,
24-year-old coordinator at
Albany, Newport, Isle of
Wight." It was eight care- New Horizon, "Longford in
fact went out of his way to
fully written pages. It began
"Dear Frank" and was bring Profumo into social
work and here to New Horisigned "Ian Brady."
Brady kidnapped two chil- zon."
Frank Longford is hard to
dren, tortured them, and
carved up their bodies. Lord pin down. He was a Conservative who, at Oxford at age
Longford is the founder and
30, when intellectuals were
president of "The New
Bridge," a society which going Marxist, became a Socialist. Four years later he
helps prisoners. Ian Brady
and Myra Hindley 1 his ac- became a Roman Catholic.
complice, are two he helps.
In 1939 he enlisted in the
He has asked the Ministry Territorial Army as a priof Health to transfer Brady vate. When War was deto a prison where he can clared, he had a nervous
receive mental care, but the breakdown.
request has been refused.
"It has enabled me to un''Brady is an extraordi- derstand the outcasts and
nary chap," Longford says.
the afflicted. When I've
"He is a strange, solitary
been absolutely unequal to
character who likes being a situation of stress or disalone and reading. He's fortress, I have been l;llade
ever reading Tolstoy and
equal to it by this experiDostoevski."
ence of having, myself, been
Prisoners in England, one of the afflicted."
Longford says, are no longer
The Longford family is
victimized: "they are forgotknown as the "publishing
ten."
'
Longford's concern is a Pakenhams." Three years
ago Lady Longford wrote a
Christian commitment to
life of the Duke of Wellingthe "outcasts" of society.
But there is something ton; Lady Antonia Fraser
wrote "Mary Queen of
more, and he is honest
about it. "There is excite- Scots;" a son, Thomas, wrote
"The Year of Liberty" about
ment, novelty, c~riosity in
Ireland; Lady Rachel Bilknowing the unknown."
When LongfO~ religned lington, another daughter,
published a novel. That year
from the Cabinet in 1968
when the Labor Govern- Lord Longford brought out
ment postponed a bill rais- a little volume of philosophy
and theology called "Humiling the school-leaving age
from 15 to 16, he opened a ity."
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Memorandum to the file

October 24, 1972

From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Obscenity Cases
(Notes on Court Conference)
Bill Brennan
Our problem differs from England as we have the First
Amendment.
Roth established that obscenity is not protected by the
First Amendment. It also established that all erotic expression

J4,-.

has protection unless it is obscene

Finally, whether expression

0

is obscene is a constitutional question which we cannot delegate
to juries. (Bill cites John Harlan and also Bill says Redrupt
so held unanimously

0

)

have
Since Roth, there kxx never been five votes in accord as
to what the definition means.
This has resulted in two problems: (i) vagueness for
parties, and (ii) institutional uncertainty on part of law enforcement and legislature.
Stanley departs from Roth

0

Its principle is contrary to

Reidel and 37 Photographs: Bill, who joined these two cases,
now would overrule them.

•

-2Bill now thinks state may control erotic material rather
than suppress it. This control may be rational state action if it
applies only to minors and non-assenting adults.
'J(~.M.~c...:l&/ ~

Bill would redefine in specific terms - e.g., de scrip-

~ · tion of proscribed material (e.g.,

actual or simulated intercourse).

He referred to Oregon statute.
aez:.~

,.:_.;

Bill would allow states or Congress to proscribe obscene

~~
~~

live shows even for adults. This is conduct - a view shared by

J-t4-«••'-4-u~. Douglas.

But Bill distinguishes motion pictures from live shows -

arguing that a movie is "expression" not conduct.
As to minors, Bill has modified views expressed in his
memo. He now likes Harlan's dissent in Jacabellais which suggests
"standards" Bill would now accept as to minors. This would enable this Court to review only the standards and not the particular
expression.
(But how does this position square with Bill's view that
we cannot delegate to anyone the responsibility of determining what is obscene 7)
Would not require expert testimony.

-3Potter Stewart
Would draw no distinction between live shows and
movies.
Cases before us all involve ::Fburteenth Amendment state
action. It is settled that First Amendment has been incorporated.
Two of the cases next week involve Federal statutes. Harlan
and Jackson thought that in obscenity cases the First Amendment
was not adopted in its entirety. Potter thinks we would have to
overrule long line of cases to accept Harlan's view.
States may regulate and protect minors.
States also may protect unwilling public from what may
be an' assault" on their sensibilities.

Byron White
Thinks we have over-emphasized the obscenity issue.
If in legislature, he might eliminate most obscenity

laws. But as judges, we must decide whether all state and Federal
obscenity statutes are invalid.
Specific definition - of acts (intercourse) - of hard core
would help.

-4-

There should be national standards for definitional
purposes - but allow juries to apply community standards within
the definitional standards.
In general would adhere to Roth.

Would not overrule Roth but would redefine obscenity
in terms of specifics.
Would make no distinction between adults and minors
or consenting and non-consenting. If definition is sufficiently
explicit - even narrower than Oregon statute - he would allow
states to regulate as to everyone.

****
have
There kxx never been five votes for the Jacabellais
and memoirs for "redeeming social value."

Thurgood Marshall
With Brennan.
Likes Oregon statute.

-5Harry Blackman
Closer to White and Chief than to Brennan.
Emphasized key role of jury as reflecting community
judgments.
Would not overrule Roth. Would re-examine definition.
Does not agree that printed text cannot be regulated.
What about Suite 69 ?
But is intrigued by Brennan's "privacy" rationale.

Bill Rehnquist
Not sure that Harlan's view is wrong. Certainly up
to time of the Fourteenth Amendment, states were free to regulate
obscenity.
Would reaffirm Roth with greater specificity.
We should vote to deny cert more regularly than we have
in past.

MY NOTES FOR CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 24, 1972
Complement Bill and Chief

At time First Amendment was adopted, no one then
thought that it protected obscene expression from legislative
regulation or control.
I agree with Roth formulation that obscenity is not

protected expression.
I think I would have voted with majority in Stanley -

accepting its disclainer that it was undercutting Roth.
The problem that has confounded everyone is how to
define obscenity - vagueness, etc. I would not overrule Roth
but would redefine in terms of specific standards.
Definitions can be made specific - except as to books.
Some sort of administrative procedure would help on
vagueness issue.
Am closer to Chief than to Bill -but am unsure on several
points and will await next drafts of opinions.

L. F. P., Jr.
LFP, Jr. :pis
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~---.....- 71-1051- Paris Adult Theatre Iv . Slaton
71-1315- Alexander v. Virginia
71-1422 - Kaplan v. California

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I.

The Obscenity Problem
The obscenity cases argued last week again put before thi s Court

what Justice Harlan aptly described as "the intractable obscenity
problem. " Interstate Circuit, Inc . v . Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704.
As I have said in my previous memoranda, I do not see any easy
Judicial "solution,

11

short of abandoning this Court 1 s responsibility

to the Constitution by adopting the absolutist approach which,for me)is
an abdication of the judicial function.

As in other major areas of First

Amendment controversy relating to free expression, this Court will
inevitably be required to make difficult judgments .
It may be useful to summarize again the elements of the obscenity
problem presented by the pending cases .

First, there is the n eed to
'•

2.

define the scope of the first amendment protection, a need welldocumented by Justice Brennan's comprehensive memorandum on
Miller (No. 70-73), which was in a sense a response to my memo.
With Justice Brennan, I find the policy of Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767, unacceptable.

See Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (dissent).

It is neither sound nor feasible for this Court 1 s assuming the role of
an unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively
judging each piece of material brought before it.

-

Again, with Justice

Brennan, I believe that obscene materials in some situations are not
protected by the First Amendment, but that this Court has failed to
establish clear standards by which other courts can separate protected
.,------

~

._,&wz

---

from unprotected materials •
....--.

s""'

......

- .

Our inability to develop a workable rule up to now is not, however,
a reason to abandon our responsibility and to declare that the First
Amendment protects everything.

For me, the First Amendment was

) made to protect commerce in ideas, not pornography.

Clarifying the

standards and procedures which should be used to determine what is

-

"obscene,
priority.

- -

'

I'

11

in the sense of being constitutionally unprotected, is a first

3.

Secondly, the cases argued last week present the specific question of
when :E'irst Amendment protection can be expanded by adding an element
of

11

privacy.

11

In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, this Court determined

that a person may not be prosecuted for possession of obscene materials
in the privacy of his house.

As my memoranda in U.S. v. Orito, No.

70-69, and 12 200 Ft Reels (No. 70-2) indicate, I am prepared to consider extending this right to materials carried on the person or transported in personal luggage and intended for personal use only, provided,
first and foremost, we stop the noxious flood of
private area.

11

hard core 11 in the non-

But it is not obvious to me that such

stretched to include

11

11

privacy 11 should be

hard core 11 commercial book dealers (see Alexander,
._..,......~

-

No. 71-1315, and Kaplan, No. 71-1422) and
Paris Adult Theatre, No. 71-1051).

11

hard core 11 theatres (see

Just because married human beings

are free from any governmental inquiry into their private relations under
Griswold v. Conn .. ,

381 U.S. 479, and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,

does not mean they have such rights in town square or a commercial
theatre,( and for me there is no difference --both are public) nor does it
authorize prostitution.
)

The distinction between (a) public display and

commercial exploitation and (b) the rights of privacy must be defined.
To ignore this distinction overrules our recent decisions in U.S. v.

4.

Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355, and U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363, 376-377, (Opinion of Justice White), 378-379 (Justice
Stewart concurring. ) But if we can solve the broad problem, I think
we might safely consider some relaxation on Reidel and Thirty-Seven
Photographs.
Finally, the arguments last week raised a challenge to the power
of the States

~to

consenting adults.

regulate commerce in obscene materials between

Two of the cases to be re-argued next week,

Orito

(No. 70-69) and 12 200 Ft. Reels (No. 70-2), raise similar challenges
to the power of Congress.

I agree with Justice Brennan that when

obscenity is thrust upon unwilling adults, or is exposed to children,
there are state interests which are both legitimate and compelling.
But are these the States' legitimate concerns?

Does the State not have

a responsibility to its citizens with respect to the environment created
by 250

11

hard core 11 so-called

11

adult bookstores 11 as in Los Angeles?

Are States powerless to regulate commerce between consenting adults
which rots the commercial environment of the heart of a great city, as
in San Francisco for example?
The Hill-Link Minority Report of the Presidential Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography (pg. 391-397) points out evidence that use of

7

5.

pornography may encourage sexual deviation and sexual crimes.

It

also gives statistics demonstrating an alarming rise in the rate of rape
in America during the same period as a major expansion of commerce
>

in.. pornography
(1960-1970).
.......,

Is this Court prepared to decide that these

possible correlations are groundless, the more so since the minority
view comports with ordinary human experience and common sense?
If these correlations are significant, are States powerless to protect

the public environment?

Finally, is this Court prepared to say that the

moral climate of a city is unaffected by commercialized obscenity, or
that the general welfare is totally unrelated to morality standards and
common decency?
Unless we hold that all obscenity is

~ ~

constitutionally protected,

I believe that it is impossible to answer the questions before us without
consideration of the power of a State or of Congress to prevent pollution
of the public "environment.

11

Otherwise the is sue of "commercial" re-

lations between consenting adults will appear again, this time in the form
of ''private" commercial prostitution, ''private clubs'' with LaRue-type
entertainment.

Outside the privacy of the home, is there a true privacy

issue in commercialized pronography that is open to the public?

.

~·

6.
II.

The Scope of First Amendment Protection: The Perils of
Absolutism
For me the First Amendment was made to protect commerce in

ideas.

The assumption that restricting obscenity and pornography will

throttle the free flow of such ideas will, in the course of time, (if it is
not already clear) be seen as one of the greatest frauds ever perpetrated.
For the first 100 years after the adoption of the Constitution, our
Republic witnessed great freedom of speech and at the same time a
very strict censorship of obscene materials.

No historian claims that

the latter ever jeopardized our progressive political system.
Of course we must have a "national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open •••
But what does that have to do with Roth obscenity?

It demeans the high

purposes of the First Amendment and debases the currency of the history
of the struggle for free expression to equate robust and free debate with
filth that, in turn, debases one of the high values of human existence
and demeans human beings to the level of animals .

We can concede that

some benefit has resulted from the demoliton of Victorian prudery without
accepting the notion that the absolutism of the First Amendment precludes
any control of public obscenity .

11

7.

It has been often pointed out that the Constitution must be interpreted
to preserve its elasticity and capacity to cope with new conditions.

The

power to deal with unforeseen problems of the future in an evolving
societ y ought not be precluded by an absolutist approach.

Much of the

survival and success of our .A:m.erican institutions rests on the viable
nature of constitutional terms.

One of the strengths of Roth is that it

permits legislatures to make choices about dealing with obscene materials
within a constitutional standard which itself develops and shifts with
changes in society.

Many elitists dislike legislatures, suspect juries,

and want Courts to govern everything.

But we have prized these institutions

over the years for ability to respond to change and concern among the
people, even if crudely and belatedly.

Legislatures and juries are among

our most sensitive and flexible institutions.
351, 357.

See U.S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S.

But when we embalm concepts in a constitutional holding, we

stop the evolution of the law.
Some have long and ably argued the view that all obscene materials
are constitutionally protected.

That, of course, makes life quite simple,

because absolutism removes all choice and all responsibility from society.
Everything goes; nothing can be governed or regulated.

'

'

This "solution"

8.

was also chosen by the student first prize winner of the National College
Essay Competition who said:
"In either event, permitting obscenity to find its own
position in the open market of competitive capitalism is the
only truly definitive solution. It is the American Way."
Obscenity: Censorship or Free Choice? (1971).
This is an appropriate solution for sophomores) but not for a mature,
free people who must be trusted with the responsibility for choice.

It is

precisely this spirit of absolutist social laissez faire which is now under
attack for destroying our natural environment and,for me, environment
1s more than trees, grass, lakes and rivers and the physical atmosphere.
Justice Brennan's memo on Miller agrees that not all obscenity is
protected by the First Amendment, but concludes that obscenity must not
be wholly suppressed in the absence "of a demonstration of some
subordinating>:~

governmental interest requiring that result." I heartily

agree that "prevention of offensive exposure to unwilling individuals and
dissemination to juveniles 11 are legitimate state interests.

But I do not

see how this "solution" resolves the First Amendment difficulties.

I

As

Justice Douglas points out in his memorandum on Miller (No. 70-73) at
pg. 6, it is still necessary to define what is "obscene. "

The standards

proposed by Justice Brennan may turn out to be "as elusive to define

>!~I

wonder whether this is a typographical error in Bill Brennan's memo.
Should "subordinating" not be "overriding."

9.

and apply" as the old tests that have so dismally failed.

It is also now

necessary to define the "governmental interest" Justice Brennan is
referring to.
Justice Brennan's memo states that this Court:

I
l

" • • • need not and should not at this time detail the regulatory
schemes for the control of offensive exposure and distribution
that would pass constitutional muster. That must await concrete legislative attempts to deal with those problems.''
He

~es

on, howeverC§ specificallyzrestrict such legislation "to

pictorial or three-dimensional representations of fundamentally offensive sexual acts that go beyond the mere depiction of nudity • • • ",
except when the privacy of the home is concerned.
Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 741.

Rowan v. Post

Thus, while disclaiming any legis-

lative intent, Justice Brennan's memorandum in effect allows only two
legitimate state interests and sharply restricts the way these interests
can be protected.

Although this approach allows more latitude to the

States than that of Justice Douglas, it is ultimately a highly inflexible
approach which never really solves the problem of what is ''obscene."
Moreover, it has all the hallmarks of an advisory opinion.
As indicated in my memorandum on Miller (No. 70-73), I believe
that the answer is more flexibility for the triers, rather than less.

I

10.

would indicate that the tripartite test in the plurality opinion in
Memoirs v.

Mass.,

383 U.S. 413, is adequate to separate

protected from unprotected materials.

But other "tests" that a State

might adopt could be equally satisfactory, as long as they convey the
essential idea that a state law must be clearly focused on materials
which portray sexual activities in a fundamentally offensive way, as
distinguished from communication of ideas in works having literary,
artistic, political, or social value 1as people have commonly used those
terms.

I£ a state statute is reasonably limited in this regard, by its

terms or as interpreted, then First Amendment values, as applicable
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, are adequately served
by the additional freedom of appellate courts, including this Court, to
conduct an independent review of

t~he

record when necessary in par-

ticular cases of egregious abuse by state action.
•

Mass .,

See Memoirs v .

383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis v.

Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Roth v. U. S.,
354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (concurring and dissenting opinion).

Chief

-

Justice Warren and Justices Harlan and Jackson perceived the danger to
orderly social progress which results from enforcing a single rigid

11.

standard on the fifty States, choking o££ sources of valuable experimentation and flexibility in overcoming our national problems.
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 456 (dissenting opinion).

Memoirs v.

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378

U.S. 184, 200-201 (dissenting opinion), 203-204 (dissenting opinion).
Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 496 (dissenting opinion).
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294-295 (dissenting opinion).

Beauharnais v.
(Justice Blackmun

and I joined this company in 1969-71.
I remain unconvinced that materials must be "utterly without redeeming social value" to be obscene.

Compare Memoirs v. Mass.,

383 U.S. 413, 418 • .Throwing a bit of Shakespeare into a book like
Suite 69 (See Kaplan, No. 71-1422 ), does not miraculously transform
it into protected communication.

I agree with Justice White that

"redeeming social value" and "social importance" are not "independent
tests of obscenity," but (to the extent anyone knows what this "test"
means) are "relevant only to determining the predominant prurient
interest of the material." Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413, at 462,
(White dissenting).

See also Memoirs, supra, at 445 (Clark dissenting).

Our past lack of success in achieving a workable definition of the
scope of the First Amendment in this area may have been the result of

12.

setting out on the impossible task of simplifying an inherently complex
problem.

This past failure should be no e4cuse for now enforcing the

States into a constitutional strait jacket, as I believe the approaches of
Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan would do.
However, I agree with Justice Brennan that the new Oregon
"obscenity" statute, 1971 Ore. Laws. C. 743, § 255-262a, is admirable
in its specific description of prohibited acts and in its protection of
juveniles.

But in the six cases now before us, we have no statutes like

Oregon's, and we can hardly write a code for the States or give an advisory opinion as to what kind of state statute would pass muster.

Con-

ceivably, a concurring or dissenting opinion could pose this solution for
the States, and if enough votes supported that view to give it credibility,
the States might move in this direction.
I would certainly recoil from the suggestion that the Oregon statute
marked the outermost limits of a State's legitimate interests and power
or represents the only acceptable way of framing a state obscenity statute.
For example, in my view both the A. L. I. Model Penal Code § 251. 4
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962) and the model state statute proposed by
the Majority Report of the Presidential Commission on Obscenity and

13.

Pornography , 65-69 (1970) would be constitutionally permissible
alternatives.

See Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S. 476, 487 n. 20.

The three cases argued in October also raise the question of whether
a "national" standard of obscenity is corratitutionally required.

My posi-

tion on permitting local or state-wide community standards of obscenity,
as opposed to requiring a national standard, has been presented in length
in my memoranda on Miller (No. 70-73), pgs. 4-16.

also~

See

v.

Minnesota, 399 U. 524 (Blackmun dissenting); Cain v. Kentucky, 397
U.S. 319 (Burgerdissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-201.
There never has been a Court majority for a national standard and in this
diverse country, with a valuable tradition of pluralism, a national standard
is both impractical to determine and undesirable to apply.

Just as horse-

theft in Wyoming may destroy a man's livelihood, while merely threatening
a luxury in New York, obscenity may have vastly different dimensions as
a social problem in Vermont, as ·opposed to Las Vegas.

It is pointless to

try to force local legislatures and juries to ignore these differences.
people of Vermont should not be compelled to accept something simply
because it is found tolerable in Las Vegas.
It may be 'that the dichotomy in the debate over "community" or
11

national 11 standards is reduced to a matter of semantics in actual

The

14.

operation.

Unless we require, as I would not, that the parties put in

evidence of standards, the jurors will apply what they consider the
community standard to be at the time for it is the one they know.

In

reality, they may apply a ''boiling point standard'' or a ''tolerance''
standard, but in all events it will inevitably be subjective.

The alleged

expert testimony submitted in the cases we have seen is stilted nonsense
from -- as one lawyer put it -- ''hired guns.

11

Kaplan (No. 71-1422) and Paris Adult Theatre (No. 71-1051)
raise this exact issue of whether a jury may properly apply the Rot h
test without affirmative ''expert ' ' evidence .

Very recently we declined

to review a case which held that affirmative expert testimony for the
State on contemporary community standards was not required when the
alleged obscene materials were in evidence .

Wisconsin v. Amato, 49

Wis. 2d 638, cert. den . , 405 U . S . 981 (Jan. 24, 1972).

See U.S. v.

Wild, 422 F . 2d 34 (CA 2), cert. den., 403 U.S . 940, (as to the principal role of the materials themselves as evidence. ) In the last analysis
the related questions o£ whether materials predominantly appeal to the
prurient interest o£ the ' 'average adult" in a fundamentally offensive way
and whether materials represent communication of literary, artistic,
political , or social v alue are pr o perly left, under Roth, to the experience

15.

of the trier of fact, as confronted with the materials.

We have said

for generations that the genius of our jury system is its use of a cross
section of the community to whom we entrust the gravest decisions.
Obviously, if the communication itself cannot be put into evidence,
as would be the case in LaRue-type "dances," its nature would have to
be described by affirmative evidence sufficient to determine that it was
obscene.

"Pandering'' by the dealer, or the dealer's own description

of his wares, could be part of such affirmative evidence.

Ginzburg v.

U.S., 383 U.S. 463, 470-473, ABookv. Attorney-General, 383 U.S.
413, 420.

But, in this field of human knowledge, requiring "expert"

testimony is absurd.

What "qualifications" must such an "expert"

have?
Alexander. (No. 71-1315) raises the additional issue of whether a
jury trial is required by Roth in civil proceedings involving a determination of obscenity.

Nothing at Roth hints at such a right.

The civil

proceeding in Alexander was a special statutory remedy provided by
Va. Code § 18. 1 - 236. 3.

Nothing in the Constitution requires a jury

trial for a statutory civil remedy unknown to common law in 1791.

The

trier of fact in Alexander, the trial judge, properly employed the standards
established by the plurality in Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413.

16.

III.

Commerce and the Stanley Right to Privacy
It has been decided by this Court that the First Amendment takes

on expanded dimensions in the privacy of a man's house.
Georg 'ia,394 U.S. 557.

Stanley v.

In my view, Stanley did not rest on an un-

restricted "right" to receive materials devoid of Intellectual content.
In that case First and Fourth Amendment rights overlapped, together
providing more protection to the hon'l.e library than either amendment
could provide alone.

See Note:

"Still More Ado About Dirty Books

(and Pictures)," 81 Yale Law Journal 309 (1971).

Purely private

conduct, unlike any .conduct in places open to the public, has a restricted capacity to harm the moral tone of society by example or
influence, and enforcement of laws to regulate private conduct invariably
intrude on the. privacy of the hone and family in a way that offends the
spirit, if not the letter, of our Constitution.
381

u.s .

See Griswold v. Conn.,

482 .

I could find it tolerable to expand the special protection of Stanley
to materials carried for demonstrably private, personal (non-commercial)
purposes on the person and in personal baggage, as my memoranda in
U.S. v . Orito (No. 70-69), and U.S. v . 12 200ft. Reels (No. 70-2)
indicated.

But I cannot understand how a commercial bookdealer - - a

..,
1
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seller -- can invoke a Stanley right to privacy.

This Court has only

recently rejected such an expansion of Stanley in U.S. v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351, and U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363.

In oral

argument, counsel for California in Kaplan (No. 71-1422) estimated that
there were over 250 adult book stores in the Los Angeles area alone.
To bar the regulation of such large scale commerce in the name of a
special right to privacy under Stanley would require holding that a
panderer has a vicarious "constitutional" right through his potential
customer's "right.

11

The reasoning behind this eludes me.

Griswold v.

Conn., 381 U.S. 482, is not remotely in point on this kind of "privacy,

11

purveyed by pimps.
IV.

The Power of Government to Regulate Public Moral Pollution
Americans, as a "refugee" race, have in our origins and growth

always had a healthy suspicion of any governmental infringement on
individual freedom.

But almost all laws curtail some freedom of

individuals for the purpose of promoting a common good, and these laws
reflect the basic moral assumptions and values accepted by our society.
There is an inevitable need to strike a balance between freedom and
necessary authority.

See Devlin, Enforcement of Morals 102 ( 1965 ed. ).

Mill, On Liberty, 7 (1955 ed. ).
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This Court in Stanley, 394 U.S . 557 at 566 , repudiated any
legitimate state concern in the "control [of] the moral content of a
person's thoughts," and I agree .

But I suggest that Justice Brennan's

memorandum in Miller (No. 70 - 73) makes the unwarranted assumption
that, outside of "mind control, " the only legitimate state interests involving obscenity are prevention of exposure to non-consenting adults
and juveniles .

To me this is not too far from saying that those who

pollute the atmosphere can tell the rest of us not to breathe.
Justice Brennan cites large sections of the Majority Report of the
President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, for the proposition
that "explicit sexual materials [play no] significant role in the causation
of delinquent or criminal behavior . . . "
note 11) .

(Miller memo, supra, at 17,

This conclusion is hotly contested.

The Hill-Link Minority

Report gives evidence to support contrary conclusions , including evidence
that use of pornography may encourage sex crimes and sexual deviation.
Report of the Presidential Commission, pgs . 391-397 .

It also found

evidence (the Abelson Survey) that most commercial pornography,
although bought by elders, ultimately finds its heaviest "use" in the hands
of juv eniles and young adults [women aged 15 to 20,· men aged 15 to 29].
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Report of the Presidential Commission, pg. 401.

In addition, the

Keating Minority Report and the British Longford Report attack the
impartiality and the methodology used by the Majority Report of the
Presidential Commission, on which Justice Brennan relies.
In its conclusion, the Hill-Link Minority Report made the following
statement:
"Because of the extrem.e complexity of the problem and
the uniqueness of the human experience it is doubtful that we
will ever have absolutely convincing scientific proof that pornography is or isn't harmful. And the issue isn't restricted to,
'Does pornography cause or contribut.e to sex crimes?' The
is sue has to do with how pornography affects or influences the
individual in his total relationship to members of the same as
well as the opposite sex, children and adults, with all of its
ramifications.
''The 'burden of proof' or demonstration of no harm in a
situation such as this is ordinarily considered to be on the
shoulders of he who wishes to introduce change or innovation.
It might be noted that in areas where . health and welfare are at
issue most government agencies take extremely conservative
measures in their efforts to protect the public. In the case of
monosodium glutamate which was recently removed from all
baby foods by government order, the evidence against it, in
animal studies, was quite weak. However, because the remote
possibility of harm existeq., measures were immediately taken
to protect children from consuming it. 11 [Emphasis added.]
[The Report of the Presidential Commission, supra, at 411-412.]
The Hill-Link Report is not alone in its concern about the longrange effects of pornography on the values which hold our society
together.

Leading humanists have expressed a similar concern.

·'"
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Professor van der Haag of N.Y . U. has said:
"It is silly to insist that unless criminal sex acts can be
traced directly to consumption of pornography by the criminal,
pornography must be harmless . Lack of evidence for harmfulness is not evidence for harmlessness . Moreover, there is
no reason to assume that the de-identification supported by
pornography will directly find sexual outlets. Finally, the
influence of pornography is usually diffuse and often indirect,
as is the case o£ Marxism or religion. Most persons do not
emulate pornography directly, or habitually use it to stimulate
themselves. Yet pornography has a cumulative influence on
the lives of this third group by affecting public morality and
also everybody ' s personal attitudes, values and ambitions.
Any model of action attractive to some part of the average
person when presented often enough will influence and make
what is modelled -- be it anti- semitic, or sadistic, or
Communist -- more acceptable . Extolling either martial or
pacific virtues will make either of them more acceptable; and
so will the inviting presentation of sexual vices." [Censorship:
For and Against, 156-157 (1971 ed. )]
Professor Max Lerner of Brandeis adds:
" • . • The staff and majority of the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography may be wrong or right in their conclusions
that there is 'no evidence to date' of a ' significant role' played
by explicit sexual material in criminal behavior or in any other
social ills; but the Hill-Link dissent which retraverses the same
data gives (I quote from a perceptive piece by Murray Kempton)
'a most convincing portrait of a commision majority which
winnowed the chaff that gave scientific color to its thesis from
the chaff that might bring it into dispute."' [Censorship: For and
Against, supra, at 192 - 193 . ]
I resist the bland and easy assumption that obscenity is only harmful
to children or that it is merely a nuisance t o unconsenting adults.

To
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compel public toleration of pervasive commercial pornography, an
activity deeply at odds with fundamental sexual morality and with human
dignity, cannot, in my view, fail to have a destructive impact on the
totality of the environment in which we live.

In any event, the issue

before us should be whether or not Roth obscenity is protected by the
First Amendment.

If it is not, this Court has no business restricting

state governments solely on the basis

of~

unprovable assumptions

about the impact of ''hard core" material, thus ignoring the states'
obligation to preserve a decent social environment for the people they
represent.
Of course, none of us "know 11 all about "obscenity,
alleged "experts 11 who have written on the subject.
subject.

11

including the

It is not a "knowable 11

Our · conclusions must rest on certain assumptions that have

guided civilized people for thousands of years, but these assumptions have
consistently been rejected by this Court in favor of individual notions that
have never commanded a majority.

These assumptions are not demon-

strable, but they have centuries of history and experience behind them.
I£ good plays, good books, good art, the company of decent people as

teachers and exemplars are the determinants of character -- as we have
always been taught --how can we say that the filth and depravity daily

'.
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foisted on people of all ages in movies, magazines and books, will not
have a comparable impact?

As Professor Bickel of Yale Law School

has rightly stressed:
"Take these assumptions [of privacy], and still you are
left with at least one problem of large proportions. It concerns the tone of the society, the mode, or to use terms that
have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life,
now and in the future. A man may be entitled to read an obscene
book in his room, or expose himself indecently there . . . We
should protect his privacy. But if he demands a right to obtain
the books and pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather
in public places -- discreet, if you will, but accessible to all -with others who share his tastes, then to grant him his right is
to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other
privacies. Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes,
effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we
cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and done
intrudes upon us all, want it or not. [22 The Public Interest 25
(winter, 1971, 25-26.]
We have been told that the blame for the crime and drug abuse in the
core areas of our cities must rest on us, because we have allowed the
children of the poor and disadvantaged who live there to grow to maturity
in the depraved moral climate of the ghetto.
it both ways.

We ought not to ask to have

I accept the proposition that the moral climate "bends the

twig," but I think we must apply this across the board, not just when it
is a convenient crutch.
Without the possibility, as I see it, of any affirmative national
standard of decency, the sleazy commercial exploitation of one of the
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highest values and cherished relationships of the human race has indeed
created a national atmosphere debasing our common humanity.
It simply cannot be that the First Amendment should be read to make
us an impotent society in terms of total surrender in dealing with this
intangible pollution of the national atmosphere.

For me this is as much

the function of government as containing any other environmental pollution.
If this means that we follow the Jackson-Harlan thesis of a "graded" appli-

cation to the States of the First via the Fourteenth Amendment, that is a
course I am prepared to explore.

See Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at

203-204 (dissenting opinion), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra, at 294295 (dissenting opinion).

I consider some such approach essential if this

country is to avoid an amendment of the First Amendment -- a development
that could, in the long run, be an ominous threat to liberty.
I have read that the waters of£ the city of Hong Kong are the most dangerous in
controls.

th~

world because, for centuries, ,there have been no pollution

Yet the thousands of people who live on boats on those waters

bathe in that water, cook with, and do not die.

They have developed a

tolerance for waters that would promptly destroy most mortals.

..

Can it
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be that the Constitution compels the States to let the m.oral climate
and intellectual environment descend to that level of tolerance?

.§u.prtutt <qo-u.rt o-f tltt ~tb ~taftg

2Jiru;fringtrut. :!fl. <q. 2llbfJ!.~
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 27, 1972

Re:

Obscenity Cases

Dear Chief:
Herewith are my very rough and tentative ideas in
response to the recent circulations by Byron and Harry
on this subject:
1.
Reels.

I agree with Byron and Harry as to Orito and

2. I agree that we should ·retain Roth without the
Fanny Hill gloss. While it may be desirable and possible,
as Byron suggests, that the Court define the boundaries
of that type of material which may be proscribed, I would
have some difficulty being quite as specific or categorical
as he seems to be in his November 16th memorandum.
I would
think that if the opinion gets this specific, it should do
so by way of example, rather than in an attempt by dicta to
exhaust all possible candidates for this class.
3. I agree with Byron and Harry that while of course
the standard laid down by the Fourteenty and First Amendments
is a national one, the very definition embraced in Roth
of "community" standards suggests that there is a role to be
played by local jurors in applying the standards of the
community as embodied in the Roth test. Certainly we should
not lay down any constitutional standard which would
encourage expert witnesses on both sides -- "opposing

- 2 bands of oath helpers" as I believe Wigmore called them -to dominate the trial of an abscenity case.
4. I would not go as far as Byron indicates he would
in requiring a prior adversary hearing in connection with
obscenity seizures. I would treat Marcus and Books as
dealing with seizures for the purpose of suppression, rather
than for evidence, and permit seizures for the latter
purpose of one copy of the material in question to be
carried out under normal Fourth Amendment procedures. ~n
the case of movies, where the single copy is all that the
proprietor has, this obviously raises the question of on
whom the burden should fall when, even though the seizure
is only of the amount necessary to permit prosecution, it is also
sufficient to prevent at least temporarily the further
distribution of the product. I do not believe the
Constitution prevents it from being put on the distributor,
if the state so chooses.
5. While we will undoubtedly be making ultimate
constitutional judgments under the constitutional standards
outlined, as we would in applying Bill Brennan's alternative
approach, much of this will be done in the exercise of our
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Once the reasonably
clear standards have been enunciated -- if that is possible
in this area -- I would make the test of granting or denying
certiorari, so far as my own vote is concerned, depend on
whether or not the lower court seems to have conscientiously
tried to apply the standards enunciated by this Court,
rather than whether I agree with the result reached by
the lower court.
Sincerely,

· ~
The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

~
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 15, 1973

Re:

Obscenity Cases

Dear Chief:
I am substantially in accord with the proposed analysis
contained in your circulations in these cases.
I take it
that in Orito and Reels the judgments in each case would be
reversed if your view prevails, since as I understand it it
was assumed for purpose o~ decision by both District Courts
that the matter in question was obscene.

Sincerely~~

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 13, 1972 -

Re: Obscenity Cases
Dear Chief,
Responding to your memorandum of this date,
I am as of now in general agreement with Bill Brennan's
circulation of last Term on the general problem (with certain qualifications), and with your circulations of last Term
in Orito and 12 Reels. I would prefer, however, not to
definitely make a commitment in advance ·of seeing what is
finally written. Indeed, it is my understanding that at least
two members of the Court do not agree with either you or
Bill.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBER S OF

<q. 2.0~J1~

November 14, 1972

JUSTI C E LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

Re: Obscenity Cases
Dear Chief:
Responding to your memorandum of November 13, I confirm
my statement at the Conference to the effect that I am generally in
agreement with your approach on the basic problem. I may have some
suggestions to make, but these would be within the framework - I think of your general approach.
As to Orito and 12 Reels, I was inclined to accept the analysis
in the memorandum which you circulated last spring. Recent discussions
in our Conference, however, have caused me to give further consideration
to these two cases. Orito, involving the Government's admittedly broad
power "at the border," is not as difficult for me as 12 Reels. The latter
is not easy to distinguish from Stanley. Yet, if we go beyond the "home"
under the Stanley doctrine it is difficult - as Bill Brennan has argued
eloquently - to know where to stop.
I consider the overriding problem to be a disposition of the
Miller type case in which at least five members of the Court can join. Almost any such disposition would, I think, be preferable to the present intolerable confusion and uncertainty - with the Bar and the public not knowing where the Court stands. Accordingly, and while I must await circulations of draft opinions before making a final decision, I am inclined to support your general approach to the problem.
Sincerely,
.

,fl

/

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
LFP, Jr. :pls

-
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CHAMBERS 0,..

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

November 13, 1972

Re: Obscenity Cases

MEMORANDUM TO THE

CO~FERENCE:

Apropos of the above cases, it was agreed at Conference
that the time had come for 11 a division of the House'' so
that some specific writing can begin.
Bill Brennan and I have each tried to articulate a general
approach on what seems to me the basic problems in
Miller v. California and comparable cases. I still consider Orito and 12 Reels problems peripheral and far less
important in the whole scheme. Millions of people are
offended and injured by the public displays; only a small
number of true 11 Stanleys 11 are skulking around and I can
11
take or Leave 11 their aberrations.
If we treat the broad problems of Miller et alas Part I
and the Orito-12 Reels as Part II, it would now help Bill
and me if you would indicate that you 11 generally agree 11
with Bill or with me.

We can then begin top t the pieces together.
Regards,

No. 70-73 MILLER V. CALIFORNIA

Argued 11/7/72

I

~(f:'veJ4J

~~- ~ , ~~~~

~<~P..~~.~
~~~k~.,~
--- /"2--~\~~~
~
. ----r- ,_ ....-7
r
/

~~~~~7f~c;._~~~
vi~~ ~~ 4::::.

/rv)

~~c~~~~~
~~·
~

~t-

nu,_;f-~~ :\·~~

~

- ~ ~

)--{u_:;f-

~~~~
~~~~~~

...

.

'

,

Conf.

11/10/72

Court ................... .

Voted on . ........... . ..... , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned ..... ............. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No. 70-3

MILLER
vs.

CALIFORNIA

HOLD

CERT.
JURISDICTIONAL
MERITS
MOTION AB- NOT
FOR 1-----.--+---..ST_A_T_E-..M_E_N_T...---t----.,---+---.---f SENT VOTG

Rehnquist, J ................. .
Powell, J ............ .. . .... . .
Blackmun, J ................. .
Marshall, J .................. .
White, J ..................... .
Stewart, J ................... .
Brennan, J ......... .......... .
Douglas, J .................... .
Burger, Ch. J ................ .

D

N

POST

DIS

AFF

REV

AFF

G

D

lNG

..,

-r~:

.r ~~~~~. I/6

-

~~~~~.,(~

d~~~~~~;t
~1f-u-·
I

A<-f,_~- ~

J' ~

cL...po' wLJ,

.I

~ ~ ~ ~~c-4-. 7h~.h~~
r~. "?k~~ ~ ;t, ~r~

~

r

;;tkr /.?~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~~(~~~~--~~
/

~ ~'-d·

yo~~
?

t!ll#

'·'.

To: Mr.

Jus·~i.ce

Mr .

lh,......~~~.~ ._:;f- ~

7

"-o ~

.

~~

•

3rcl DRAFT

Ju~.)

tf:grasP. r

t ~cr: }3:::.·::n'1an

Hr . Just ~ C"!· S te\mrt
Hr . Ju.~-1.:.. ~8 \· '~1·1 te
Mr. Jn::. t::.c) . x-;;1'1" 11

.

t

Ju;· .·_c -....h~·'·,ru( :1)
llr. J "'' I, C; ) 1.:-':Jell
H:.:-. cJ· o.,.J...,ico h~;;.:mquis t

Mr.

C:i. J.~oul':lt~ ·l: _·

_ _ _ _ __ _

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ~tt~ated: JAN 1 0 1973
No. 70-73

Marvin Miller, Appellant,

v.
State of California.

On Appeal from the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California,
County of Orange.

[January -, 1973]
Memorandum from MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER.
This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography"
cases being revie\ved by the Court in a re-examination
of standards enunciated in earlier cases.
Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called
"adult" material. He was convicted, after a jury trial,
of violating California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a misdemeanor, by willfully and knowingly distributing obscene matter. 1 His conviction was specifically based on
1

The California Pcu:1l Code reads in relev:tnt part:

"§ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution;
printing, exhibiting, di~ tributing or possessing within
state
"(a) Every person who knowingly: ~e nd s or cause~ to be ~ent,
or brings or causes to be brought , into this sta tr for ~a le or diHt ribution , or in this state prepare~, publi~hrs, prints, exihibits, di ~t ributes,
or offer~ to distribute, or has in his po~~e~sion with intent to di~
tribute or to exhibit or offer to clistributr, any ob~rene matter, is
guilty of a mi ~clemeanor .
"§ 311. Definitions
"As used in this chapter:
" (a) 'Obscene maHer' mean ~ mat!Pr, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average pen.;on, applying rontemporary standards, is to prmiPnt interest, i. e., a shameful or
morbid intcrc~t in nndity, sex, or excrrtion; and is matter which

70-73-l\lEMO
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his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California.
The envelope was opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not requested the brochures; they complained to the police.
The brochures advertise four books entitled "Intercourse." "Man-\Voman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated,'' and
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film entitled "Marital Intercourse." ·w hile the brochures contain some descriptive printed material, primarily they
consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting
men and women in groups of two or more e11gaging in a
takl'n as a \rlloln gor~ ~ubtanl iall~· br)·oncl cu,;tom;tr)· limits of
eandor in drsrription or rrprr~rnt:1tion of such mattrr~: and is
mattrr whirh t:1krn ns " whole i~ uttrrlr without rrdrcming ~o('i:il
impmtancr.
'' (1) The predominant appral io pruril'llt intC'rr~t of the m:il ter
is judged "·ith rrfrrrmr to :1\"CntgC' adults unles:-< it apprar~ from
the nature of thr mnttrr of thr rirrwnslanrrs of its dis~rmitwtion,
distribution or C''l:hibi1ion, that it is designrd for cle:Hl)· drfined
dc,·innt sexu:1l groups. in whirh rase . thr prrdomin:111t itppral of
thr mattrr ~11.111 br judgnd \rith rrfrrrncr to its intf'ndrd rrripirnt
group .
.. (2) In prosrrulions undrr thi." rhaptrr, whrrr l'irrum~tntH·r~ of
production, prr,;rntation, ~air, di,s<•min:llion. di,:trilmti()n. or puhliril)'
indien tc t hal mat I er j,; bring rommerrinll)· C'l:p!oited by the drfrnd:.nl for the sake of its pntriPn1 appral, ::;ucl1 r\·idrnrr i~ proh<1ti1·r
with rrspert to thr l1[1tnrr of the m:tilrr and ran .iu~tif~· thr ronrlu~ion that. thr mattrr i,; uttrrl.1· without rrclC'rming ~or>i:tl import:Jnce.
"(b) 'l\'fnltrr' n!rnns nn~· book, m:1g:1zinr, ti('\I'~J1:1pcr or othPr
printrd or written malrrial or nn~· pictun·, dr:l\l'ill!~. photograph,
motion ]Jirturr, or othrr pictorial rrprr,:rnlntion or an.1· ~tatur or
othrr figurr, or an~· n·l·ording, transniption or 1mrrhanicnl. dwtnil'al
or rlrrtric:1l rrproclucl ion or an~· ot hrr artidr~. C'quipmrnl. m:1t'itinrs
or m:1lrrinl".
''(c) 'l'rr,;on' nwans nn~· incliYidual, p:1rlnN~hip, firtn, :ls,:o<·i:tlimt,
corporation or othrr legal rntit~·.
·'(d) 'Di;-;tribute' mratts to tmn,:frr po:-,:rssion of, whetlwr " ·ith
or without ronsidrra tion."
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variety of sexual activities, with genitals often pronnnently displayed.
I
This ca~e involves the application of a State's criminal
obscenity l"tatute to a situation in which sexually explicit
materials have been thru!"t by aggressive sales action
upon unwilling recipients who had in 110 way indicated
any desire to recci \'C snch materials. This Court has
recognized that States have a legitimate interest in prohibiti11g dissemination or exhibition of obscene materials
partjcularly ,,·hc11 the mode of dissemination carries with
it a significa11t cla1Jgcr of offending the sensibilities of
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles. Stanley \'. Georgia, 394 F. R. 557, 567; Redrup v. N c·w
1' ork, 386 U. R. 767, 760; Ginzburg v. United States, 380
U. R. 463, 468--470. Rec Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622. 641- 642; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 F S. 77, 88-89;
Prince v. Ma.ssachusett:s, 321 U. S. 158, 169-170. Cf.
Butler v. Michigan , 352 U. S. 380, 382-383; Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 F. S. 451, 464--465. It
is in this context that we arc called on to define the
standards "·hich must be used to iclcntify_obscene materials within the power of the State to regulate. See
Roth Y. United States, 354 U. S. 476. - By way of background, it is helpful to recall that,
apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no
majority of the C'ourt has at any given time been able
to agree on a standard to determine what is pornographic
or obscene material subject to regulation under the police
power. See, e. g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767
(1967). Inste-ad. there has resulted "a variety of views
among the members of the C'ourt unmatched in any other
course of constitutional adj uclication." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704-705.~
" In thr ab~rnrr of a majorit~· Yirw, thi~ Court wn:s romprllcd
to rmb~trk on thr prnf'ti('r of per curiam rr,· rr,;:d~ of com·ictions
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The view attracting the most support at any one time,
but never a majority, has been the tripartite test articulated by MR. Jus·riCE BRENNAN, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 418. That opinion stated:
"We defined obscenity in Roth in the following
terms: '[W]hether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards. the dominant
theme of the material taken as a 'vhole appeals to
the prurient interest.' 354 U. S., at 489. Under
this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases,
three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value." 383 U. S., at 418.
The case we now review was tried on the theory that the
California Penal Code § 311 incorporates that threestage test. But now the M ernoirs test has been abandoned as unworkable by its own author. 3 No member
of the Court today supports that formulatio11.
We reverse and remand this case in light of standards
adopted today by the Court.
for tho dissemination of materials that at len~t fh·c members
of the Court, applying their separate te~ts, found to be protected
by the First Amendment. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.
Thirty-one eases have hern decided in this manllC'r. Tho Redru71
"policy" is, however, totally \Yithout an~· jn~tificntion exrrpt for
the necessit~· of circumstances. Sec Walker v. Ohio, 398 U. S.
43-± (dissent). This Comt should not a::>~ume the role of an unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, ~ubjoetin:oly jndging
each piece of material brought heforo it.
"Sec the opinion of Mit . .JusTICE BHENNAN in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, infra, at pp. - - - .
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This much has been categorically settled by the Court.
that obscene, pornographic materials are unprotected by
the First Amendment, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S.
475. We acknowledge the inhere11t dangers of undertaking regulation of any form of expression. Any step to
develop a coherent standard that will allO\Y States to control obscenity and pornographic materials requires that
state statutes be carefully limited. As a result, wenow limit tho )ermissiblo scope of ro ulation to materials
which depict s )ecifically defined )hysical conduct in a
manner whiCh appeals to the prurient 111 erest. 4
sta e
oflense mus also e unite to materials that portray
such conduct in a fundamentally offensive way, as distinguished from communication of ideas in works having
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 5 The basic
guidelines for the trier of fact, in considering both
prurience and fundamental offensiveness, must be
whether "the average person, applyinl}- contemporary
community standards" would find: / ( 1) that "the
dominant theme of the regulated materials taken as a
whole" ap )eals to the rurient interest, Roth, supra,
354 U. S., at 489, and (2) that the materials portray
sexual conduct in a fundamenta y offens1ve w
f a
state aw t at regu a os o scene or pornographic rna-

-

4 See, e. g .. Oregon Lnw::; 1971, c. 743, Art. 29. § 255, ns an example
of a state law directed at carefully definrcl phy::;ical conduct, as
opposed to expres~ion. Other ~tate formulntions could be· equally
Yalid in thiR respect. In giving this example, we do not wish to be
unclcr~tood as approYing of it in other rp::;pcrt~ uor n" c"tabli~hing
its limits as the rxtrnt of state power.
" \Yc cl,a. 1~
10
utterly without rrdecming ~ocial Yaluc"·
test of Memoirs. supra, 383 U. S., nt 41S. Adding a snippet of
f:lhake~pearc, a commentary on \Var nml Peace or some plat it udcs
on the brothrrhood of man, doc~ not change the charac-ter of ob~ccnc
material~. Sec !11ernoirs, &upra, 38:l U. S., at 460 (Wnl'l'E, .J.r

-r

cli,~cnting).
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terials is thus limited, as \\Titten or construed, then First
Amendment values as applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment. arc adequately served by
the ultimate ])O\Yer of appellate courts, including this
Court, to conduct an independent revie"· of constitutional
claims. ''"hen necessary in particular rases of abuse. Sec
ll1 emoirs v. M nssachusetts, 380 U. S. 413. 453 (dissenting
opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. R. 184,203 (dissenting
opinion); Roth v. Uuited Stales, 354 "G. S. 476, 496 (roncmTing and dissenting opinion).
It is not our function to propose 1werise regulatory
schemes for the States. That must a\\·ait concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, however, to give illustrative
examples of " ·ha·r 1s cleru·ly un )rotectccl.
(a) Fundamentally offensive and prurient representation~. pictorial or thrrc-dimensional, of ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, are
unprotected.
(b) Similar representations of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd. suggestive or inviting exhibition of
the human body arc also unprotected.
Mere nudity. ho\Yevrr. is not neccs~arily un11rotected.
There is nothing inherently obscene or pornographic about
the human body itself. as some great "·orks of art demonstrate. Sec. e. g., Fellon , .. City of Pensacola, 390 U. R.
340. N' or docs the mere fact that mat0rials are sexually
oriented make them unprotected. "IS .!ex and obscenity are not synonymous . . . . '' Roth Y. [ 7 nited
States, 354 U. S. 476. at 484.
This does not mean that sex and nudity may he exploited without limit on film. in picturrs. or in live performances, any more than it can be exhibited without
limit in open public places." At a minimum, such exhi'' Y'i'hilr lYe nrr not prr~enlrd lwrr IYilh the problem of rrgul:tt ing
lrwd ph~·~irnl rondtH·t il~df, it i,.; ciP:tr that thr StalrH hnw ('l·c·n
morr power,; to rrgulnte liOili'Nbnl, phy~irnl conduct th:tn to ,;up-
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bition must have an artistic or scientific justification.
Medical books for thr education of phyf'icians and related
persollncl, for example, necessarily usc graphic illustrations of huma11 anatomy. Conceivably some usc of the
unclothed body ,,·oulcl be appropriate in both graphic
arts and theatre. but here the basic trst again must be
wlwthcr "the dominant theme, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest," and \Yhether the material is
"fundamentally offensive." In resolving the inevitable
questions of fact and law, we must continue to rely on the
jury system, together with the safeguards that judges,
rules of evidence, the presumption of in norcncc and othrr
protective features provide; as v;e do with rape, murder
and a host of other offenses against society and its
in eli vicl ual members.

III
Under a national Constitution. fundamental First
Amendment limitations on the powers of the States clo
not vary from community to community, but this docs
not rnean that, there are or should be uniform national
standards of "prurient appeal" or "fundamental offensiveness." These are e8sentially uestions of ~t, and
this Nat ion is simply too big am eli verse to reasonably
expect that such standards could be articulated for all
50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the
prerequisite consensus exists. 'When triers of fact are
asked to decide \vhether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards" \\'Ould consider certain materials "prurient," it \\·ould be unrealistic to re11rr~s picl orin! or thrrc-dimrnRion:ll rrprr,.,cut at ions of 1he same
hrha1·ior. Such Htatc rcgnl:ltion '·i,; sniJieirntl,l- .iu~tifircl if . . . it
further:< an important or subHLtnlial p;o1·rrmnrnt inlrre~t; if the·
go1·rnm1rnt intC'f<',;t is unrrl:ttrcl lo IIH' snpprr~~ion of frrc rxprrs~ion; and if ihc incidcnial rr~t ri(·(ion~ on a11Pgccl Fir~t Amendment
freedoms i~ no grcnicr thnn i~ c~~cntial to the furthrrancc of that
intPrr~t." 'Cnitcd States \'. O'Brien. 891 U. S. 307, 37()-377. Soc·
California v. Laltue,- U.S.-.

•'
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quire that the ans,,·er be based on some abstract
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as
the ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permittrd jurors to draw on common human
experirnce and on standards of their community, guided
always by limiting instructions on the law. To requirC'
a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national "community standard" would be an
exercise in futility.
As noted before. this case was tried on the theory that
the California obscrnity statute sought to incorporate the
tripartite test of M cmo'irs. This, a "11at.ional" standard
of First Amendment protection enumerated by a plurality
of this Court, was correctly regarded at the time of trial
as limiting state prosecution under tho controlling case
law. The jury, however, was explicitly instructed that,
in determining whether the dominant theme of the material "taken as a whole appealed to the prurirnt interest" and in determining whether the material "goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor and
affronts contemporary standards of decency," it was
to apply contemporary community standards prevailing
in the State of California. Thus, during the trial, both
the prosecution and the defense assumed that the relevant "community standards" in making the determination of obscenity were those of the State of California,
not of the United States of America at large. Defense
counsel at trial never objected to the testimony of the
State's expert on community standards or to the instructions of the trial judge on "state-wide" standards.
On appeal in the Orange County Superior Court, Appellate Department, appellant for the first time contended that application of state rather than national
standards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
\Ve conclude that the State's failure to offer evidence
of "national standards" and the court's charge that the
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Jury consider state standards, was not constitutional
error. Kothing in the First Amendment requires that a
jury must consider such hypothetical ancl unascertainable
"national standards" when attempting to determine
"·hether, as a matter of fact, certain materials are obscene
or pornographic. 7 It is neither realistic nor COlJstitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that
the people of Maine or New Hampshire accept public conduct found tolerable by Las Vegas, Nevada, or New York
City. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455, 458460. Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 378 U. S .. at 203-204.
Roth v. United Slates, 354 U. S. 476 , 496, 500-503. See
also Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U. S. 524 (dissenting opinion); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (dissenting opinion);
Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U. S. 319 (dissenting opinion).
See O'Meara, Shaffer. Obscenity in The Supreme Court:
A note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 Notre Dame Law., 1,
6-7. As the Court made clear in .Mishkin v. New York,
383 U. S. 502, 508-509, the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards" is to
be certain that, so far as material is uot aimed at a
deviant group, it "·ill be judged by its impact on an
average person , rather than a particularly susceptible or
In Jar·obellis Y. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, l'omr .Ju~ticf' H argurd Owl
application of "local" communit~· standards would run thr ri ~k of
provenling di~::;rmination of material~ in some pl:tcr~ brcau::;r srllcrs
would be unwilling to ri~k criminal convirtion b~· tc•sting variations
in standard::; from place to placr. 378 U. S., at 19:~-195. Thr u::;c
of ·'national" ::;landards, however, ncer~~arilr implirs that matcriab
found tolrrablr in some plaerH, but not undrr tlw ··national" critrria,
will nrvrrthelrss br unav:tilnblr where thr~· arc :tcrcplablc. Thus,
in trnn~ of d:mgc•r to fr<'C cxprC':;~ion. t lw pot cnt i:il for "u pprc~~ion
~rrms at least a ~ ~rent in the application of a ~ inglr nationwide
~tanclnrd nH in allrmin~ di~tribution in accoJTl:III<'C wililloeal tastes,
a point which .Ju ~ ticc Harl:tn often C'mphn~izcd. Sec Roth , .. Cnitrd
8tatrs. supra, :3-L'5 U. S., at 506.
7

.-
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sensitive person-or indeed a totally inscn~itivc one.
Rec Roth Y. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 480-400.
Compare tho now discredited test in Regina v. Hicklin
(1868) L. R. 3 QB 360. \Ve hold the requirement that
the jury evaluate the materials \Yith reference to contemporary standards of the State of California serves this
protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate.

IV
Equating the free and robust exchange of ideas and
political debate with commercial exploitation of pornographic and obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First A1ncndment and its high purposes
in the historic struggle for freedom. Th<"rc is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the stern 19th century
American censorship of public distribution and display
of material relating to sex, see Roth v. United States,
supra, at 482-485, in any,yay limited or affected expression
of political, scientific. or literary ideas. On the contrary, it \Yas an "extraordinarily vigorous period" not
just in economics and politics, but in belle leth·es and in
"the outlying fields of social and political philosophies.""
To see the harsh hand of censorship of ideas and "repression" of political liberty lurking in every state regulation
of commercial exploitation of human interest in sex is
naive. at the very least. It confuses the means of suppression "·ith the objectives.
'Rrc Pnrring:ton, :\Jain Currrnt~ in .\nwriean Thought. Yol. :2,
p.
& et Sf(f. A~ to tiH' !attN part of the lflth rrntm.l·, Parringt on ob,PI"\'rrl '·A nrw ngr hnd romr n ncl ot hrr cl rrnm~-t hr ngr and
drrnm8 of n miclcllr ela~ . . ~oYerrig:nt~· . . . . Fmm t hr crudr and Ya~t
romn nt ie:-nn:; of t h:11 Yigorou~ ~O\"PI"Pign t ~· emNgc•d r1·rn t tt:dl.1· a
~pirit of rrnli~tir rritiei~m, srrkinJ?: to eYnluatr thr worth of thi~ urw
Amrrira, and di~ro1· rr if po~~iblr othrr philo~ophir~ to takr 1hr
pl:1rc• of tho~r whic·h had p;onr clown in lhr firrrr hattlr~ of th<'"
Cil"il \Ynr." !d., YO!. 2, :1t -1.7-t

n·.
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One can concede that the "sexual revolution" of recent
years is not without useful byproducts in striking layers
of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that "anything goes." and that no regulation of explicit materials
is needed or permissible, any more than civilir.ed people
allow unregulated access to heroin because it is the prime
source of medicinal morphine.
The judgme11t of the Appellate Department of the
Superior Court. Orange County, California., should be
vacated and the case remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is for
the California courts to determine, in the first instance.
whether the California obscenity la \\'S, as construed and
applied, meet the standards enunciated today by this
Court.
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MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opnnon of
the Court.
This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography"
cases being reviewed by the Court in a re-examination
of standards enunciated in earlier cases on what Mr.
Justice Harlan called "the intractable obscenity problem."
Interstate Circuits, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704.
Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called
"adult" material After a jury trial he was convicted
of violating California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a misdemeanor, by willfully and knowingly distributing obscene matter. 1 Appellant's conviction was specifically
The California Penal Code reads in relevant part:
"§ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution;
printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within
state
"(a) E\·ery person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent,
or brings or causes to be brought , into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exihibits, di~ tributes,
or offer::; to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
"§ 311. Definitions
"As used in this chapter :
" (a) 'Obscene matter' means matter, taken as a whole, the pre1
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on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail in an envelope
addressed to a restaurant in Ne\\'port Beach, California.
The envelope 'vas opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not requested the brochures; they complained to the police.
The brochures advertise four books entitled "Intercourse," "l\1an-\Voman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film entitled "Marital Intercourse." While the brochures condomin:111t appeal of \Yhich to the :n·eragr prr,;on, appl,,·ing contrmporar~· ~tandard~, i~ to prmirnt in I rrr~t. i. e., a shameful or
morbid intcrr~t in m1dit~·, >:rx, or rxcrrtion: and iN mattrr \\·hich
taken a::; a wholr goes suh"tnnti:lll.'· hr,,·oml cu~tomar)· limits of
candor in dC'sc·ription or rC'prC'senta lion of such nwl tcr~: and is
mal trr which taken as a wholr is ut terl~· wil bout rrdreming social
importnnce.
"(1) The predominnnt nppcal to prmient intrrest of thr m:1tler
is judgrcl \\·ith refrrence to :1\'eragr nclul!N unlr~~ it npprarH from
thr nature of thr mattrr of the rircllm~tancr;; of ils di,~emination,
di,trilmt ion or exhibition, t hnt it i~ clr~ip;nrd for clen rl~· clrfi ned
de,·iant sexual group~. in which cnse the predomin:mt app<'al of
the mattrr shnll be jmlgrd wilh rcfNence to its intended rccipirnt
group.
"(2) In prosecutions under thi~ rlwptrr, where circumstancr.~ of
production, prrsentat ion, sale, cli~semin:ll ion, di~trilml ion, or publi<'il y
indicaiC' th:1t mattrr is being rommcrcinll~· exploilrcl b~· th<' clrfrndant for the ~:1ke of it~ prurirnt appr:d, ~nrh o,·idenre is prohatiYo
with rr~pcct to thr nature of tho matler aml ran jn~tif~· thr conclusion that the mattrr i~ ullerly without reclremillg social importance.
"(b) 'l\ latter' me:m~ an~· book, magazine, 11C'\\'"J1apcr or other
printed or writ t <'n mat erial or an~· pir·lnre. dr;nYing, photo).!;r:qJh,
mot ion picture, or other pictorial rrprr~enl Mion or an~· ~t nlue or
other fignrr, or nn)· rC'corcling, transcription or meehnnical. C'll<'ll1ical
or electrical rcprodudion or an~· olhrr arliclr:', equipment , machim's
or materials.
"(c) 'Person' mean~ any indi,·idual, 11:Lrlner~hip, finn, a"'t)('ialicm,
corporation or other legal entity.
"(d) 'Distributr' mean" to tran~fer pos~r~'<sion of, wlJCthcr wiLh
or without eonRicleration."
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tain some descriptive printed material, primarily they
consist of pictures and clra"·ings very explicitly depicting
men and \YOmen in groups of two or more engaging in a
variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed.
I
This case involves the application of a State's criminal
obscenity statute to a situation in " ·hich sexually explicit
materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action
upon unwilling recipients \Yho had in no way indicated
any desire to receive f'uch matE'rials. This Court has recognized that the States have a lcgi tim ate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material, ~
2 This Comt h.1~ ckfinrcl "ob~rrnr mntrrinl" rtR "mntrrinl whirh
deaL" with ~c·x in a m:mner appraling; to pmrirnt intrrr~t." R(lth
Y. Unitrd States. 354 U. S. 476, 4~7 (19.57). hut the Roth clrfinition
clors not rrnrrt thr ])rrri~c meaning of "ohsrrnr" ns trnditionall.v
u~rcl in the Engli"h lnnguagr. DNiYrcl from 1hr Lnt in obsrarnum.
of filth, "ob>:rrnr" is drfinrd in thr '\Vrb"trr's New Intrrnational
Dirtionnr~· (Unnhriclgrd. 2d rd .. 19!i~) n~ "ofTrn,ivr to ia~tr: fmd:
lo ath~omr. di"gu,ting . . . offrn~iw to rhaRtit~· of mind or to
mod rot~·: rxprr~O'illg or pre,.;rnt ing to 1hr mind or Yirw "omcthing
that drlirac)·, pmit~ · and decrnry forbid to he exposed; lewd ;
inclrrrnt: as obsrrnr language, danrrs, images." Tbr authoritat i\'C'
Oxford Engli~h Dictionary (1933 rd.) give" a "imilar definition ,
"offrnsi,·r to thr "rnscs. or to taste or refinement: cli~gu"ting , rrpulsi,·r. filthy, foul, nbominable. loath~ome."
Thr material \Ye are cli~ru~~ing in thi~ ra~e i ~ more :trcuratrly
defined as "pornograph~·" or "pornographic material." "Pornograph~·" deriye,; from the Greek (porn!>, harlot and (J1'Q7Jhos. to
write). The word now mran~ "1. Description or portra~·:t! of pro~
titutr~ or pro~! it ut ion. 2. Ob~rrnr or licrntiou ~ 1niting. paintintr. or the likc." 'Veh~trr'" Ne\\' International Dirtionnr~·. supra.
Pornographir mnterinl which is ob~rrnr forms a sub-group of all
"oborrnc" expression, but not the wholr. at lea~( as the word "obscene" is now used in om l:mguagr. We note. thrrrforr, that the
words "obscene material" a~ used in thi~ cacc haYe ::t sperifir judicial
mraning whirh elates from the Roth case, i. e., ob~crnr matcri:tl
"which deals with srx." Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 487. Sec also·
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particularly when the rnodc of dissemination carries with
it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of
unwilling recipients or of ex osure to juveniles. Staney v.
eorgw,
4 U. . 557, 56 ; e rup v. New
York, 386 U. S. 767, 769; Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 468-470. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 641-642; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 88-89;
Prir1ce v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 169-170. Cf.
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 382-383; Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 464-465. It
is in this context that we are called on to define the
standards which must be used to identify obscene materials within the power of the State to regulate. See
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476.
By way of background, it is helpful to recall that,
apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no
majority of the Court has at any given time been able
to agree on a standard to determine what is pornographic
or obscene material subject to regulation under the police
power. See, e. g., Redrup v. New Y ark, 386 U. S. 767
(1967) . We have seen "a variety of views among the
members of the Court unmatched in any other course
of constitutional adjudication." Interstate Circuit,
supra, 390 U. S., at 704-705 (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting). 3
A. L. I. Model Penal Code, § 251.4 (I) "Obscene Defined." (Official Draft, 1962.)
3
In the absence of !J majority Yiew, this Court was compelled
to embark on the practice of summarily rever~ing conviction~ for
tl1e dis~emination of material~ that at lcn~t five mPmb:'r,.; of
ilw Court, npplying their 8eparate test~, found to be protected
by the First Amendment. Redrup Y. New York, 386 U. S. 767.
Thirty-one ca~es haYe been decided in this manner. Beyond the
nece~::>ity of rirrumst:Jnce::, howrYer, no ju::>tification has ever bern
offered in support of the Rrdrup "policy." See Walker v. Ohio, 398
U. S. 43-1 (di~RC'nt). The Redrup prorrdure has cast us in the role
of an unre\·icwable hoard of cen~or::;hip for the 50 State~, subjcetively
judging each picre of material brought before us.

I
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The view attracting the most support at any one time,
but never a majority, has been the tripartite test articulated by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas, in Memoirs Y. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 418. That opinion stated:
"We defined obscenity in Roth in the following
terms: '[W]hether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest.' 354 U. S., at 489. Under
this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases,
three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
sex; (b) tho material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value." 383 U. S., at 418.
The case we now review was tried on the theory that the
California Penal Code § 311 incorporates that threestage test. But now the Memoirs test has been abandoned as unworkable by its own author 4 and no memberof the Court today supports the Memoirs formulation.
We reverse and remand this case for reconsideration
in light of standards adopted today by the Court.
II

This much has been categorically settled by the Court,.
that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 475. "The First
and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as
ab::.olutes." Brear·d Y. Alexandria., supra, 341 U. S. 622,
1 See the opinion of MR. JuoncE BHENNAN in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton,- U . S . - , - - - - (Hl73).
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at 642, and cases citecl

~"'"' Tr.o~"'-_._.__~---- _ _ _

----

(1) the work taken as a whole has a predominant appeal to the prurient
interest, Roth, supra, 354 U.S. , at 498, (2) that the work portrays
specifically defnied physical conduct in a fundamentally offensive way,
and (3) that the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific content.
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values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment arc adequately protected by the ultimate
power of appellate courts to conduct an independent revicm of constitutional claims when necessary in particular cases. Sec Memoirs Y. J.lf assachusetts, 383 U. S.
413, 455 (dif'senting opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U. S. 184, 203 ( dis:::enting opinion); Roth v. United
Slates, 354 U. S. 476, 306 (concurring and dissenting
opi11ion).
\Vc cmphasiw that it is not our function to propose
regulatory schemes for the States. That must await
their concrete lcgislati ve efforts. It is possible, however,
to give plain illustrative examples of prurient physical
conduct.
(a) Fundamentally offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated.
(b) Fundamentally offe11sive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the human body, such as suggestive or
sexually inviting postures focused on the genitals.
Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit
on film or in pictures any more than they can be exhibited
without limit in open public places. 7 At a minimum, such
exhibition must have serious artistic or scientific justificaAlt.hou~h we a rr not pn:~rnt ed hrre with tlw problem of re~u
lating public lewd phy~irnl conduct itHelf, thE' Statef' h:wc greater
power to regulate noll\·erbal, ph~·~ical conduct than to suppre~s
pictorial or three-dimcmionnl repre~entntion;; of the ~ame behn\·ior.
~uch state regulation "is sufficiently ju:;tified if . . . il further<:~
an important or ~ub:-;tantial ~o\·emmrnt inlere"t; if the gon'rnmrnt intrre~t is unrPiatecl to thr ~UPJlre~~ion of free expre~~ion;
:mel if the incident a! re~trirtions on allc~rd Fir.•t AmPndment freedoms i~ no p;rratrr than is r~~rnlial to the furtherance of that
interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377. See·
California v. LaRue, U. S. (slip opinion, at 8-9) (71-36)7

(Dec. 5, 1972).

['"om
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tion. Medical books for the education of physicians and
related personnel, for example. necessarily use graphic
illustrations and descriptions of human anatomy. In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact ancllaw,
we must continue to rely on the jury system, accompanied
by the safeguards that judges. rules of evidence, presumption of innocence and other protective fea.tures provide, as we do with rape, murder and a host of other
offenses against society and its individual members.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, author of the opinion of the
Court in Roth, supra, Jacobellis, supra, Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U. S. 436, Mishkin v. New York, 383
U. S. 502, 510, and Memoirs, supra, has abandoned his
former position and now maintains that no formulation
of this Court, the Congress, or the States ca.n adequately
distinguish obscene material unprotected by the First
Amendment from protected expression, Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, U. S. (1973) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Paradoxically, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
concedes that suppression of unprotected obscene material is permissible to avoid exposure to unconsenting
{)___ adults, as in this case, and to juveniles, although he gives
~ indication of how the division between protected and
nonprotected materials may be drawn with greater precision for these purposes than for regulation of commercial exposure to consenting adults only. Nor does he
indicate where in the Constitution he finds the authority
to distinguish between a willing "adult" of 22 and a willing "juvenile" of 20.
Under the hol-dings announced today, no one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials depict or describe fundamentally offensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically
defined in advance by the regulating state law, as
written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific
prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such
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pornography that his public and commercial activities
may bring prosecution. If the inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision 8 removes
the power of the State to regulate altogether, then "hard
core" pornography must be exposed without limit to the·
juvenile, the passerby, and the consenting adult alike,
as, indeed, MR. JusTICE DouGLAS contends. Miller v.
California,- U.S.- (1973) (opinion of DouGLAS, J.).
See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 443, 476, 482·
(dissenting opinions of Black, J., and DouGLAS, J.);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (concurring opinion
of DouGLAS, J.); Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 508 (dissenting opinion of DouGLAS, J.). In that contention, however, MR. JusTICE DouGLAS stands alone.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN also emphasizes "institutional
stress" in justification of his change of view. Noting
As MR. JusTICE BRENNAN himself stated in Roth, wpm, 354
U. S., at 491-492:
"Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity
statutes are not precise. [Footnote omitted.] This Court, however,
has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to
the requirements of due process. ' . . . [T]he Constitution does
not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the
language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. . .. ' United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7-8. These
words, applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct
proscribed and mark ' ... boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges.
and juries to administer the law . . . . That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line
on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to
hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. . . .'
/d., at 7. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 624,
n. 15; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc . v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340;
United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 523-524; United States v.
Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396; Hygrade Provision Co . v . Sherman, 266
U . S. 497; Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273; Nash v. United States,.
229 U. S. 373."
8
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that "tho number of obscenity cases on our docket gives
ample testimony to the burden that has been placed
upon this Court," he quite rightly remarks that the examination of contested materials "is hardly a source of
edification to members of this Court." Paris Adult
Theatre, supra, at (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). He
also emphasizes, and we agree, that: "ullcertainty of ...
standards creates a continuing source of tension between
state and federal courts . . . . [ t Ihe problem is that
one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene
until at least five members of this Court, applying various
obscure standards, have pronounced it so."
But today, for the first time since Roth was decided
in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concreto guidelines to isolate "hard core" pornography from
expression protected by tho First Amendment. No\Y we
may abandon tho casual practice of Redrup v. New York,
supra, and provide positive guidance to tho federal and
state courts. This may not be an easy road, free from
difficulty. But no amount of "fatigue should lead us to
adopt a convenient "institutional" rationale-an absolutist, "anything goes" view of the First Amendmentbecause it will lighten our burdens. Any assumption concoming the relative burdens of tho past and tho probable
burden under the standards now adopted is pure speculation. Nor do we remedy "tension between state and federal courts" by arbitrarily clepri ving the States of a power
reserved to them under the Constitution and which they
have enjoyed and exorcised continuously from before
the adoption of the First Amendment to this day. See
Roth, supm, 354 U. S., at 482-48.3.

Ill
Under a national Constitution, fundamental First
Amendment limitations on the po"·ers of the States do
not vary from community to community, but this does
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not mean that there arc, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what constitutes
"prurient appeal'' or "fundamental offensiveness."
These are essentially questions of fact, and this nation
is simply too big and too diverse for this C'ourt to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for
all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the
prerequisite consensus exists. 'Vhen triers of fact are
asked to decide whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards" "·ould consider certain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as
the ultimate factfindcrs in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted jurors to dra\Y on the standards of
their community, guided ahYays by limiting instructions
of the law. To require a State to structure obscenity
proceedings around evidence of a national "community
standard" would be an exercise in futility.
As noted before, this case was tried on the theory that
the California obscenity statute sought to incorporate the
tripartite test of ]!,[ emoirs. This, a "national" standard
of First Amendment protection enumerated by a plurality
of this Court, was correctly regarded at the time of trial
as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case
law. The jury, hmYever, was explicitly instructed that,
in determining whether the dominant theme of the material "taken as a "·hole appealed to the prurient interest" and in determining whether the material "goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor and
affronts contemporary standards of decency," it was
to apply contemporary community standards prevailing
in the State of California. Thus, during the trial, both
the prosecution and the defense assumed that the relevant "community standards" in making the determination of obscenity were those of the State of California,

70-73-0PINION
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not of the entire United States of America. Defense
counsel at trial never objected to the testimony of the
State's expert on community standards or to the instructions of the trial judge on "state-wide" standards.
On appeal in the Orange County Superior Court, Appellate Department, appellant for the first time contended that application of state rather than national
standards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
We conclude that the State's failure to offer evidence
of "national standards" and the court's charge that the
jury consider state standards, was not constitutional
error. Nothing in the First Amendment requires that a
jury must consider such hypothetical and unascertainable
"national standards" when attempting to determine
whether, as a matter of fact, certain materials are obscene
or pornographic.8 It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New
York City. M emoirs v. Massachus etts, 383 U. S. 413,
458-460 (dissenting opinion). Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra,
378 U. S., at 203- 204 (dissenting opinion). Roth v.
Unit ed S tates, supra, 354 U. S. 476, 500-503 (concurring
and dissenting opinion). See also Hoyt v. Minn esota,
8
In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, two Justirrs nrgu cd thnt
npplication of "local" community standards would run the ri,,k of
proyenting dissemination of materials in some places because sell ers
would be unwilling to risk criminal conviction by testing va riations
in st anda rds from place t o place. 378 U. S .. a t 193- 1D5. The use
of " national" standards, ho\Yevcr, n eces~aril y implirs that mat erials
found t olerable in some places, but not under the " nat ionnl" r rit r ria,
will nc\·erthclcss be unavailable where they arc accept able. Thus,
in t rrms of da nger to free cxprrssion , the p ot ential for s upprr~~ion
srems at least as great in the application of a single na tionwide
standard as in allowing clistribut ion in accordamc with lo cal taHtcs,
a point which Justice Harlan often emphaRizccl. See Roth v . ['uitcd
St ates, supra, 345 U. S., at 506.
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399 U. S. 524 (dissenting opinion); Walker v. Ohio, 398
U. S. 434 (dissenting opinion); Cain v. Kerntucky, 397
U. S. 319 (dissenting opinion); O'Meara, Shaffer, Obscenity in The Supreme Court: A note on Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 40 Notre Dame Law., 1, 6-7. People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes and
this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism
of imposed uniformity. As the Court made clear in
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 508-509, the
primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the
standard of "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" is to be certain that, so far as
material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be
judged by its impact on an average person, rather than
a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-or indeed
a totally insensitive one. See Roth v. United States,
supra, 354 U. S., at 489-490. Compare the now discredited test in Regina v. Hicklin (1868), L. R. 3 QB
360. We hold the requirement that the jury evaluate
the materials with reference to contemporary standards
of the State of California serves this protective purpose
and is constitutionally adequate.

IV
The dissenting Justices sound the alarum of repression.
But, in our view, to equate the free and robust exchange
of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation
of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the
First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom. It is a "misuse of the great
guarantees of free speech and free press .... " Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 645. The First Amendment
protects works which have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific content, regardless of whether the
government or a majority of tho people approve of the
ideas those works represent. But tho public portrayal
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of hard core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commcrical gain, is a different matter.
There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the
stern 19th century American censorship of public distribution and display of material relating to sex, see
Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 482-485, in
anyway limitC'd or affcctrcl C'xprcssion of political, scientific. or litC'rary ideas. On the contrary, it is beyond any
question that the era. from Thomas Jefferson to Theodore
Roosevelt, \Yas an "extraordinary vigorous period" not
just in economics and politics, but in belle lettres and in
"the outlying fields of social and political philosophies." 9
\Ve do not see the harsh hand of censorhip of ideasgood or bad. sound or unsound-and "repression" of political liberty lurking in every state regulation of commercial exploitation of human interest in sex. Mn. Jus'l'JCE BRENN AN finds "it is hard to sec how state-ordered
regimen ta.tion of our minds can ever be forestalled."
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra,- U. S., a t (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). But this Court can distinguish commerce in ideas, protected by the First Amendment, from commercial exploitation of pornography and
Sec Parrin~rton, Main Current~ in American Thought, vol. 2,
p. IY, & et SNJ. .\~to the latter part of the 19th crntur.1·, Paning-·
ton observrcl "A nrw ngc hnd rome :1ncl othrr drrams-lhr agr tmd
dreams of a middle class so1·rrPignt~· . . . . From thr crude and Yast
romnntir~ms of that Yigorous soYrrrignt~· emerged rwn(ll;lll.'· a
spirit of rralistir critiei~m, seekiug to eya]uatc thr \rorth of thi~ new
Amerira, nncl discon•r if pos;:;iblC' other philosophies to take the
plarr of tho::;r which hnd gone clown in the fierre battlr~ of ihe
Cid \Ynr." !d .. ,·ol. 2, at 47-L 8rr nl~o ::'llori~on, Comm:1ger, nncl
Lcuchtrnburg, Thr Growth of thr American Republic (6th rd.,
19()9), Yol. 2. nt 107-288; Gnrr;ll~· . Thr Nrw Commom,·calth (196.'1
eel.), 220-385; Pnth~ of Amrrir;m Thought (SehbingN , \Vhifr eel.,
1063 rei.). 105-lHl, 12a--2!)0 (nrtieb br Firming. L<.'rnrr. Coh<.'n,
White, K Ro~tow, Samul'l~on, Knr-in, Tlof~tadtrr); and vVi~h, Sorirty and Thought in Modern Amerit•a (1!).')2 rd.), 337-:3RG.
0
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obscenity. Moreover the control of hard core pornography so as to make it unavailable to nonadults has all
the elements of "censorship" applying only to adults;
indeed even more rigid enforcement techniques may be
called for with this dichotomy of regulation.
One can concede that the "sexual revolution" of recent
years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers
of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no regulation of sexually explicit materials is needed or permissible; civilizerl people do not allow unregulated access
to heroin because it is the prime source of medicinal
morphine.
The judgment of the Appellate Department of the
Superior Court, Orange County, California, is vacated
and the case remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Vacated and rem,anded.
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January 18, 1973

.JUSTIC E WM. J . BRENNAN , JR .

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
RE-: Obscenity Cases
The Chief Justice has circulated Memoranda in
No.
No.
No.
No.

70-2 United States v. 200 Ft. Reels
70-69 United States v. Or ito
70-73 Miller v. California
71-1051 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton

I assume he will in due course be circulating a Memorandum
in the remaining three cases:
No. 71-1134 Roaden v. Kentucky
No. 71-1315 Alexander v. Virginia
No. 71-1422 Kaplan v. California
In light of the views I expressed in my Memorandum in
Paris Adult Theatre, I would, of course, disagree with the
Chief Justice in Or ito, 200 Ft. Reels and Miller. I shall, after
the memorandum in the three remaining cases is circulated,
attempt a revision of my Memorandum in Paris Adult Theatre
to answer the proposals of the Chief Justice in all of the cases.
I contemplate that I'll not be able to complete this for some time.

W.J.B. Jr.

j>uvrmt <!Jcurt cf t4t 'Jllnittlt j5taftg
~asJrmghtn.. ~. <!f. 2LT.;t't.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 19, 1973

Re: Obscenity Cases
Dear Bill,
As I have previously told you, I agree
with your views in these cases. Accordingly,
I join your eight separate circulations of
March 16.
·
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

I

j;uvumc ~ou.rt of tltt ?Jnitdt ,§tales
'Wru;ItiJt!)ton. p. <!f. 20,5)1-,3
CHAMBERS OF"

March 20, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

Obscenity Cases

Dear Bill:
I agree with all eight of your
obscenity proposals.

I am ready to join

each of them.

Sincerely,~'-

T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

Conference

April 16, 1973

'/(), 7:3

Miller v. California and ether Obscenity Cases
Dear Chief:
of

Over the weekend, I reviewed preliminarily your revised drafiB
for the Court in the obscenity cases.

~inions

One point that attracted my attentioo and seems important is the
change in the pr~osed test of "obscene" material. This occurs in
MUler, the ease in which the test is formulated. In the third draft of
Miller, p. 5, the test includes the famUiar Roth requirement:
"That the 'dominant theme of the regulated material
taken as a whole' appeals to the prurient interests, "
R<th, supra . . . "
- The new drafts changed this language (see p. 6 drafts 4 and 5 of
MUler) to read as follows:
''Whether the 'average persoo apply.ing contemporary
community standards' would find (i) that the challenged
material, viewed in Its setting, appeals to the prurient
interests, Rcth, supra. "
On the same page the third portion of the test is articulated in similar

language as follows:
'~3)

that the challenged material, viewed in its setting,
does n<t have serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific content. "

-2I recognize, of course, that no words in this esoteric area can
be free from doubt as to their meaning. The Roth and Memoirs tests
abundantly demonstrated the impossibility of assigning precise meaning
to particular words. The great virtue of your new formulation is to relate the test, overall, to conduct. This, in itself, is a significant clarify~ step.
Yet, I must say that I feel less sure as to the meaning of the
language change from "taken as a whole" to "viewed in its setting." I
am in full accord with the view made clear elsewhere in your opinion that
an otherwise obscene product cannot be sanctified by including fragments
of history, politics or meritorious literature. Yet, I still think juries
should be required to view the work "as a whole, " and not be left free to
condemn a book or a movie on the basis of random selected descriptions
or portrayals offensive to the particular jury. This random selection
technique would conceivably have invalidated a substantial segment of
what is widely regarded as serious and meritorious literary work.
There is also merit, I think, in changing the Roth formulation only
where it must be changed to accord with your basic "conduct" orientation.
I am in full accord with the elimination of the third element in Memoirs,
requiring that the material be "utterly without redeeming social value."
This qualification has been the principal defect in the Roth test, as expanded in Memoirs.
With these thoughts in mind, I wonder if you would be :willine: to
revert to the substance Qf your original formulation ' so that the ba.'~ic
guidelines (Miller, p. 6} would read substantially as follows:
"(1) that the dominant theme of the challenged
material , taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, 3 54 U.S. 489, (2)
that the material portrays specifically defined
physical conduct in a fundamentally offensive way,
and (3) that the challenged material lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific content."
Apart from believing that this terminology is less likely to be misunderstood or abused, I would prefer to see us remain as close to Roth as
we can. You accept Roth as the basic foundation for your opinion, namely,
that the First Amendment does not protect obscene materials. It is Justice
Brennan's opinion that now wishes to jettison Roth, abandoning a substantial

-3volume of constitutional doctrine. There is virtue in maintaining as
much constancy as possible, and I think your opinion is strengthened
by maintaining that posture and, perhaps, even contrasting it with the
radical new departure by the dissenters.
I am not circulating this letter to the Conferenee, as I do not
wish to add further uncertainty at this time. I think, however, that
your original language presents a stronger opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP,Jr.:psf

,jn:prttttt <!fourl of flrt ~b .ibdtg

'JihtgJrington. ~. <!f.

2llgi~.;l

/

CHAMI!IERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 16, 1973

Re:

Obscenity Cases

Dear Chief:
Having reviewed the recent circulations in these
cases, including yours, I am still with you in
No. 70-2, 12 200-Ft Reels, based on your second draft
of April 9; No. 70-69, Orito, based on your second
draft of April 9; No. 70-73, Miller v. California,
based on your fifth draft of April 11; and No. 71-1051,
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, based on your fourth
draft of April 11.
I also join your opinion in No. 71-1422, Kaplan
v. California, based on your second draft of April 9,
as well as your suggested per curiam in No. 71-1315,
Alexander v. Virginia, circulated on April 9.
In view of the changes you have made in your
present circulations, I am inclined to withdraw my concurring opinion circulated in some of the above cases.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

~upr.em.e Cliourt of t~.e ~11it.eo ~tat.es

?Jlffas~ington,

c!EL QI. 20543

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 9. 1973

Re: No. 70-73 - Miller v. California and companion cases

Dear Chief:
I have studied carefully your recirculations of May 8.
I am close to joining you. but I have one primary reservation.
I learned this morning that Lewis entertains the same reservation.
He showed me today his letter to you of April 16. and 1 am free
to state that I am substantially in accord with both points he raises
in that letter.
My concern centers on the revised material on page 7
of the Miller opinion. This. of cou se. is the heart of the obscenity
decisions. Despite the addition of the new footnote 7. I am somewhat concerned -- and Lewis entertains this concern -- with the
descriptions in (1), (2). and (3) in the first full paragraph of that
page. We know what you mean, but each of us wonders whether
the meaning is absolutely clear. I believe our difficulty centers
in the phrase "in its entire setting. 11 This phrase would replace
the familiar Roth requirement that the "work" be "taken as a whole."
Courts and lawyers will be asking themselves (as, indeed both
Lewis and I did) whether the opinion intends to change the rather
fundamental requirement that the challenged work be judged as a
whole rather than fragmented. Doubt as to our meaning would
frustrate one of the purposes of our many months of effort: to
clarify and resolve as many of the present ambiguities as possible.
In addition. if the words "challenged material" in (3) were replaced
by the single word "work." or something similar, I would feel
better. 1 also suggest. mildly, that the last two words of (3) be
expanded to include ''scientific value or context."

- 2If these changes could be made, I am with you. 1
realize that you may !eel I am quibbling. I earnestly feel that
these suggestions will aid in clat"ification, and I suspect that
is what we are all stl"iving for at this point.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

be: Mr. Justice Powell

/
r

I

V

Rider A (Miller)

5-9-73

This phrase woulll replace the familiar

~requirement

that the "work" be "taken as a whole". Courts and lawyers will
be asking themselves (as, indeed both Lewis and I did) whether the

opinion intends to change the rather fundamental requirement ..that
the challenged work be judged as a whole rather than fragmented.
Doubt as to our meaning would frustrate one of the purposes of our
many months of effort: to clarify and resolve as many of the present
ambiguities as possible.
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May 15, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Re:

Obscenity Cases

I have advised the Chief Justice that, subject to some
suggested changes in phraseology, I am prepared to join his
opinions in the following cases:
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

70-73
71-1051
71-1422
70-2
70-69
11-1;n5

Miller v. California
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
Ka£lan v. California
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels
United States v. Orito
Alexander v. Virginia

The Chief advises me that these changes will be made. I
therefore circulate this memorandum to avoid further delay pending
receipt of new drafts from the printer.
Sincerely,

.i;ltpt'mt:t ~xmrl of t!rt ~b .i;taftg
'Jiiag!p:ttght~
<!J. 2ll&l~~

J.

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

May 18, 1973

Re: No. 70-73 - Miller v. California

Dear Bill:
In response to your suggestion, I am quite willing
to change footnote No. 8 on page 8 to read as follows:

'''§_/
Although we are not presented here with
the problem of regulating lewd public conduct
itself, the States have greater power to regulate
nonverbal, physical conduct than to suppress
depictions or descriptions of the same behavior.
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 u.s. 367, 376377 (1968), a case not dealing with obscenity,
the Court held a State regulation of conduct which
itself embodied both speech and non-speech
· elements to be 1 sufficiently justified if • • • it
furthers an important or substantial government
interest; if the government interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expressioa; and if
the incidental restrictions on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 1
See California v. LaRue,
U.S.
(slip
opinion, at 8-9) (71-36) (Dec. 5, 1972). 11
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATmculated : MAY 1 9 1972
No. 70-73
Ma.rvin Miller, Appellant,

v.
State of California.

Recirculated : __~----~---

On Appeal from the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California,
County of Orange.

[May - , 1972]
Memo to the Conference.
Here are my views on the above case. I begin with
the facts.
Appellant was convicted by jury of violating California Penal Code § 311.2, a misdemeanor, by willfully
and knowingly distributing obscene matter. His conviction was based on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the
mails in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California as part of a mass mailing of
such brochures. The envolope was opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother, who then com-·
plained to the police.
The brochures advertise four books entitle "Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film
entitled "Marital Intercourse." While they contain
some descriptive printed material, listings of other avail-~able publications, and order blanks, they primarily con-·
sist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting
men and women in groups of two or more engaging in
a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often promi-·
nently displayed.
An examination of the materials reveals that by a.n y·
standard they are "hard core" pornography of a kind
not protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless,.
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petitioner claims error in that the jury was instructed
to determine the obscene character of the materials with
reference to state-wide, rather than national, standards
of offensiveness.
I
I begin with the proposition that under Roth v. United
States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1957), the First Amendment does
not protect the right to disseminate or engage in other
"public" activities with respect to obscene materials.
Cf. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super Bmm.
Film, et al., ante, at - ; Stanley v. Georg1:a, 394 U. S.
557 (1969). This leaves the difficult problem of how
to identify what is or is not "obscene" and whether
there is but one or a spectrum of standards.
Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case,
no majority of the Court at any given time has been
able to agree on a single rule to describe "obscene"
materials subject to regulation. Sec, e. g., Redrup v.
New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967). In light of this lack
of unanimity, the idea that the Constitution commands,
or that the Court can articulate, a single verbal formula
of nationwide applicability governing every State was
perhaps never more than a wish to find a simple solution to a complex a.nd elusive . problem. The States
should not be forced into a constitutional straitjacket
am61guously verbalized when a maJority of £Ius Court
is una6le to agree on a standard. The critical inquiry,
so far as state prosecutwns are concerned , should b
whether the elements of the state offense arc drawn with
sufficient care to ensure that enforcement of the state
law is clearly focused on materials that portray sexual
activities in a fundamentally offensive way, as distinguished from communication of ideas in works having
literary, artistic, political, or social value. If a state
statute is reasonably limited in this regard, by its terms
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or as interpreted, then First Amendment values, as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
arc adequately served by the additional freedom of appellate courts, including this Court, to conduct an independent review of the record when necessary in particula.r
cases of egregious abuse by state action. See 111emoirs
Y. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455 (1!)66) (dissenting
opinion); Jacobellis v. Oh·io, 378 U. S. 184, 203 (1!)64)
(dissenting opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S.
476, 496 (1957) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
The tripartite test articulated in the plurality opinion
in Memcnrs v. M assachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966), notwiths tana ing certain infirmities inherent in any such
"test," is adequate to achieve that end. That opinion
stated:
"We defined obscenity in Roth in the following
terms: '[Wlhethcr to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant ~heme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest.' 354 U. S., at
48!). Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three ek!_,ncnts must coal~sce: it must
be established that (a) the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly J
without redeeming social value." 383 U. S., at 418.
I

While this verbal formulation satisfies First Amendment requirements, I am not prepared to say that it
is the only satisfactory definition of obscene materials
a State can adopt, or even that it is the best that can
be devised. The unelaboratcd Roth formulation itself
conveys the essential idea that in order to satisfy the
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First Amendment a state regulation must be clearly
aimed at materials portraying sexual activities in a
fundamentally offensive manner. Other "tests" that
a State might adopt could be equally satisfactory.
It is in this framework that appellant's contentions
should be evaluated.
II
This case was tried on the theory that the California
statute incorporates a tripartite test for obscenity substantially identical to that announced in the plurality
opinion in the Memoirs case. The jury was explicitly
instructed! however, ~ in determining whether the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appealed to the prurient interest and in determining
whether the material "goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor and affronts contemporary
standards of decency" they were to apply contemporary
comn111njty standards of the State of California. Bath
the prosecution and the defense tried the ca.se on tho
theory that the relevant "community standards'' in
making the determination of obscenity wore those of the
State of California, not of the United States of America
at large. Defense counsel at trial at no point
objected to the testimony of the State's expert on community standards or to the instructions of tho trial
judge on the ground that "state-wide" standards were
inappropriate. On appeal in the Orange County Superior Court, Appellate Department, appellant for the
first time contended that application of state rather
than national standards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He raises the same contention
here.
In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 ( 1964) , four members of the Court divided on the question whether the
prevailing test for obscenity required materials to be
judged by national or local standards. Since that time,

I
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the Court has not explicitly addressed the issue, and
it has never fully explicated the role it envisaged for
"commm1ity standards" in defining obscene materials
·within the power of a State to regulate under Roth and
subsequent cases. Probably this reflects what has been
the continuing uncertainty among members of the Court
themselves in this perplexing, sensitive and elusive area.
Community standards was not an explicit element of
the Model Penal Code test for obscenity that so strongly
influenced the Court in the Roth and M enwirs cases. 1
In the Roth formulation, community standards appeared
to be linked to determining the general question of the
"prurient appeal" of the materials. But in the later
Memoirs plurality opinion, it was stated to be specifically relevant to the narrower question of "patent offensiveness"-that is, whether the material is "patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters." 383 U. S., at 418. I read this
language as treating dissemination of pornography much
like any other intolerable nuisance found offensive to
a community.
The Memoirs plurality thus recognized that a prima!)"
justification for the long-standing power of States, in
the exercise of the1r pohce power, to regulate "public"
activities with respect to obscene "lnateria:ls-such "7ts
the d1ssemmatwn revealed""by this record-rs their atent
ot:ensiveness to the deeply held standar s regarclin ~
portrayal of sexual matters ;erevailing in the community. fn these terms, the application of the standards
the local community where the dissemination occurs
properly serves the values of the First Amendment, as
the decisions of this Court and others have long assumed. The very instructions before the Court when

or

1
Model Penal Code § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) ,.
§ 207.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957).
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it affirmed the conviction in Roth clearly contemplated
that the jury would apply its own concept of standards
of decency as the "common conscience" of what the
judge referred to as "our community." They were explicitly instructed that they were completely free to
disregard any and all expert testimony as they saw
fit.~ In light of this instruction, it can hardly be sug-

Z,rt._

2 The pertinent instruct ionr-; in Roth wrrr nr-; follows:
"The real disputed is~ue is thr second elemrnt of the offenso-the
nature and character of the circulnrs, book, pictures :1nd publications.
Who dCltermines that issue?

"You, as membe1·s of the jury, are the sole and exclu~ive judges
of the facts, and it is for you to deride, as you decide all questions
of fa.rt.
"What is mrant b~· 'obscrne, lewd. lascivious nnd filthy' and what
standards do you apply in reaching a cletrrmination whether the
pictures, circular~ or hook nrc of thnt charactrr?
"The words 'obscrne, lewd nne! lasci,·ious' as used in the law,
signify thnt form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity and has a trndenr~' to excite lustful thoughts. The matter
must be calculated to corrupt nnd debauch the minds nnrl mornls
of those into whose hands it may fall. It must lend to stir sexual
impulses and lmd to sexual!~· impure thoughts. The test is not
whether it would nrm1~c sexual desires or sexunl impure thoughts
in those comprising a pnrticulnr segment of the cmmmmity, the
young, the immature or thc highly prudiHh or would leave nnother
segment, the scientific or highl.v cducatcd or the so-called worldlywise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoYed. 'Filthy' as used
here must also relate to sexua I. matters. It is dist inguiHhable from
the term 'obscene,' which trnd to promote l.u~t nnd impure thoughts.
'Filthy' pertnins to that sort of treatment of sexunl matters in such
a vulgar and indecent way, so that it tend~ to nrou~e n feeling of
disgust and revulsion.
"The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as :1 whole, not upon any particular class, but
upon all those whom it is likrl~' to reach. In other words, you determine its impact upon the a\·era~;~_e pcr~on in the community.
The book~, pictures nnd circul:i7s must be judged as a whole, in
their entire context, and you arc not to com,icler detached or separate
portions in reaching a conclusion. You judge the circulars, pic-
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gestcd that the trial judge, or this Court 111 affirming
Roth's conviction, expected the jury to apply some
concept of a " national" standard of decency and acceptability in the portrayal of sexual matters. The
t1trPi1 nnd publication~ which have brrn put in evidencr by presentday standards of the community. You ma~· ask your~elves does it
offend the common ron~rienre of thr community by present-day
stand:uds.
"The dcfmdant hrrr has rnlled rrrtain rxprrt witne~ses. Their
testimony has bern admitted for the purpose of showing you what
the rommon conscience of the community is tocl:ty. You are not
bound by it. You are at libe1·ty to arcept or reject, in whole o:r in
part, such testimony, accepting only that portion which commends
itself to your judgment. Thr~e witnesses ~ave their opinions as to
the impart this literature would have on the general public.
Whether or not i hrHe pirtmrs nnd publications are of such a character a~ to stir sexual impnbes or arou~r lustful passions or are
revulsive or dis~nsting must be detrrmined b~· you and you alone,
acrordin~ to the st:mdnrcls I have given you.
"The testimony of an expert witness is treated no differently than
that of any other witne~s. Yon wei~h his or her interest in the case,
possible bias or prrjudire, manner of trstifying, and in general
evaluate the testimony in accordance with your !!;OOd, sound rommon sense and what apprals to ~·our reason.
"The defendant. fllso introduced in evidPnce certnin books, bestsellers, and excrrpts therefrom, as some evidence of the current reading hnbits of the public. I instruct ~·ou whnt wei!!;ht if any you give
to this evidPJH'e re8ts with you. I cnution you you nre not required
to limit yourselws to a consideration of one or all of the books
introduced b~· the defencbnt as exnmples of presrnt-dny standards
of litrra.r~· taste. You may con~ider and compare the number of
people who read these books with the number of people who mnke
up our community, nnd it mny be your judgmc•nt that some or all of
the boob introduced by the defendnnt :1re obscene themselves, in
accordance with the standard I have given you.
"In thi.~ tasr, ladies and gentelmen of tlw juru, you and you alone
are the exclusive judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience you are to consider
the community as a 11•hole, ymwg and old, educated and uneducated,
the religions and the irreligious-men, women and children . . . ."
(Emphasi'J added.)
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jury's assessment of community standards of decency
on the basis of its mvn experience is not fundamentally
different from the use of the "reasonable man" criteria
in other contexts, on \Yhich courts have relied for
centuries.
This view, implicit in Roth, was made explicit in
Justice BRENNAN's dissenting opinion in Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 447-448 ( 1957), in which
he stated:
"In Alberts v. California and Roth v. United
States, decided today . . . , the Court held to be
constitutional the following standard for judging
obscenity-whether to the average person, arplying contem Jorary community standards, the dominan 1eme of the material ta en as a w ole appeals
to prurient interest. . . .
"The jury represents a cross-section of the community and has a special aptitude for reflecting
the view of the average person. Jury trial of obscenity therefore provides a peculiarly competent
application of the standard for judging obscenity
which, by its definition, calls for an appraisal of
material according to the average person's application of contemporary community standards. A
statute which does not afford the defendant, of
right, a jury determination of obscenity falls short,
in my view, of giving proper effect to the standard
fashioned as the necessary safeguard demanded by
the freedoms of speech and press for material which
is not obscene. Of course, as with jury questions
generally, the trial judge must initially determine
that there is a jury question, i. e., that reasonable
men may differ whether the material is obscene."
(Emphasis added.)

J
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Perhaps the most perceptive statement of the role
the jury should
nd the standards it should apply
is that of Judg Hand · his seminal decision in United·
States v. Kenner , 09 Fed. 119 (SDNY 1913). There
he stated:
"Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that which is honestly germane to a
pure subject, however little it may mince its wordsr
still I scarcely think that they would forbid all
which might corrupt the most corruptible, or that
society is prepared to accept as its own limitations
those which may perhaps be necessary to the weakest of its members. If there be no abstract defini-tion, such as I have suggested, should not the wor-d
'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical
point in the compromise between candor and shame
at which the community may have arrived here
and now? If letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense of what is right,
it wouLd seem that f!)uru.. shou~d in each case establish the standard much as they do in cases of
1::;-g[-~,gence. To put thought m leash to the average
consc1ence of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to
fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least
capable seems a fatal policy.
"Nor is it an objection, I think, that such an
interpretation gives to the words of the statute a
varying meaning from time to time. Such words
as these do not embalm the precise morals of an
age or place; while they presuppose that some things
wilt always be shocking to the public taste, the
vague .s ubject matter is left to the gradual develop_)nent of general notions about what is decent.
A }ury is especially the organ w~th which to feel
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the content comprised within such words at any
given time, but to do so they must be free to follow the colloquia.l connotations which they lwve
drawn UJJ instinctively from life and common
speech." 209 Fed. , at 121. (Emphasis added.)

That we have almost instantmlcous global communications, gives no support for the concept that there
exist "national" standards of taste or of what constitutes pornography or obscenity. In a society as diverse
as ours, the notion of a homogenous "national" consensus of what is or is not tolerable in the commercial
exploitation of human interest in sexual matters is completely divorced from reality. Beyond that there is
no rational basis whatever in law, logic, or human
experience to tell us that the people of every State and
community must adjust their ideas of what is decent
in the portrayal of sexual activities to what is found
tolerable in some other and perhaps distant place. The (
Constitution does not demand such Orwellian c<m:
f ~mity to uniform standards of taste. Moreover, as
illustrated by t 1e cone uct of the tnal in this case, it
is difficult enough to ascertain "statewide" community
standards with any degree of certainty and objectivity,
let alone those of the Kation as a whole. Here, for
example, the prosecution relied on a statewide survey,
admittedly not "scientifically" designed, conducted by
a vice-squad sergeant in the Los Angeles Police Department, while the defense relied on the conclusions of its
alleged "expert" based in large part on occasional discussions with relatives a.nd friends. \Vhat either could
contribute that jurors did not know is at best a matter
of dubious conjecture. For rvery other purpose within
the fact-finding function of .~r,ors we treat them as in
a collective sense "ths conscience of the community."
That this is fraught with hazards and difficulties in the
First Amendment area there is no doubt, but that is
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the essence of our system of justice up to now and few
would be so bold as to say the jury system is any less
pcr·fect than other human institutions.
Recognizing these difficulties, Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote in Jacobellis, supra:

"It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth
that obscenity is to be defined by reference to
'communit stan rc s 1 meant commum s an ards-not a national stanc ard, as 1s sometimes argued. Tbelieve that there is no provable 'national
standard,' and perhaps there -;holi'i'C.'i"be no-ne.-At
all eve~ ts, this Court has not been able to enunciate
one, a11d it would be unreasonable to expect local
courts to divine one. It is said that such a 'community' approach may well result in material being
proscribed as obscene in one community but not
in another, and in all probability, that is true. But
communities throughout the Nation are in fact
diverse, and 1t must be remembered that, m cases
such as this one. the Court is confronted with the
task of reconciling conflicting rights of the diverse
communities within our society and of individuals."
378 U. S., at 200-201.

-

I accept this analysis. In a society that prides itself-and properly so-in supporting pluralism and diversity there is no sound reason for the law to say that
what is found tolerable in the portrayal of sexual activities in Los Angeles or Las Vegas must be accepted in
Maine and Vermont. The justification for regulation
of the dissemination of such material is the offense it
gives to the people living in the community in which
the dissemination occurs-not that it might give in
some other community hundreds or thousands of miles
away.
The primary concern of Roth over "tests" and standards was not that the jury would draw simply upon its
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own experience in determining the degree of offensiveness and indecency of the sexually oriented materials
before it, but that they might be swayed by undue
regard for the sensibilities of some peculiarly susceptible
or sensitive member of the community. So far as the
related question of the "prurient appeal" of the materials
was concerned, this was the primary fallacy of the now
discarded and unworkable test of Regina v. Hicklin,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, that permittee! materials to be prohibited where "the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences." A rule permitting regulation of public activities with respect to sexually
explicit materials solely on the basis of their offensiveness to particularly susceptible or weak individuals would
be equally objectionable. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352
U. S. 380 (1957).
An instruction to the jury to assess the materials in
terms of the stan dards of their own community is as
sound to assure that dissemination of such materials
will not be prohibited solely on the basis of the personal predilictions of members on the jury as the "reasonable man" criteria of negligence and other kinds of
cases. It minimizes the risk that the evaluation will
be made on the basis of possible impact on a peculiarly
sensitive person; in so doing the instruction adequately
serves the purposes of the First Amendment.
It should be fully evident from the previous description
of the materials involved in this case that regulation of
their dissemination presents none of the exceedingly difficult problems surrounding attempts to-regulate works
of genuine literary, scientific, educational, political or artistic value, most often presented in book form. Words,\
of course, are poor instruments to convey the distinction \
between legitimate works and the kind of materials involved in this case. But the instructions of the trial
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judge required the jury to find, before reaching its verdict,
not only that the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appealed to the prurient interest of an average
person, but that the material was "utterly without redeeming social value." (I have never been sure just
what this phrase means, but neither-very likely-are
most lay jurors so that we could disregard it without
great risk.)
It is open to dispute whether an inqury into "redeeming social value" should be viewed as a First Amendment
requirement separate and apart from the question of the
"prurient appeal" of the material. See, e. g., M emoiTs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 460 (1966) (WHITE, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, the statement that material
should be "utterly" without redeeming social value is
clearly too sweeping, for its tendency has been to permit
those who would commer cially exploit the market for
matenals portraymg sexual acb v1h es m a fundame'i1tally
offensive and indecent way to insulate themselves from
liability by the formalistic inclusion of some material
th-;t might "6e tliought to n ave some tfvalue,'' but is
usually at best only tangentially relat eCI to the real
matter of interest. Courts have seen patently spurious
"inserts" to season filth with a dash of the race problem~
foreign policy or the evils of "war profiteering." But
such questions are not squarely presented on this record.
Whatever the requirements of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the California statute required the jury to
find not only that the dominant theme of the materials
appealed to the prurient interest, but that it was "utterly" without redeeming social value. Independent review of the record shows the jury's conclusion in these
respects abundantly supported. Under these circumstances, I am unwilling to conclude that the high purposes served by the First Amendment additionally require
that the jury find the materials "patently offensive" when
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judged by some hypothetical and unascertainable "national" standard unrelated to any offense or injury the
dissemination may have caused in the place where it
occurred. The local jury, representing the conscience
of the community in which the activities occurred,
is peculiarly qualified to apply the standards of that
community to the materials and activities involved in
the case before it to determine whether they fall below
what is acceptable and if we do not accept that we condemn the jury system. Its finding that the materials are
patently offensive when judged by community standards,
insures as has already been noted that dissemination of
such materials will not be prohibited unless they are
indeed patently offensive to the average, rather than a
peculiarly sensitive, individual, and serves the purposes
of the First Amendment as well as can be done in this
sensitive area with the blunt instrument of trial by jury.:•
What has been said should demonstrate that there was
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in permitting the jury here to assess the offensiveness of the materials in terms of less than national standards, guided
by opinion testimony of limited value regarding such
standards. The ·ury's own assessment of the evidence
is what is enerall 1 )OSSitive of the vast majorit of
a cases, both civil and criminal. If we are o rely on
:• In Jacobellis, two member~ of the Court nrgucd that application of "lorn!" eommunity sf nndnrd~ would run the risk of preventing dissemination of m:tfrrials nceeptnblc in ~orne pl:lers becnuse
sellers would be unwilling to risk rriminnl c·om·ietion by trsting
variationH in standard~ from pl:.w c to pl:we. Howe\·er , the usc of
"national" standard~ ncce~~arily implie~ that materiab found tolerable in some places, hut not under the "national" criteria will newrthrless be unavailable where thry arc accrptablc. Thus in terms
of danger to free expre~sion, the potential for suppression seems
at least as great in the application of a single nationwide standard
as in allowing distribution in areordancc with local tastes, a point
which Justice Harlan often empha sizrd.

I
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a system of fact-finding by lay juries, we must assume
that in a period of great tolerance generally on matters
of sex the accused will not be convicted in a case of this
kind unless his ·wares and the mode of their dissemination
are in fact patently and grossly offensive to an average
individual in the community. Application of state-wide
standards as seen by lay jurors also served to insulate
the accused from arbitrary action. Indeed the California procedure gave appellant some additional protection beyond what the Constitution requires, by making
sure that individual jurors would be informed of some
objective criteria rather than being confined to their own
experience as to what was acceptable in their community
and State.
The jll!'y here was also instructed that they must determine the "prurient appeal" of the material with reference to contemporary community standards of the State
of California. As the Court made clear in Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966), the primary concern
with respect to the element of "prurient appeal" is that,
so far as material not aimed at a deviant group is concerned, it be judged with reference to its effect on an
average person, rather than its effect on a particularly
susceptible or sensitive person as it 'vould be under the
now discredited Hicklin test. It is clear that the requirement that the jury evaluate the materials with reference
to contemporary standards of the State of California
adequately served this protective purpose.
In the long run this Court cannot act an an efficient ~
Super Censor and the sooner ,.,,.e leave the problem to
the States the better off we and the public will be.

III
In a subsidiary argument, appellant contends that
the State's expert on the standards of California, officer
Shaidell, was not qualified because his testimony was

I

~·
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based on a "patently defective" survey. Appellant
argues that the group surveyed was not representative
of all economic, philosophical and geographical groups
in the State, that the questions asked were not "scientifically" selected to elicit the proper information. and
that the survey was distorted because conducted by a
known police officer.
The record shows that while officer Shaidell acknowledged that the survey was not completely scientific, and
was unable to break down those interviewed into age
and economic groups, he did make a serious effort to
obtain a representative sample of opinion from a "crosssection" of residents of California. The survey sampled
opinions of 1,902 citizens in 18 counties representing
90o/o of the State's population, and was conducted in
both rural and urban a.reas, and among members of
many different religious, fraternal, and civic groups. In
addition, officer Shaidell testified that while he gave
'"quite a bit of weight" to the survey, he gave "a lot
more" to his six years of broad experience while working in the field of obscenity. During that course of
·time, the officer had received over 100,000 complaints
from members of the public regarding dissemination of
materials dealing with nudity and sex, and had traveled
throughout the State as a police department representative talking to groups and individuals concerning their
'feelings about such materials and observing the mateTials being offered to the public. He had qualified as
an expert on statewide standards on 26 occasions in a
period of slightly over a year prior to trial.
Considering the record as a whole it cannot be said
that the trial judge abused his discretion in receiving
the testimony of officer Shaidell as one who was qualified to give an opinion on statewide standards; and
there is no basis for a conclusion that receiving that
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testimony was an error of constitutional dimensions.
Cf. United States v. Augenbl-ick, 393 U. S. 348 (1969).
Indeed, his qualifications compared quite favorably
'with those of the experts tendered by the defense. Any
deficiencies in the basis for Shaidell's opinion were, of
course, fully open for defense counsel to bring to the
attention of the jury on cross-examination and in closing
argument. Indeed, in large measure the complaints regarding his testimony are merely inescapable consequences of any attempt to ascertain so elusive a matter
as a "community" or "state-wide" standard on matters
of decency, with any degree of precision. We may
assume that the jurors assessed all of the expert testimony in light of their own experience regarding standards of acceptability in their community and State ..
There is nothing remarkable in this; jurors doubtless do
this with respect to expert testimony on land values and
other subjects. Such an assessment unguided by any
expert testimony would adequately have served First
Amendment purposes. The additional guidance provided by officer Shaidell was certainly not so lacking
in foundation as to create a constitutional error.
Appellant also argues that the federal laws punishing mailing or advertising by mail of obscene materials
have pre-empted state prosecutions for distribution of
obscene materials through the mails. 18 U. S. C.
§§ 1461, 1463. Roth itself strongly suggested, however,
that state statutes regulating dissemination of obscene·
materials, whether through the mails or otherwise, do·
not pose the type of direct physical interference with
or immediate burden on the performance of the postal
function that might support a. finding of pre-emption
under the Supremacy Clause. 354 U. S., at 493-494.
The prosecution here certainly involved no interference
with the operation of the postal service. There is no.
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reason to suppose the Congress expected or desired the
federal mailing statutes to supplant the operation of
state and local laws in this area of primary local responsibility and concern. See Huron Portlm1d Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960); Head v.
New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963).'
Finally, appellant argues that he has been subjected
to the application of an Ex Post Facto law. At the time
appellant committed the offense involved in this case,
the California Penal Code defined "knowingly" for the
purpose of a ~ 311.2 prosecution as "having knowledge
• Appellant al~o ar~u~ that , rntirrl~r npart from the Fir~t Amrndment or any fedrral pre-rmption, thr Commrrrc Clau~r of it~ own
force prohibits application of varying standard~ for ob~ccnity from
State to State because of the drlcterioul' effect such varying l'tandards could h:n-e on inter~ta tr commerce in ~Hc·h ot lwrwi~e nonprotected materials. No sueh i~~ue is presented by this rnsr, for
1hero is no indiration that nppellant 's materinb were rvrr di~trib
Htrd inter~tate. But the argmnrnt would nppr~1r without sub~t:uwr
in any e\·C'nt. Matrrial" of nn ob~renc ehnrncter that mn~· bo
validly pro"cribcd by a Stnte in the exerrise of itH power to protrct
the health, "afC'ty, and g<'nrrnl welfare of its population hnn~ Jl<',·er·
been thought to be le~~:it imate ~ubjrrt~ of intrr~tate ronunrree.
Such materials arc no morr entitled to the protection of the Commcr·re Clau~e than materials hnzardou· to the hralth or ;:afrt~' of
the citizens of a State enn if thry are not found object ionablr in
the Stnte of origin or othrr plarc~. Ab~ent nn:v effort to bmdrn
intrr"tnte commrree to obtain n local rror1omic advnntagr, the
exerri;.e of thr traditional!~· lo<'nl power to prr,·rnt di~;:rmination
of ob"cenc mnteri:d" not protretrd b~' the Fir~t Amrndmrnt rai'r~
no ~ub~tantinl is~u<' , de~pite i'omr po~~ible inridentnl rffcrt on the
flow of such matrrin.ls aero~~ stntr lin~. SC'e, e. g., Ilead v. New
Jlfc:rico Boar·d, 374 U. S. 424 (1963); lhtr·un Portland Cempnt Co_
Y. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960); Beard ,.. ('ity of Alrxandl'ia, 341 U. S. 622 (1951); JI. P. Hood c~· Sons v. D1ulfond,.
336 U. S. 525 (1949); Bald·ll'ill v. G. A. F. Secli11g, 294 U. S. 511,
525 (1935); Slight v. Kirktcood, 237 U.S. 52 , 59-60 (1915).
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that the matter is obscene." After the commission of
this offense, but prior to appellant's trial, the Penal Code
was amended to provide that "knowingly means being
aware of the obscene character of the matter." At trial,
the jury was instructed not only in the language of the
statute in effect at the time of the offense, but also that
"knowlingly ... imports a knowledge of the contents of
the material, and being aware of its obscene character
or nature." (Emphasis added.)
On the basis of this instruction, appellant contends
that a more liberal definition of knowledge added to the
Penal Code after he committed his offense was improperly
applied at his trial, in violation of the prohibition against
Ex Post Facto laws. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10. The record conclusively shows, however, that the new statute
was not applied at appellant's trial. Instead, it is clear
that the instruction quoted was based on California cases
interpreting the version of the Penal Code in effect at
the time appellant committed his offense. See People
v. Pinkus, 256 C. A. 2d 941, 63 Cal. Reptr. 680 (App.
Dept., Superior Court, Los Angeles 1967); People v.
Campise, 242 C. A. 2d 905, 51 Cal. Rptr. 815 (App. Dept.,
Superior Court, San Diego, 1966). Thus, appellant was
not subjected to trial under a new legislative definition
of knowledge enacted after he committed his offense, but
only to an instruction based on prior judicial interpretations of the statute in effect at the time of his offense.
The prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws applies only
to retroactive legislation, and is therefore inapposite here.
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1944); James
v. United States, 366 U. S. 213, 241 (1961) (concurring
and dissenting opinion); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S.
309 (1915); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 389. And, it is
clear that there was no problem of due process warning
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here comparable to that involved in the Bouie case, for
the prior state decisions on the question, previously cited,
were in accord with the instructions given at appellant's
triaU
r. In his jurisdictional stntemcnt, appellant also contended that hehad bt?en subjected to double jeopardy by his rorn-iction, undrr
tho Court'!:i drci~ion in Ashe v. Steenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970).
Particularly, he claimed that he had previous!~, brrn pro~rcuted in
a mnnici11al court in Los Angeles County for dit<tributing the same
brochures that arc thE' subject of the present Orangr Count~' prosecution to a different individual. Appellant contended thnt. in tho
Lo~ Angeles Count~· case. the trial judge had grnntt?d his prctrial
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the material<~
"·ere, as a matter of law, not obscenE', and argued that the State
\\"US therefore collaterally e 'topped, as a constitutional matter, from
claiming the materials to be unprotected in the present case.
That claim i~ not free from doubt, involving a~ it docs a claim
that the Constitution precludes the State from relit igating a lcgal
determination of a court of lt?sser jurisdiction in a subsequent criminal prosecution basE'd on a separate criminal act. against an e11tirely
diffcrent victim. There is no need to rench this issue, however, as
it is not properly presented on this record. In the state appellate
court, its motion to affirm in this Court, and in its brief on the
merits, the State has consistently a~erted that the issue was not
properly presented in the state courts, bt?causc appellant pleadcd
"not guilty," instead of "once in jeopardy" a required under
California Penal Code § 1017 (4). As the Californin appt?llate
court affirmed appellant's conviction without opinion, it is not
absolutely certain that it ncceptcd this argument, but a reYiew of
California cases reveals strong authority that a plea of former
jropardy under § 1017 (4) i the proper and rxrln~ive mode
of raising such an issue, and that it is waived if not so raised nnd
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. E. g., In re Ilarron,
191 Cal. 457 (1923); People v. Fairchild, 254 C. A. 2d 8.'31, G2 Cal.
Rptr. 535 (1967); People v. Garcia, 166 C. A. 2d 141, 3:33 P. 2d
69 (1958). The record docs indicate that appellant rai~ed this
contention by motion to strike the complaint prior to trinl. But
tho California cases are to the effect that such a motion is not a
proper substitute for the plea required by the Penal Code. Sec
People v. Martinson, 179 C. A. 2d 164, 3 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1960);
People v. Mims, 136 C. A. 2d 828, 289 P. 2d 539 (1955); sec gCJJ-
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erally Witkin, Calif. Criminal Procedure, § 244 (1963). Moreover,
on ornl argument the State represented without contradiction that
appellant presented no evidence on this motion and tJ1at there wa s
no hearing on it.
Appellant has at no time responded to the State's contention that
this question was not properly raised in the California courts, and
indeed has neglected to address any portion of his brief on the
merits to this issue. Under the circumstances, and considering
that this issue is not, in m1y event, a proper subject for an appeal,.
it is unnecessary to reach or decide this matter. See, e. g., Mishkin
v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 512-514 (1965).
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This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography''
cases being reviewed by the Court in a re-examination
of standards enunciated in earlier cases on what Mr.
J ustice Harlan called "the intractable obscenity problem."
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704
(1968) .
Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called
"adult" material. After a jury trial, he was convicted
of violating California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a misdemeanor, by willfully and knowingly distributing obscene matter/ and the Appellate Department, Superior
At the time of the commisswn of the alleged offense, which wa;,
prior to June 25, 1969, § 311.2 (a) and § 311 of the California Penal
Code read in relevant part :
''§ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution ;
printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within
state
"(a) Every person who knowingly : sends or causes to be sent,
or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribu1
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Court of California, County of Orange, summarily affirmed the judgment without opinion. Appellant's conviction was specifically based on his conduct in causing
tion, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exthibits, distributes,
or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter, is
guilty of a mtsdrmeanor . .. "
"§ 311. Definitions
"As used in this chapter :
"(a) 'Obscene' mean::; that to the avt>rngr pPI'son, applyin!!: eontemporary ::;tandards, the predominant appeal of the matter , taken
a::; a whole, is to prurient interest, i. e., a ::;hameful or morbid intere~t
in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond cu~
tomary limits of candor in description or representation of ::;uch
matters and is matter whJCh ~~ utter!) without redeemin~ HOrta]
importance
"(b) 'Matter' means any book, magazme, new::;paper or othet
printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph ,
motion picture, or other pictorial representation or any statue or
other figure, or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical
or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, macluncs
or materials.
"(c) 'Person' means any individual, partnership, firm, association,
corporation or other legal entity.
"(d) 'Distribute' means to transfer possession of, whether with
or without consideration."
" (e) 'Knowingly ' mean/:i havmg knowledge that the matter tl:obscene."
Section 311 (r) of the Caltforma Penal Code. supra, wa::; amended
on July 25, 1969 , to read as follows.
" (e) 'Knowmgly' means bcmg aware of thr character of the
matter or live conduct. "
See Cal. Amended Stats. 1969, c. 24!:J, § l, p. 598 Desptte petitioner's contentions to the contrary, the record indicates that the
new § 311 (e) was not applied ex post facto to hts casr, but only
the old § 311 (e) as construed by state decisions pnor to the commission of the alleged offense. See People v. Pinkus, 256 C. A. 2d
941, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680 (App. Dept , Superior Court, Los Angrles,
1967); People v. Campise, 242 C. A. 2d 905, 51 Cal. Rptr. 815 (App .
Dept., Superior Court, San Dtego, 1966) . Cf Bouie v. City of
C'olumb~a. 378 t l. S. 347 (1944)
Nor did § ;nu, supra, as au-,
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five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through
the mail in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in
Newport Beach, California. The envelope was opened
by the manager of the restaurant and his mother They
had not requested the brochures; they complaiurd to tlw
police.
The brochures advertise four books entitled "Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated/' and
"An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film en*
titled "Marital Intercourse." While the brochures contain some descriptive printed material, primarily they
consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting
men and women in groups of two or more engaglng m a
variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed.

I
This case involves the application of a State's criminal
obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit
materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action
upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated
any desire to receive such materials. This Court has r~ 
cognized that the States have a legitimate mterest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene matenal
phed, create any " rhn•et, illlJTIPdmtP burdt-11 011 the perforlllalH'v
of postal functiOn;; ," or mfnng<' on congr<>:;sional comm<>rce power~
under Art. 1, § 8, cl . 7 SeC' Roth v. United 8tates, :354 U S 476 ,
494 ( 1957) , quoting Railway 111 ail Assoc. v. Corsi , :326 U. S. 88, 9ti
(1945); !d., 354 l l. S., at 504 (Harlan , .J., dJ:,;:,;elltmg) . SeC' abo
Mishktn v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 506 ( 1966) ; Sm!th v . CaMorma .

361 U. S. 147, 150-152 (1959)
2 This Court has defined "obscene material" as "matenal whiCh
deals With sex Ill a manner app<>aling to prunC'nt mterC'st," ltoth
v. Unit ed States, 354 U. S. 476, 487 (1957) , but the Roth defimtwu
does not reflect the precise meaning of " obscene" as traditionally
used in the English language. Derived from the Latin obscaenum,
of tilth , " obscene". iR drfined m tlw Web~ter';; New TnternationR)
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when the mode of dissemination carries with it a sig:..
nificant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling
:recipients or of exposure to juveniles. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 567 (1969). Ginsberg v. New York,
3'90 U. S. 629, 637- 643 (1968). Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. Dallas, supra, 390 U. S., at 690 (1968). Redrup v.
New York, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1969). Ginzburg v.
Unite:d States, 383 U.S. 463, 468-470 (1967). Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1963). Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 502 ( 1952). See Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313, 317 ( BuRGEH , C. J., concurring)
(1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 360-362
(MARSHALL, J. , concurring) ( 1971) ; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-642 ( 1951); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 169- 170 (1944). Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352
Dictionary (Unabridged, 2d ed., 1958) as "offensive to taste; foul;
loathsome, disgusting . . . offensive to chastity of mind or to
modesty; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something
that delicacy, purity and decency forbid to be exposed; lewd ;
indecent ; as obscene language, dances, images." The Oxford English
Dictionary (1933 ed.) gives a similar definition, "offensive to the
senses, or to taste or refinement ; disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul,
abominable, loathsome."
The material we are discussing in this case is more accurately
defined as "pornography" or "pornographic material." "Pornography" derives from the Greek (pome. harlot, and graphos, to
write) . The word now means "1. Description or portrayal of prostitutes or prostitution. 2. Obscene or licentious writing, painting, or the like," Webster's New International Dictionary, supra.
Pornographic material which is obscene forms a sub-group of all
"obscene" expression, but not the whole, at least as the word "obscene" is now used in our language. We note, therefore, that the
words "obscene material," as used in this case, have a specific judicial
meaning which derives from the Roth ca~e, i. e., obscene material
"which deals with sex." Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 487. See also
A. L. I. Model Penal Code, § 251.4 (l) "Obscene Defined." (Official Draft, 1962.)
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U. 8. 380, 382-383 (1951); Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U. 8. 451, 464-465 ( 1952). It is in this context that we are called on to define the standards which
must be used to identify obscene material within the
power of a State to regulate consistent with the First
Amendment as applicable to the States through the Four•
teenth Amendment.
The dissent of MR. JusTICE BHENNAN reviews tlw
background of the obscenity problrm, but since tlw
Court now undertakes to formulate standards more concrete than those in the past, it is useful for us to focw,
on two of the landmark cases in the somewhat torturPd
record of the CQJJrt.:s obscemty decisions. ln Roth v
United States, 354 U. 8. 476 ( 1957), the Court sustained
a conviction under a federal statute pUtushmg the marlmg
of "obscene, lewd , lascivious or filthy .. " matenals. Tlw
key to that holding was the Court 's reJrctwu of the claim
that obscene materials were protected by tfw First
Amendment. Five JustiCes JOined 111 the oplllion statrug .
''All Ideas havmg even the sllght<'st redeem!llg
social importanee-unu~'thodox 1deas. eon troversral
Ideas, even Ideas hateful to tlw prevailing climat.<'
of opinwn-have full protPctwu of the l First
Amendment] guaranties, unless excludable because
they encroach upon thr limited arra of more im portant mterests. lFootnote omrtted.j But mlplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
reJection of obscemty as utterly without redeem~
s~~e.
Tlus is the same Judgmen t expressed by this Court in Chaplinsky v New
Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572
"
There are certain well defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, t,lw preven tion and punishment of which have never been
t,hought to rarse any Constitutional problem.

.·
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These include the lewd and obscene. . . .

It has

essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step Lo truth that
any benefit that may derived from them is
.clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality . .. .' I Emphasis by Court
in Roth opinion.]
"We hold that obscenity is not within the arC'a of
constitutionally protected s]weeh or press. " :354
U. S., at 484- 485.
J

Nine years later in Memoirs v. Massachusetts , 383 U.S.
413 'o966), the-court veered sharply away from the
Roth concept and, with only three Justices 111 the plurallty
opinion, articulated a new test of obscemty . The plurality held that under the Roth definition .
" ... as elaborated m subsequent cases, thrC'C' elements must coalesce: it must be establiRlwd that
(a) the dominant theme of t!H' ma tPrial taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) tlw
material is patently offensive because Jt afi'ronts COil temporary community standards relating to tlH' de
scription of representatwn of S('xual matters, and
(c) the material is, utterly without redeeming social
value .'' Jd., 383 r S., at 41R
The sharpness of the break with Roth represented by the
third rlement of the Memoirs test, emphasi~ed by Juf'TICE WHin's dissent, td., 383 U. ~ .. at 461, was further
underscored when the Memoirs plurality went on to
state :
"The Supreme Judicral Court erred m holding that
a book need not be 'utterly worthless before it ca11
br deemed obscene .' A book can not he proscribed

.·
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unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming
social value." (Emphasis in original. ) 383 U. S..
at 419.
While Roth presumed "obscemty" to be " utterly with~
out redeeming ~cia] importance," ~airs re~ired th~t
to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively established
tflat ''the material is ~ without redeeming social
value." Thus, even as they repeated the words of Roth,
the Memoirs plurality produced a drastically altered test
that caiTea OJl the prosecution to pr~ a negative , 1. e.,
that the material was "utterly without redeeming social
value"-a burden virtually impossible to discharge under
our criminal standards of proof. ::-luch consideratious
caused Justice Harlan to wonder 1f "the 'utterly without
redeeming social value ' test has any meanmg at all. '1
M emoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, 3H:~ 1'. ~ .. at 45H
( 1966). See also id., 383 U. :::l .. at 461 ( WHITF~ . .J . (hssenting); United States v. Groner , F. 2d ( shp
opinion , at pp. 5- 8) (May 22. lD?aJ (CA5 107:3 J
Apart from the 1111tial formulatiOn 111 tlw Rolli cast>. no
majority of the Court has at any given time been able
to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes
pornographic or obscene material subJect to regulation
under the States' police power. See, e. g., Redrup v.
New York, 386 U. S. 767, 770-771 (1967). We have
seen "a variety of views among the members of the Court
unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication." Interstate Circuit, Inc v Dallas, supra, 390
U. S., at 704-705 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting) .3 This is not remarkable, for in the area of
8 In the absence of a majority view, this Court was compelled
to embark on the practice of summarily reversing convictions for
the dissemination of materials that at least five members of
the Court, applymg their seJ?a ratf' tests. found to be protected.

.·
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freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious
literary, artistic, political. or scientific expression. This
is an area in which there are few eternal verities.
The case we now rrvipw was tned 011 thr throry that
the California Penal Code ~ :n 1 incorporates tlw thrrcstage Memoirs test, supra. But now the Memo1rs test
has been abandoned as unworkablr by its author' all(!
no member of thr Court today supports th<' Mernmrs
formulation.

II
This much has been categorically settled by the Court,
that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment. Kots v. Wisconsiu , 40H t '. :"'. 2:W, :230 ( 1U72 J
Roth v. Cm'ted States, 354 t'. ~- 475 , 4Hn ( HH)7 J ·• ''Th<'
First and Fourteenth Amendments haw never been
by the First Amendment. Redrup v New Yvrk, :~86 U. S. 767
(1967). Thirty-one cases have been decided in th1H manner. Beyond the necessity of circumstances, however, no JUStificatiOn ha~
ever been offered m support of the Redrup "pohcy." Sre Walker v.
Ohio, 398 U. S. 434, 434-435 (dissPnting opmwn8) (1970). The
Redrup procedure has cast us m the role of an uureviewablr board
of censorship for the 50 States, ~:mbjectivdy .1udgmg pach JlH'CE'" of
material brought before us
4 See the opinion of MR. JusTICE BRENNAN m Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, - U. S. - , - - - (1973)
~ As Ch1ef Justice Warren stated, d1ssentmg, m Jacobetlts v. Ohio,
supra, 378 U. S., at 200 (1963)
"For all the sound and fury that the Roth test has generated, it
has not been proved unsound, and I believe that we should try to
live with it-at least until a more satisfactory definition IS evolved.
No government-be it federal, state, or local-should be forced to
choose between repressing all material, including that within the
realm of decency, and allo~ing unrestrained license to publish any
material, no matter how vile . There must be a rule of reason in
this as in other areas of the law, and we have attempted in the Roth
case to provide such a rule,"

\
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treated as absolutes." Breard v. Alexandria, supm, 341
U.S. 622, at 642 (1951), and case cited. :-lee' Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 C S . 43. 47- .'50 ( 19(H); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, 343 U. S., at 502 (1952) .
We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of
undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State
statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be
carefully limited. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,
supra, 390 U.S., at 682-685 (1968) . As a result, we now
confine the permissible scope of such regulation to wor s
whic
e )ict or escn e sexual eonduct. That conduct
must be specifically efined by th<' applicable statela"",
as . written or authoritatJ vely COllStrucd.n A state offense
must also be limited to works whJCh, taken as a \Vhole
appeal to the prunent mterest in sex, which portray
sexua~ct in a patently offensl.ve way~ch.
taken as a whole, do not have senous hterary, artiStiC,
political, or scientific value .
~for tlw tner of fact must bL~
(a) whether "the average per~on , applymg cotttc'mpurary
community standards" would find that thl' "ork . take11
as a whole, appeals to tlw prunent mterest, K01s v W?sconsin, supra, 408 (T :-l .. at 230 ( Hl72) a nd Hoth v. [' nlfed
6

See, e. g., Oregon Laws 1971, c. 743, Art. 29, § 255, and Hawaii
Penal Code, Tit. 37, §§ 1210-1217, 1972 Hawa1i Sr::>Hion Lnw::;, Act 9 .
p . 32, as examples of :;tate laws dm•ctrd at dep1ct ion of defined
physical conduct, as opposed to expre~s10n . Other ;;tate formulatiOns could be eCJually vahd 111 t h1s r('speet. ln g1vmg the Oregon
and Hawau statutes as examples, wr do not w1sh to be understood
as approving of them 111 nll other respect~ nor a~ establishing their
hm1ts as the extent of state power
We do not hold, a~ MR. .JUH'I'IC'E B~tENNAN mt1mate~, that all
State;; other thnn Oregon and Hawa11 mu:st now enact new ob~cemt~
;;tatutes. Other exi8ting state ~tatute~, ati construed heretofore or
hereafter, may well be adequate. Sec Umted 8tate8 v 12-200 I•' I ,
Reels Ji'ilrn, lJ S (p 7, n ()) ,

.•
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States, supra, 354 U. S., at 489 (1957), (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lackf'
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' If
a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of
appellate courts to conduct an independent review of
constitutional claims when necessary. See Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, 408 U. S., at 232 ( 1972); M ernoirs v.
Massachusetts, supra, 383 U.S., at 459-460 (Harlan, J ..
dissenting) (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 204
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ( 1964) ; New York Times Co . v
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, .284-285 ( 1964) ; Roth v. U'nited
States, supra, 354 U. S., at 497- 498 (Harlan, J ., con ~
curring and dissenting) ( 1'957). We do not adopt as a
constitutional standard the "utterly without redeeming
social value" test of M ernoirs v. M assachuselts, supra,, 383
U. S., at 418 (1966); that concept has never commanded
the adherence of more than three Justices at one tinw .
See pp. 6-7, supra.
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose
regulatory schemes for the States. That must await
their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, however,
to give a few plain examples of what "affronts coutemporary community standards relating to the description
"A quotation from Voltarie m the flyleaf or a book w11l not conredeem an otherwi~e obscene publication." Kois v.
Wisconsin, supra. 408 U. S., at 231 (1972). See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, 38:3 U. S., at 441-443 (Clark, J ., dissenting)
(196-) ; id., at 461 (WHITE, ,) ., dissentmg). We also reject, a~ a
constitutional sta ndard, the ambiguous concept of "social importance." See id., at 462 (WHI'rE .• J. , diRsentmg) .
7

~titutionally
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or representation of sexual matters," Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, 384 U.S., at 418 (1966):
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or
simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals.
Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit
by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public
accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can
be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places."
At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or
description of sexual conduct must have senous literary,
artistic, political, or scientific justification to merit First
Amendment protection. See Kois v. Wisconsi'll, supra,
408 U. S., at 230-232 ( 1972); Roth v. United States,
supra, 354 U. S., at 487 ( 1957) ; Thornhill v. Alabama,
supra, 310 U. S. 88, 101- 102 ( 1940). For exam,Q}e, medical books for the education of physicians and related
personnel necessarily use graphic illustratiOns and drscriptions of human anatomy. In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact and law, we must con tinue to rely on the JUry system. accompanied by the
8
Although we are not prE'sented here with the problrm of regulating lewd public conduct 1tself, the States have greater power to
regulate nonverbal , phy::;icaJ conduct than to suppress depictwns or
descriptions of the same behaviOr In Umted States v. O'Br£en, 391
U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968), a case not dealing with obscenity, the
Court held a State regulation of conduct which itself embodied both
speech and nonspeech elements to be "sufficiently justified if . . .
it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the
government interest IS unrelated to the suppresswn of free expression; and if the incidental restrictions on alleged F1rst Amendment
freedoms is no greater than IS essential to the furtherance of that
interest." See California v. LaRue, 1J S. ·- · (slip opmwn, at
8-9) (71-36) (Dec. 5, 1972) 1
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safeguards that judges, rules of evidence, presumption of
innocence and other protective features provide, as we
do with rape, murder and a host of other offenses
against society and its individual members."
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, author of the opinions of the
Court in Roth v. United States, supra, Jacobellis v. Ohio,
.supra, Ginzburg v. United State<S, 383 U. S. 463 ( 1966) ,
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 510 (1966), and
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, has abandoned his
former positions and now maintains that no formulation
of this Court, the Congress, or the States can adequately
distinguish obscene material unprotected by the First
Amendment from protected expression, Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, U. S. (1973) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Paradoxically, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
concedes that suppression of unprotected obscene material is permissible to avoid exposure to unconsenting
adults, as in this case, and to ju. ve.niles, although he gives
indication of how the division between protected and
nonprotect~d materials may be drawn with greater precision for these purposes than for regulation of commercial exposure to consenting adults only. Nor does he
indicate where in the Constitution he finds the authority
to distinguish between a willing "adult" one month past
the state law age of majority and a willing "juvenile" one
month younger .
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials depict or describe pat9

The mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the
same material does not mean that constitutional rights are abridged
As this Court observed in Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U. S.,
at 492, n. 30 "[I]t is common experience that different juries may
reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of
the consequences we accept under our jury system. Cf. Dunlop v"
United States, 165 U. S, 486·, 499-500/'
·

'•
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ently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically
defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites
will provide fair notice to a dealer in such pornography
that his public and commercial activities may bring
prosecution. If the inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision 10 altogether removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then "hard core" pornography may be exposed
without limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and the consenting adult alike, as, indeed, MR. JusTICE DouGLA:s
contends. Miller v. California, U. S. (1973)
(opinion of DouGLAS, J.). See United States v. Thirty
Seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 379- 380 (dissenting
opinion of Black, J., joined by DouGLAS, J.); Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 443, 476, 482 (1966) (dissent10

As MR. JusTICE BRENNAN stated m Roth v. Umted States ,

supra, 354 U. S., at 491-492 (1957)
"Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity
statutes are not precise. [Footnote omitted.] Th1s Court, however,
has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to
the requirements of due process. ' . . [T]he Constitution does
not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the
language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. . . .' United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7-8. These
words, applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct
proscribed and mark ' ... boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges
That there may be marand juries to admimster the law . . .
ginal cases in which it 1s difficult to determine the side of the line
on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to
hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense ... .'
ld., at 7. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 624,
n. 15; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 340;
United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 523-524; United States v.
Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266
U.S. 497; Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273; Nash v. United States,
229 U, S. 373•."

.·
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ing opmwns of Black, J., and DouGLAS, J.); Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion
of DouGLAS, J.); Roth, supra, 354 U. S., at 508 (1957)
(dissenting opinion of DouGLAS, J.) . In that contention,
however, MR. JusTICE DouGLAS now stands alone.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN also emphasizes uinstitutional
stress" in justification of his change of view. Noting
that uthe number of obscenity cases on our docket gives
ample testimony to the burden that has been placed
upon this Court," he quite rightly remarks that the examination of contested materials uis hardly a source of
edification to members of this Court." Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, supra, a t - (opinion of BRENNAN,
J.) . He also notes, and we agree . that "uncertamty
of .. . standards creates a continuing source of tension
between state and federal courts
[ t] he probkm
is that one cannot say with certainty that material 1s
obscene until at least five members of this Court, applying various obscure standards, have pronounced it so.''
It is certainly true that the absence, since Roth, of a
single majority view of this Court as to proper standards
for testing obscenity has placed a strain on both state and
federal courts. But today, for the first time smce Roth
was decided in 1957, a maJority of this Court has agreed
on concrete guidelines to isolate "hard core" pornography
from expression protected by the First Amendment.
Now we may abandon the casual practice of Redrup v.
New York, supra, and attempt to provide positive guidance to the federal and state courts alike.
This may not be an easy road, free from difficulty.
But no amount of "fatigue" should lead us to adopt
a convenient uinstitutional" rationale-an absolutist,
"anything goes" view of the First Amendment-because
it will lighten our burdens.11 "Such an abnegation of
We must note, in additwn, that any assumption concerning the
relative burdens of the past and the probable burden under the
standards now adopted is pure speculation,
11
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judicial supervision in this field would be inconsistent
with our duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees."
Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 378 U. S., at 187- 188 (opinion
of BRENNAN, J.). Nor should we remedy "tension between state and federal courts" by arbitrarily depriving
the States of a power reserved to them under the Con~
stitution, a power which they have enjoyed and exercised
continuously from before the adoption of the First
Amendment to this day. See Roth v. United States ,
supra, 354 U. S., at 482-485 (1957) . "Our duty admits
of no 'substitute for facing up to the tough individual
problems of constitutional judgment involved in every
obscenity case.' !d., [Roth v. United States, supra] ,
at 498; see Manual Enterprises, Inc . v. Day, 370 U. 8.
478, 488 (opinion of Harlan, J.)." Jacobellis v. Ohw,
supra, 378 U. S., at 188 (opinion of BRENNAN , J .J

III
Under a national Constitution, fundamental First
Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do
not vary from community to community, but this does
not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed,
uniform national standards of precisely what appeals
to the "prurient interest" or is "patently offensive."
These are essentially questions of fact , and our natwn
is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for
all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the
prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are
asked to decide whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards" would consider certain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as
the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions,
has historically permitted triers-of-fact to draw on the
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standards of their community, guided always by limiting
instructions on the law. To require a State to structure
obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national
11
community standard" would be an exercise in futility.
As noted before, this case was tried on the theory that
the California obscenity statute sought to incorporate the
tripartite test of Memoirs. This, a 11 national" standard
of First Amendment protection enumerated by a plurality
of this Court, was correctly regarded at the time of trial
as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case
law. The jury, however, was explicitly instructed that,
in determining whether the 11dominant theme of the
material as a whole ... appeals to the prurient interest"
and in determining whether the matenal "goes substan·
tially beyond customary limits of candor and affronts
contemporary community standards of decency" it was
to apply "contemporary community standards of the
State of California."
During the trial, both the prosecution and the defense assumed that the relevant "community standards"
in making the factual determination of obscenity were
those of the State of Calfornia, not some hypothetical
standard of the entire United States of America. Defense counsel at trial never objected to the testimony of
the State's expert on community standards 12 or to the in-·
structions of the trial judge on "state-wide" standards.
On appeal to the Appellate Department, Superior Court
12 The record simply does not support petitioner's contentwn, belatedly raised on appeal, that the State's expert was unqualified to·
give evidence on California "community standards." The expert, a
police officer with many years of specmlizatwn in obscemty offenses,
had conducted an extensive state-widr survey and had given expert
evidence on 26 occasions iri. the year prior to t his trial. Allowing
such expert testimony was in no way error of constitutional climrnsions. Cf. United ·States v. Augenblir:k, 893 U S, :348, 355-:356;
(1969).

~·"'· t
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of California, County of Orange, appellant for the first
time contended that application of state, rather than
national, standards violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
We conclude that the State's alleged failure to offer
evidence of "national standards" and the court's charge
that the jury consider state standards, was not constitutional error. Nothing in the First Amendment
requires that a jury must consider such hypothetical and
unascertainable. "national standards" when attempting to
determine whether c~rtain materials are obscene as a maLter of f~ct. Chief Justice Warren pointedly commented
in his dissent in Jacob ellis v ()hw, supra, :178 U 8 .. at
200 :
"It is my belief that when the Court said in
Roth that obscenity is to be defined by reference
to 'community standards,' it meant community
standards-not a national standard, as is sometimes
argued. I believe that there is no provable 'national standard,' . . . At all events, this Court has
not been able to enunciate one, and it would b<
unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one."

It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of
Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Ve~~:as, or New York City.ta
In Jarob ellis v. Ohw, :37H U. ::3 184 (19()4) , two .Ju::;tJCe::; arguC'd
that apphcation of "local" community standards would run the risk of
preventing dissemination of materials in some places because sellers
would be unwilling to risk criminal conviction by testing variations
in standards from place to place. 378 U. S., at 193-195. The use
of "national" standards, however, necessarily implies that materials
found tolerable in some places, but not under the "national" criteria,
will nevertheless be unavailable where they are acceptable. Thus,
in terms of danger to free expression, the potential for suppression
seems at least as great in the application of a single nationwide
1 :;
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See Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524-525 ( 1970) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U. S. 434
(1970) (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting); id., 398 U.S., at 434435 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S.
319 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting) ( 1970); id., 397 U.S., at
319-330 (Harlan, J. , dissenting); fTnited States v.
Groner,- F. 2d (slip opinion, at ~)- 14) (May 22.
1973) (CA5 1973). O'Meara, Shaffer, Obscenity ill ThP
Supreme Court: A note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 Notre'
Dame Law., 1, 6-7. See also Menw~rs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1966)
Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, 378 U. S., at 203- 204 (Harlan,
J., diesenting) ( 1964).
Roth v. United States, supra,
354 U. S. 476, 505-506 (Harlan, J.. concurring and dissenting) (1957). People in different States vary in then
tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to b<>
strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. As
the Court made clear in Mishkin v. 1\ ' ew York, 383 U.S.
502, 508-509 ( 1966), the pnmary concern with r<'qmrmg
standard as in allowing distribution in accordance with local tastes,
a point which Justice Harlan often emphasized. See Roth v . United
States, supra, 345 U. S., at 506 (1957) .
Petitioner al~o argues that adherence to a "natwnal ;;tandard"
is neces~ary " in order to av01d unconscionable burclem; on thf'
free flow of int<'f~tatl" comm~?rce . " A~ notre! bdore , pp. 2-:3, n. I,
supra, the application of domest1r Htatr policr powl"rs in this cas!"
did not mtrude on any congrr~swnal powrr~ undn Art. l, § H, cl. 7,
for 1here 1::; no indication that appellant',; matl"rial::; wrrr ewr d\::;tributed int~?n;tatr. The argument would apprar w1thout wb::;tance
in any event. Obscrne material may be validly rrgulated b~· a 8tate
\n the E'XerCI~e of its traditwnaJ local power to protrct the general
welfare of it~ populatiOn dP~p1te somr po~~ible mc1clental ~?ffect on
the flow of such matenals aero:;~ state !mE's. Srr, e. g., Ilead v. New
Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co .
v. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960)) ; Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U. S. li22 (1951) ; H . P. flood & Sons v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949) ; Southern Pac!fic Co. v. Anzona, 325 U. S. 711 ,
766 (1945) ; Baldwin v. G . A. P. Seeling, 294 U S. 511 , 525 (1935) ,
Sligh v. Kirkwood , 237 {) S. 52, 59-tlO (1915) .

-..
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a jury to apply the standard of "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" is to be
certain that, so far as material is not aimed at a deviant
group, it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitiv<'
person-or indeed a totally insensitive one. ~ee Roth v,
United Stales, supra, 354 U. ~ .. at 489 ( 1957). Compare the now discredited test in Regina v. Hicklin [1868]
L. R. 3 Q. B. 360. We hold the requirement that the
jury evaluate the materials with reference to "contemu
porary standards of the State of California" serves this
protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate .''

IV
The dissenting Justices sound the alarm of represswu
But, in our view, to equate the free and robust exchange
14
,
Appellant's Jurisdictional statement contends that he was subJected to "double jeopardy" because a Los Angeles County tnal Judge
dismissed, before trial, a prior prosecution based on the same brachum,;, but apparently allegmg expo::;urr:-; at a diffC'fc•nt time in
a diffrrent Hrtt ing. Appellant argur~ that otH'(' matrnal has bc·Ptl
found not to br obscene in one procc>edmg, tlw Stntr ts "collatrralh
estopped" from ever alleging 1t to bP obsccm· m a d1ffrrent proceeding. It is not clear from the record that appeJ!ant proper!)
raised this is::;ue, better regarded as a question of procedural due
process than a ''double jeopardy" claim, m the state court~; below
Appellant failed to addres::; any portion of h1::; bnef on the ment~
to this t::;sue, and appellee eontrnd::; that tlw que::.;t1on wa:s
waived at Ca!tfornia law because 1t was Improperly pleaded at trial
Nor is 1t totally clear from the record before us what collateral effect
the prrtnal di~miHHHI might have under Htate law. Tlw diHITII~<."al wa~
based, at least 111 part, on a fa1lure of thr prosecutton to present
affirmattve evidence required by state law, evtdrncr wluch was apparently presented in this case. Appellant'::; content10n, therefore,
Js best left to the California courts for further considrrat10n on reU. S (1973)
mand. See Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. 8laton, (p.· 5, n. 3) . The 1ssue IS not, m any event, a proprr subject fot
appeal: See Mishkin v New York, 88a U . S. 502, 512-514 (1965),
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of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation
of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the
First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom. It is a "misuse of the great
guarantees of free speech and free press . . ." Breard
v. Alexar~>dria, 341 U. S. 622, 645 (1951). The First ~~
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have I
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, re- /,
gardless of whether the government or a majority of the V
people approve of the ideas these works represent. "The·
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people,'' Roth
v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 484 (emphasis
added). See Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, 408 U. S., at 231
( 1972); Thornhill v. Atabama, supra, 310 U. S., at 101102 (1940). But the public portrayal of hard core s.exual
conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial
gain, is a different matter.1 5
There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the
stern 19th century American censorship of public distribution and display of material relating to sex, see Roth v
Unite.d States, supra, 354 U. S., at 482- 485, in anyway
limited or affected expression of literary, artistic, political,
or scientific ideas. On the contrary, it is beyond any question that the era, following Thomas Jefferson to Theodore·
Roosevelt, was an "extraordinary vigorous period" not
just in economics and politics, but in belle lettres and in
1 5 In the apt word~ of Chief Ju~t1cc Warren, the petJtwner in
this case was "plainly engaged in the commercial exploitation of
the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect.
I believe that the State and Federal Governments can constitutionally
punish such conduct. That is all that these cases present to us,
and that is ali that we need to decide." Roth v. United States, ,
354 U. S., at 496 (concurring opinion) (1957). .
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~'the outlying fields of social and political philosophies."'t 6

We do not see the harsh hand of censorhip of ideasgood or bad, sound or unsound-and "repression" of po... ·
litical liberty lurking in every state regulation of commerci1;~1 exploitation of human interest in sex.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN finds "it is hard to see how state..
ordered regimentation of our minds can ever be forestalled." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, U. S., a t - (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). These doleful
anticipations assume that courts cannot distinguish
commerce in ideas, protected by the First Amendment,
from commercial exploitation of obscene material. Moreover, state regulation of hard core pornography so as to
make it unavailable to nonadults, a regulation which
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN finds constitutionally permissible,
has all the elements of "censorship" for adults; indeed
even more rigid enforcement techniques may be called
for with such dichotomy of regulation. See Interstate
Circuit v. Dallas, supra, 390 U. S .. at 690 ( 196R) 11
16

See Parrmgton, Main Currrnti:l Ill Amcnca11 Thought, vol :.!,,
p. IV, & et seq. A! to the latter part of the 19th century, Farrington observed "A new age had come and other dreams-the age and
dreams of a middle class sovereignty . . . From the crude and vast
romanticsms of that vigorous sovereignty emerged eventually a
spirit of realistic criticism, seeking to evaluate the worth of this new
America, and discover if possible other philosophies to take the
place of those which had gone down in the fierce battles of the
C::ivil War." !d., vol. 2, at 474. See also Morison, Commager, and
Leuchtenburg, The Growth of the American Republic (6th ed.,
1969), vol. 2, at 197-233; Garraty, The New Commonwealth (1968
ed.), 220-335; Paths of American Thought (Schlesinger, White ed.,
1963 ed.), 105-119, 123-290 (articles by Fleming, Lerner, Cohen,
White, E. Rostow, Samuelson, Kazin, Hofstadter); and Wish, So
ciety and Thought in Modern America (1952 ed.), 337-386
1 7 " [W]e have mdicated
that brrau::;r of it:< i:ltrong and
abiding mterest m youth, a State may rrgulate the d1ssrminatlon to
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One can concede that the "sexual •revolution" of recent
years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers
of prudery ftom a subject long irrationally kept from
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no regulation of patently offensive "hard core" materials is
needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow unregulated access to heroin because it is a derivative of
medicinal morphine.
ln sum we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscenP
material is not protected by the First Amendment ..
(b) hold that such material can be regulated by thP
f-ltates, subject to the specific safeguards enunc1ated
above, without a showinp: that the matpnal is "utterly
without redeeming :wcial value, " d . .\f e111oms v ~lassa
chusetts, supra, 383 U. ::::l., at 418 (1H66 J, and (c) hold
that obscenity is to be determined by applying "con temporary community standards ," see Kois v. Wiscon sin, supra, 408 U. S., at 230 ( 1972), and Roth v. United
States, supra, 354 U. S., at 489 (1957), not "uational
standards." Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, :378 U. 8., at,
195 (1964). The judgment of the Appellate Departmellt
of the Superior Court, Orange County , California, is vacated and the case remanded to thaL court for furtlwr
proceedings not inconsistent with the First Amendment
standards established by this opinion. See United States
v 12 200-Ft . Reels. F . ::::l. - . - rim:3J (p . 7. n. ;iJ .

Vacated and remanded for further proceedings

juveniles of, and their access to, material obJectionable as to them,
but which a State clearly could not regulate aH to adults. Ginsberg
v Neu• York, ante, p. ()29 " lnterstair r'm·u!l v Dalla~. supra. :~90.
I ' S . at f\90 ( 19()1-< l
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